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Chytrá zásuvka Shelly Plug M Gen3 v sadě čtyř kusů vyjde na 899 Kč (225 Kč za kus). • Podporuje Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, Matter a vyrábí se v EU. • Shelly milují stavitelé chytrých domácností.

JetBrains is urging customers of on-premise versions of TeamCity to update to the latest version following the discovery of a critical security issue that could result in arbitrary code execution. The vulnerability, assigned CVE-2026-63077 (CVSS score: 9.8), affects all TeamCity On-Premises versions. It has been addressed in versions 2025.11.7 and 2026.1.3. TeamCity Cloud instances have alreadyRavie Lakshmananhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/[email protected]

STAR Labs has published a Linux kernel exploit that turns an ordinary local user into root on the CentOS Stream 9 build it targeted. The flaw, tracked as CVE-2026-53264 (CVSS score: 7.8), is a use-after-free race in the kernel's network traffic-control subsystem.Researcher Lee Jia Jie said artificial intelligence (AI) helped him find the bug and speed up exploit development. This is local Swati Khandelwalhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/[email protected]

Introduction

Mirage Kitten – also known as UNC1549, Smoke Sandstorm, and Nimbus Manticore – is an advanced persistent threat (APT) group focused on cyber-espionage operations against aerospace, aviation, defense, and telecommunications sectors across the Middle East and Africa, using highly targeted spear-phishing campaigns, fake recruitment portals, and custom multi-stage malware to gain persistent access and exfiltrate sensitive data.

During recent threat research, we identified a previously undocumented malware set developed and used by Mirage Kitten. The toolset includes NightLedger, a new Windows backdoor for reconnaissance, command execution, file operations, process discovery, and screenshot capture; and two custom WebSocket-based tunnelers, ArcBridge and BridgeHead, for covert network access and operator-controlled tunneling.

Technical details

Although the initial access vector remains unclear for most malware samples observed in this activity, we saw BridgeHead being deployed during post-exploitation activities in victim environments in Egypt and at a Pakistan-based aerospace and aviation organization. The deployment followed targeted spear-phishing activity consistent with tradecraft we recently documented as part of our private threat intelligence reporting service and publicly reported by Unit 42 and Check Point Research, including the use of highly tailored social engineering lures against selected targets. These lures included recruitment-themed content impersonating trusted brands and hiring platforms, as well as lookalike videoconferencing pages that redirected victims to malicious archives hosted on third-party file-sharing services.

NightLedger backdoor

NightLedger is a recently identified Windows backdoor that we attribute to Mirage Kitten based on code and behavioral similarities to the historical implants developed and used by the group. The implant masquerades as SspiCli.dll and appears to be designed for DLL search-order hijacking, targeting a legitimate AppVShNotify.exe binary. While AppVShNotify.exe does not directly import SspiCli.dll, it imports RPCRT4.dll, which can delay-load SspiCli.dll when it invokes an RPC API that requires authentication. This allows a co-located malicious SspiCli.dll to be loaded while forwarding expected exports to the legitimate DLL.

When started, the malicious DLL creates the mutex A8215357-F99A-44FE-BC65-D8F0434B0C03 to enforce a single running instance. If the mutex already exists, it exits immediately.

NightLedger periodically contacts its C2 over HTTPS, issuing an HTTP GET request to the /edfcvfgbhnjmkqwasderfgg endpoint at the realhealthshop[.]com domain, and uses tjconsultingservices[.]com as a fallback C2.

When a valid C2 response is received, the implant tokenizes the payload using the custom delimiter (#%%#) and passes the parsed fields to its command dispatcher. From a development standpoint, this is similar to TWOSTROKE, a backdoor attributed to the same APT and previously documented by GTIG, whose C2 response is hex-encoded and uses (@##@) as a field separator.

NightLedger supports the following commands:

Command ID Description 1 Gather user and host identity information 3 Execute a process/program 17 List directories 20 Download a file to the infected system 25 Gather host and network information 27 Copy a file 30 Update beacon interval 36 Take a screenshot 43 Load a DLL 56 Kill a process 62 Delete a file 69 Terminate thread 70 Upload file to C2 server via POST request to /qasxcdfvgbhnmyuioplkhnj 75 Enumerate logical drives 90 List processes 93 Collect C:\Windows\debug\NetSetup.log together with process-list output.
NetSetup.log is a Windows diagnostic log generated under C:\Windows\debug\ during domain/workgroup join, unjoin, and related network setup operations.

Command output is returned to the C2 via an HTTP POST request to /wsdefvvbnhyuijkplmbgfrtt.

BridgeHead – a WebSocket tunneler

During our investigation, we encountered a tunnel proxy deployed as unbcl.dll in the %LocalAppData%\Microsoft\VisualStudio directory on a machine in Egypt. We also identified a similar deployment in a Pakistan-based environment, where the tunneling tool was stored as C:\program files (x86)\univpn\promote\libwinpthread-1.dll. The malware dynamically loads advapi32.dll, resolves GetUserNameA, retrieves the current Windows username, converts it to lowercase, and searches for a specific substring in it. This behavior suggests prior reconnaissance was performed within the internal network and the username check is needed to make sure it runs on a specific machine. This is potentially intended to prevent execution of the standalone malware sample inside virtual analysis systems. If the substring is not found, the function returns silently without activating.

If the username check was successful, the tunneler establishes an HTTPS WebSocket connection as follows:

GET /connect HTTP/1.1 Host: smartconnect.azurewebsites.net Upgrade: websocket Connection: Upgrade User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/86.0.4240.75 Safari/537.36 Edg/86.0.622.38

The server responds with HTTP 101 (Switching Protocols) to complete the WebSocket upgrade. After the upgrade, the client sends a binary WebSocket message containing the literal string "token" as authentication. The server must respond within 10 seconds, or the connection is dropped and retried with exponential backoff.

The malware’s next action depends on the HTTP response returned by the server:

HTTP response Description 407 (Proxy Auth Required) Queries supported auth schemes via WinHttpQueryAuthSchemes, selects Negotiate (0x10) or NTLM (0x2) in that exact order, sets Windows SSO credentials (null username/password), retries up to 3 times. 101 (Switching Protocols) Success. Proceeds to WebSocket upgrade and authentication. Other Connection failed. Closes all handles, enters backoff.

This implementation closely mirrors the enterprise proxy traversal logic seen in the backdoor we track internally as Retrograde, which overlaps with tooling publicly reported as MiniFast/MiniUpdate, attributed to the same APT group. The implant is designed to operate through corporate proxy environments by handling HTTP 407 responses, negotiating Windows-integrated proxy authentication with Negotiate preferred over NTLM, retrying with the current user’s SSO context, and falling back to exponential C2 connection retry logic capped at 60 seconds.

Once the WebSocket channel is established and authenticated, the implant functions as a full SOCKS5 tunnel proxy. The C2 server initiates all tunnel connections by sending binary commands over the WebSocket; the implant simply forwards traffic between server‑specified targets and the WebSocket channel. This makes it a relay node: the operator runs tools server‑side, and all resulting TCP traffic is tunneled through the victim’s machine as if originating from the victim’s network.

All tunnel communication uses a fixed binary wire format:

Offset Size Field Encoding 0 1 type Message type (1–9) 1 4 connId Tunnel connection identifier 5 1 flags Status or error indicator 6 2 dataLen Payload length 8 var payload Message data

Every message is at least 8 bytes. Seven message types are actively used:

Type Name Direction Description 1 CONNECT Server -> Client Open a new TCP tunnel to a SOCKS5 target address 2 CONNECT_RESPONSE Client -> Server Confirm the connection was established 3 DATA Bidirectional Relay TCP traffic through the tunnel 4 DISCONNECT Bidirectional Close a tunnel connection 5 PING Bidirectional Keepalive probe, sent every 30 seconds by timer 6 PONG Bidirectional Keepalive reply 9 FLOWCTRL Bidirectional Throttle data flow to prevent buffer overrun

The CONNECT payload specifies where the implant should open a TCP connection. The target address is encoded in SOCKS5 format and consists of a single type byte, followed by the address and a 2-byte destination port:

Type byte Description 0x01 IPv4 address (4 bytes) 0x03 Domain name (1-byte length + string) 0x04 IPv6 address (16 bytes)

Notably, in the process of threat hunting, we detected another variant (MD5: C832ECD135781B11F59E3FFFB3D2B6AC) that shares the same dynamic-resolve stub pattern. This variant communicates with businessmixture.com/blog over WSS on port 443, and not through Microsoft Azure. Still, it implements the same technique of limiting execution to a specific username on the infected machine by hardcoding a 3-character control value that must appear as a substring in the lowercased Windows username retrieved via GetUserNameA. If the match fails, the implant silently exits, confirming per-target tailoring of each deployed binary.

ArcBridge: another WebSocket tunneling tool

ArcBridge is another WebSocket tunneling tool developed and used by Mirage Kitten. We first identified it in April 2026 in activity targeting victims in the Middle East. The malware creates a mutex named F56E68DA-4A89-46B4-9AC8-7290A7651000 to enforce single-instance execution. The use of a UUID-like mutex name is consistent with the NightLedger backdoor described earlier.
The malware contains an embedded configuration block that stores the C2 host, C2 port, retry or timeout value, SSL flag, and what is highly likely an implant identifier:

"<<STARTXX>>" "aecert.org" 443 5000 0 "4B8CC395-A26F-41F1-A1DC-8B993D9D41D2" "<<ENDXX>>"

After initialization, ArcBridge communicates over a WebSocket-style channel and waits for server-side control messages. It supports the following commands:

Command Description OPEN: Creates a proxy/tunnel session to a target selected by the operator. DNS: Performs hostname or address resolution and returns the result. Victimology

According to our telemetry, we identified victims across Middle East and African countries including Egypt, SMB and government environments in Jordan and Tanzania, aviation organizations in Pakistan, telecommunication companies in Ethiopia and financial-sector entities in Burkina Faso.

Conclusion

Mirage Kitten continues to evolve its malware arsenal to support targeted cyber-espionage operations across the Middle East and Africa regions. The NightLedger backdoor retains similar core command functionality to TWOSTROKE while introducing additional capabilities, including screenshot capture and collection of the NetSetup.log file.

Another notable aspect of the campaign is the group’s continued reliance on tunneling utilities as part of its operational toolkit. This aligns with previous public reporting, which documented the group’s use of the LIGHTRAIL and POLLBLEND tunnelers. Consistent with this tradecraft, we observed Mirage Kitten continuing to leverage tunneling capabilities alongside a gradual shift away from Microsoft Azure subdomain-style infrastructure in favor of Cloudflare-backed domains in some of its malware, a change likely intended to complicate attribution while maintaining resilient command-and-control communications.

Indicators of compromise

Additional IoCs are available to customers of our Threat Intelligence Reporting service. For more details, contact us at [email protected].

File hashes

NightLedger backdoor
A239E655709A2518DD0B7BDBED163679 – sspicli.dll

ArcBridge WebSocket tunneling tool
5FA15EF96808EA82F0A6176F0BB4B386
42F847597109DA2A220391BB09D00676
AFB1C1583606599C7272CFB33CC6F498

BridgeHead WebSocket tunneling tool
6038D42AF0AFFD1FB263F470C0956F6B – unbcl.dll
AE628EFA305387B633DCE82F9364875B – unbcl.dll
F7D36CC5904A53252D2BB3D21615134F – libwinpthread-1.dll
C90F0EFADBF322E5EB1C4103A38C30E6 – libwinpthread-1.dll
D09B14A2FE01C7363ECC56F5D046162C – IPHLPAPI.dll

Domains and IPs

smartconnect[.]azurewebsites[.]net
businessmixture[.]com
global-reds[.]com
maadinglobal[.]com
Business-deegital[.]com
business-deegital[.]azurewebsites[.]net
businessdeegital[.]azurewebsites[.]net
neexportfolio[.]azurewebsites[.]net
neexportfolio[.]com
neexportfolio[.]eastus[.]cloudapp[.]azure[.]com
172[.]86[.]98[.]113
aecert[.]org
realhealthshop[.]com
tjconsultingservices[.]com
thehealth-life[.]com
buisness-centeral-transportation[.]com
healthcarezoom-centeral[.]azurewebsites[.]net
healthcarezoomcenteral[.]azurewebsites[.]net
healthcarezoomcenteral[.]org
toadreport[.]azurewebsites[.]net
business-startup[.]azurewebsites[.]net
businessstartup[.]azurewebsites[.]net

Za aplikace typu Google Drive, Spotify, Netflix, Homey nebo 1Password je potřeba platit předplatné, které může šplhat do tisíců měsíčně. Alternativou přitom může být selfhosting, kdy alternativy k velkým platformám běží na domácím NASu.

Microsoft has launched its first cybersecurity-specific model inside MDASH, its multi-model vulnerability identification and remediation harness. The company says MDASH, using MAI-Cyber-1-Flash and GPT-5.4, scored 95.95% on CyberGym. It also claims the configuration costs 50% less than its current best MDASH combination of GPT-5.4, GPT-5.4 mini, and GPT-5.3 Codex. Access is limited to approved Swati Khandelwalhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/[email protected]

Současné trakční baterie degradují výrazně pomaleji než před deseti lety • Po pěti letech provozu si elektromobily průměrně zachovávají 95 % dojezdu • Životnost článků zásadně prodlužuje správné nabíjení a styl dynamické jízdy

Architektura, která navzdory přizabití ze strany Roryho Reada získala AMD konzole a umožnila společnosti přežít krizi, a která AMD dostala do nejvýkonnějších výpočetních systémů na světě, končí…

A maximum-severity security flaw impacting on-premises versions of Arista VeloCloud Orchestrator (VCO) has come under active exploitation in the wild. The vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2026-16812 (CVSS score: 10.0), is a case of operating system command injection that could pave the way for arbitrary code execution. "VeloCloud Orchestrator (VCO) on-prem has a security issue where this issue Ravie Lakshmananhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/[email protected]

Traveling enterprise employees beware: Think twice before you log onto that oh-so-convenient public Wi-Fi.

Since at least June, threat actors have been compromising “captive” Wi-Fi gateways and other portal appliances at hotels, conference centers, and similar shared venues to hijack users’ Microsoft 365 accounts, according to the ReliaQuest Threat Research team.

Once a threat actor controls a gateway, they can silently redirect a user’s traffic to their own infrastructure and steal their Microsoft 365 credentials without ever touching the user’s device, compromising endpoints, or sending phishing links or malicious attachments.

“The most dangerous element is that it operates at the network gateway, which sits beneath most of the trust assumptions users and devices make,” ReliaQuest told CSO Online. “It’s not necessarily an enterprise breach level event on its own, but it’s a very real risk to individual accounts.”

Exploiting a ‘fundamental trust’

Domain Name System (DNS) poisoning, in which false data is injected to redirect regular web traffic to fraudulent domains, has previously been observed on small office routers, but attackers are now expanding the technique to higher-level targets, the ReliaQuest researchers explained in a blog post.

Attackers likely gain access to the gateways through weak or reused admin credentials in combination with exposed interfaces like Secure Shell (SSH), Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP), and other web consoles, they pointed out.

Admin access to the gateway is all that malicious actors need, because devices are designed to inherently trust DNS, which translates domain names like login.microsoftonline[.]com into IP addresses to route them. Therefore, a single gateway compromise gives the attacker the ability to redirect traffic for every guest logging into the network, providing IP addresses it controls in response to DNS requests, rather than the legitimate ones, without touching a single endpoint.

“Captive portal appliances sit at the network perimeter for every guest on that network,” the researchers wrote. “Detection is inherently difficult because the attack happens gateway-side, outside the endpoint’s visibility.”

In the campaign tracked by ReliaQuest, four attacker-registered domains, m365-owa[.]com, owa-ms365[.]com, ms365-device[.]com, and ms365-live[.]com, were used for Microsoft-impersonation lures.

The compromised Wi-Fi gateways were discovered across multiple US cities as well as in India and Saudi Arabia, and impacted users were from companies in professional and financial services, legal, retail, health care, and energy, indicating that the method isn’t sector-specific.

“We’ve seen enough SharePoint exfiltration cases to know that a single popped account can cascade into meaningful data loss,” ReliaQuest noted. Meanwhile, for the network operators, there’s a “reputational dimension”; user compromise is a “serious trust and brand problem, regardless of how sophisticated’ the underlying attack is.”

Safe services, DNSSEC not enough

Locking network configurations to a ‘safe’ DNS provider such as Google (8.8.8.8), Cloudflare (1.1.1.1), or the cloud-based OpenDNS isn’t a sufficient tactic, because it doesn’t change the path that queries actually travel over, ReliaQuest contended.

By default, devices send DNS queries as unencrypted protocol traffic, and those packets still have to traverse the hotel’s network to reach Google, Cloudflare, or OpenDNS, the company explained. Since the gateway sits directly in that path, it can inspect, block, or redirect the query before it ever reaches the chosen resolver.

“Specifying a trusted DNS server changes the intended destination, not who controls the road to get there,” ReliaQuest noted.

Further, Domain Name System Security Extensions (DNSSECs), which use digital signatures and public-key cryptography, only “partially” address the problem. DNSSEC provides authentication and integrity for signed domains, which means a validating resolver can detect and reject forged or tampered responses.

“What it does not do is provide confidentiality or availability,” the company said. “It does not encrypt DNS traffic or stop an attacker from intercepting, blocking, or redirecting requests.”

So while DNSSEC can defeat certain response-forgery attacks against signed zones, an on-path gateway can still see queries, drop them, or force fallback behavior. However, this protection layer only helps when domains are actually signed, and then only when the client or resolver performs validation, which “many stub resolvers do not,” according to ReliaQuest.

Full-tunnel VPNs required

To combat the problem, enterprises should require all corporate devices to use a full-tunnel VPN for network connection. Controls should prevent internet access until a tunnel is active, ReliaQuest advised.

This will route all of a device’s traffic, including DNS, through an encrypted connection to a trusted VPN server before it travels anywhere else, the company explained, thus preventing local networks like hotel gateways from seeing or modifying DNS and internet traffic.

“In effect, it takes the untrusted network out of the trust equation,” ReliaQuest noted.

However, full-tunnel configuration is not the default for VPNs, because it comes with “real trade-offs,” the researchers noted: It adds cost, latency, and bandwidth demands, since every packet has to travel through company infrastructure. Thus, forcing all traffic through the corporate backbone is “not always practical” for distributed or bandwidth-heavy workforces.

Enterprises should also enforce conditional access in Entra ID to block device-code authentication flow, which has few legitimate use cases for most users in most environments, ReliaQuest noted.

Additional precautions

The company also advised:

• Restricting Proxy Auto-Configuration (PAC) file retrieval to approved internal hosts;
• Disabling automatic Web Proxy Auto-Discovery (WPAD) via Group Policy to (this is often enabled by default in Windows);
• Deploying encrypted DNS such as DoH or DoT in strict mode as a “complement or alternative” to full-tunnel VPN. This is particularly important for organizations where always-on VPN is not feasible.
• Training employees to verify the URL and certificate of any page requesting credentials before entering them, particularly on public Wi-Fi networks.

Prevention is more important than detection here, ReliaQuest pointed out: while in tools like Microsoft Defender for Endpoint, ‘DnsConnectionInspected’ events showing queries to attacker-controlled domains are a primary endpoint-level signal, “by the time those events fire, the redirect has typically already occurred. In other words, endpoint telemetry confirms what happened more than it prevents it.”

This is exactly why methods like encrypted transport, Conditional Access, and WPAD and PAC hardening matter more than detection alone, the researchers emphasized.

This article originally appeared on CSOonline.

Now that Samsung has jumped into the crowded AI-powered glasses arena alongside Apple, Google, Meta, and others, CISOs and IT leaders are again having to think through whether it makes sense to establish enterprise restrictions on such devices, given the likely data leakage and privacy and compliance issues.

And even if those tech leaders decide that such policies might make sense, the logistical hurdles to universally enforcing them outside the office are all but insurmountable.

For example, it is up to individual wearers to choose their device’s settings, making it difficult for IT policies around data acquisition and usage to be enforced. Worse, AI devices have a history of ignoring guardrails. That means that a setting that limits how data is used may not necessarily be obeyed. 

One possible mitigating factor is that smart glasses typically have a light on the frame that activates when the device is recording, but there are also many easy ways for workers to defeat or cover up those lights to conceal their activities. 

Enforcement is virtually impossible

However, said independent technology analyst Carmi Levy, “although some organizations have tried to physically ban smart glasses from their in-person and virtual workplaces, the sad reality for corporate technological gatekeepers is there is no way to completely keep any device out of the workplace.”

There is nothing stopping employees from wearing eyewear of any type, smart or not, he noted, “and attempting to do so might put employers on the wrong side of a disability lawsuit launched by a worker who needs prescription smart glasses to accommodate vision issues.”

As well, Jitesh Ubrani, an IDC director focusing on worldwide device trackers, pointed out that the biggest challenge in creating rules around usage of smart glasses is that the data leakage problem with devices is both not new and certainly not limited to glasses. 

“The instinct to ban AI smart glasses outright is understandable, but it misses that the underlying risk isn’t new. A smartphone has been able to record a whiteboard, a screen, or a conversation for close to two decades,” he said. “What’s changed is the friction. Glasses make covert capture nearly effortless and far harder to notice because there’s no phone being visibly raised or pointed. That’s a real escalation in ease of misuse, but it’s a difference of degree rather than a fundamentally new capability.”

In fact, Ubrani argued, “where this gets hard for CISOs is enforcement. A ban on paper is easy to write. Enforcing it inside a corporate office is already difficult, since most current-generation devices, including Meta’s Ray-Bans, are visually indistinguishable from ordinary eyewear.”

And, he added, “enforcing it in a hybrid or work-from-home setting is close to impossible. IT has no practical way to confirm what someone is wearing on a home Zoom call, and even in-office detection options, like scanning for Bluetooth or BLE advertising signals tied to known manufacturer IDs, only catch devices that haven’t been reconfigured or that happen to be broadcasting at the time.”

Additional risk

Connected glasses have a history going back decades, but enterprises didn’t take them seriously until this year.

But Anshel Sag, principal analyst at Moor Insights & Strategy, characterized the problem as more psychological than technological. 

“People want to ban it because they don’t know how to handle it. But that just creates more problems than it solves. It’s a very kneejerk fear reaction,” Sag said. “We live in an era where cameras are everywhere.”

Meghan Hollis, a senior principal analyst for Gartner, agreed that the focus on smart glasses is misplaced, given that even headphones can today capture audio for translation and transcription. The change is not in the data capture, Hollis said, but the fact that it is adding video.

This creates additional risk, with the new capability brought into the corporate environment causing “a potential exposure for corporate intellectual property,” Hollis said.

One other often-overlooked issue is data sovereignty. Even if the glasses manufacturer agrees to store data only in specific countries, it could easily change that policy or simply switch third-party vendors. 

“There could be export control issues, possibly violating regulatory controls in transmitting information,” Hollis noted. 

However, Hollis said, threatening to punish workers if they are caught using unauthorized devices “is your last line of defense,” and that the best initial approach should not be enforcement, but education.

“You need to be educating your end-users, with constant reinforcement, telling them, ‘If you do this, here’s how you can harm the company and our clients/customers.’ Combine that with, ‘And if you do this, we will take action against you.’”

Tiered policies required

Hollis noted that the risk goes beyond an employee initially recording something they shouldn’t. Consider, for example, a technical meeting where an employee asks the rest of the attendees for permission to record the discussion. They agree and he starts to record. 

At the end of the meeting, he leaves to return to his office, fully intending to turn off the recording function when he gets there. But on the way, he has a brief hallway meeting with an SVP who tells him, without warning, “FYI, but the board just decided to greenlight our hostile takeover of Smith Corp. We’ll explore the specifics at a 10 a.m. tomorrow. Have your team there.” The executive then walks off.

With the recording still running, that ultra-sensitive data has just been transmitted to the cloud. 

IDC’s Ubrani pointed out that situations like this make smart glasses governance more challenging. “Enterprise IT and security leaders need to stop framing this as ‘ban versus allow,’ and instead build a tiered policy based on where the actual risk sits,” he said. “Boardrooms, R&D labs, and any space where trade secrets or regulated data are visible or discussed out loud deserve strict no-wearables rules, enforced the same way phone bans already are in those rooms.”

Open floor plans and general office space probably don’t need that level of restriction, he said, but meeting policies should require disclosure when a device capable of recording is present, similar to the way in which some companies already handle personal recording devices in sensitive briefings.

“Companies that try to write one blanket rule for every environment are going to find it’s either unenforceable or so restrictive it interferes with accessibility, since some employees rely on these devices as assistive technology,” he said.

However, Brian Jackson, a principal research director at Info-Tech Research Group, argued that enterprise CISOs and IT Directors need to take a far more strict position.

“Organizations should update their acceptable use policies for personal technology ASAP,” he said. “Look back about 15 years ago at how smartphones moved from consumer life into the workplace, and we may be at the beginning of a redefinition of BYOD here. But it needs to start with an extremely restrictive policy against the use of AI wearables and similar devices.”

He added, “organizations need to hold the line against making personal recordings in the workplace and maintain not only their compliance standards, but their workplace culture. This restriction cannot go as far as an outright ban; look at how Walt Disney World got caught up in a lawsuit after telling an employee she could not use Meta glasses. Still, this exception can be made narrow, and it should be made clear that other employees must be alerted when they are being recorded.”

This article originally appeared on CSOonline.

Hackers are actively exploiting a vulnerability in the FastJson open-source Java library, allowing remote code execution without user interaction or elevated privileges. [...]

Arista has patched a maximum-severity command injection vulnerability in on-premises VeloCloud Orchestrator deployments that is being actively exploited in attacks. [...]

Informace kolem důchodů táhnou. Kromě penze ale zapomínáme řešit podstatnou věc, která ve stáří výrazně ovlivní naši finanční situaci.

Koupíte si družstevní podíl, zaplatíte za něj miliony a byt si následně převedete do osobního vlastnictví. Když se později objeví stavební závady, družstvo za ně podle Nejvyššího soudu zpravidla neodpovídá.

Ukážeme si, jakým způsobem lze otevřít okno a přes knihovnu gg provést vykreslení celé 2D scény do plochy tohoto okna. Následně přidáme interaktivní ovládání aplikace pomocí klávesnice i myši.

…aneb Nové poznatky o fascinující čeledi Phorusrhacidae

O tom, že neobvyklé letné horúčavy môžu ľudí ohroziť a o tom, ktorí sú tí najviac ohrození, sa už popísalo veľa. Že riziko zvyšujú aj mnohé lieky, je už menej známe.

Naděje na blízký pokles cen v důsledku nabídky společnosti CXMT se rozptylují. Čínský výrobce totiž zaznamenal objednávky takového rozsahu, že si mohl dovolit nastavit ceny vyšší než Samsung…