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The ShinyHunters extortion group stole personal information from 1.6 million RingCentral accounts after hacking the company in July, according to the data breach notification service Have I Been Pwned. [...]

Monitor LG 32U721SA-W zlevnil na 3767 Kč, běžně stojí skoro dvakrát tolik. • Má 32", rozlišení 4K a potěší vstupem USB-C s 65W nabíjením. • Tahákem jsou také integrovaný systém webOS a dálkový ovladač.

Apple on Thursday sent a fresh batch of notifications to customers whom it suspects may have been targeted by mercenary spyware attacks. In a statement shared with TechCrunch, the iPhone maker said it alerted an unspecified number of users targeted in 110 countries and that it has notified customers in over 150 countries to date. Apple began sending threat notifications to users in late 2021. Ravie Lakshmananhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/[email protected]

Cryptocurrency hardware wallet maker Trezor has confirmed that a breach at one of its shipping partners exposed the personal data of more than 13,000 customers. The company's initial findings suggested the breach was limited to orders placed in certain countries during the previous 90 days. New information indicates that earlier orders may also be affected. The breach exposed the names, email addresses, phone numbers, and shipping addresses of 11,742 customers in the US, UK, Sweden, Colombia, Brazil, Italy, and Portugal who ordered Trezor products between May 10 and August 8. An additional 1,947 customers had their names, home cities, and email addresses exposed. Some members of this group may have placed their orders before May 10. "We are verifying this information and the timeframe with ShipMonk," said Trezor. ShipMonk is Trezor's logistics partner. It stores and ships products on the company's behalf and collects the information needed to fulfill orders. ShipMonk is subject to Trezor's 90-day retention policy, which requires partners to delete or anonymize customer data within 90 days of collecting it for an order. ShipMonk did not immediately respond to a request for comment. Trezor markets itself as a purveyor of secure, offline, hardware-based cryptocurrency wallets. With its products, it aims to shield customers from cyberattacks and malicious apps. While it assured customers that its own systems and devices remain secure, Trezor warned that "affected customers could experience an increase in phishing attempts." The exposed details could help criminals craft convincing phishing attempts impersonating banks, crypto exchanges, or Trezor itself. The company said it contacted affected customers directly and advised them to check any communications against information published through its official channels. "Never enter your wallet backup on a website or share it with anyone," Trezor said in an apologetic advisory. "This is the first time since Trezor was founded in 2013 that we have experienced a breach that exposed customer phone numbers and shipping addresses. "We absolutely understand how serious this is and the potential risks it poses to our customers and are deeply sorry to those affected." Trezor said in a supplementary social media post, separate from the advisory, that its "top priority" project at the moment is to establish an "Anonymous Delivery" option for customers. The service will allow buyers to complete checkout without linking their home address or real-world identity to an order. Customers using Anonymous Delivery will go through a dedicated checkout, use a nickname or label ID in place of a real name, and have their product shipped to an automated delivery locker instead of their home. The delivery will also come in unbranded packaging with a generic sender label. The carrier will only use email or SMS to send a PIN for the locker. Trezor said the service is gearing up for a September launch in the EU and by the end of the year in the US. Alas, that didn't stop Cake Wallet, a rival crypto wallet, from poking fun at Trezor. "Another rough day for self custody," it Xeeted, before suggesting crypto holders instead use an old smartphone with Cake Wallet installed because "there is no order, no shipping address, or customer data tied to the purchase." ®

Americký úřad FDA po průtazích schválil první mRNA vakcínu proti chřipce • Očkovací látka mFlusiva od Moderny je určena lidem od padesáti let • Rychlejší výroba umožní daleko lépe reagovat na nové mutace chřipkového viru

A new White House memo signed by U.S. President Donald Trump has instructed the National Coordination Center (NCC) to establish a program that would allow private sector companies to take advantage of their "innovative capabilities" to break into foreign Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs) and disrupt them. "By partnering with vetted United States companies subject to the direction and Ravie Lakshmananhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/[email protected]

Introduction

CoolClient is a backdoor family attributed to the HoneyMyte APT group (also known as Mustang Panda) that has been used in their cyber-espionage campaigns targeting organizations across Asia and Russia. It supports such capabilities as keylogging, clipboard theft, credential harvesting, file management, system reconnaissance, and plugin-based extensions.

Since its first public disclosure by Sophos in 2022 and subsequent analysis by Trend Micro in 2023, CoolClient has continued to evolve. In 2025, we analyzed a newer variant that introduced clipboard theft and HTTP traffic interception for credential harvesting.

In late 2025 and 2026, our latest investigation reveal another major evolution. The newest CoolClient variant can deploy a signed kernel-mode driver as a Windows service and communicate with it through IOCTL requests. The driver enhances the malware’s stealth by hiding the CoolClient process, protecting related files and registry entries, and preventing them from being inspected or modified. The overall design is comparable to the kernel-mode enhancements previously observed in ToneShell, but the CoolClient driver exposes dedicated IOCTL handlers that allow the user-mode backdoor to communicate directly with the driver.

We have observed this updated CoolClient variant and its accompanying driver in intrusions across multiple countries in Asia, including Pakistan, Mongolia, and Myanmar.

Technical analysis

In the observed campaign targeting Myanmar, HoneyMyte used PlugX as the initial post-compromise implant to deploy the CoolClient components. Before deploying the malware, the actor added both a folder exclusion and a file exclusion to Microsoft Defender for the fake Windows Defender installation directory and the renamed sideloader executable (defender.exe).

wmic /Node:localhost /Namespace:\\Root\Microsoft\Windows\Defender Path MSFT_MpPreference call Add ExclusionPath="$programfiles\Microsoft\Windows Defender" wmic /Node:localhost /Namespace:\\Root\Microsoft\Windows\Defender Path MSFT_MpPreference call Add ExclusionPath="$programfiles\Microsoft\Windows Defender\defender.exe"

The actor then created a fake Windows Defender installation directory, copied the CoolClient components into it, and renamed a legitimate Sangfor executable, usually named Sang.exe, to defender.exe to serve as the DLL sideloader.

xcopy "$programfiles\Windows Defender\*" "$programfiles\Microsoft\Windows Defender" /a /s /v /e /f

Persistence was established through a scheduled task that launched defender.exe with SYSTEM privileges during system startup.

schtasks /create /sc onstart /tn "\Microsoft\Windows\Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection Service" /tr "\"$programfiles\Microsoft\Windows Defender\defender.exe\"" /ru "system" /F

When executed, defender.exe sideloads the malicious libngs.dll, initiating the CoolClient execution chain described in the following sections.

CoolClient components

Similar to previous variants, the latest CoolClient user-mode component follows a multi-stage execution chain, with each component performing a distinct role during execution.

Component Description defender.exe / Sang.exe Legitimate Sangfor application abused for DLL sideloading libsrapc.dll Benign dependency required for the Sangfor application to execute normally libngs.dll First-stage loader that decrypts and loads the next stage into memory (First stage) loadcert.ini Encrypted DLL implementing the core CoolClient functionality, including command handling, process injection, driver deployment, and persistence (Second stage) cert.ini Final-stage implant responsible for C2 communication and backdoor functionality (Final stage) time.ini CoolCleint configuration file

Our previous CoolClient analysis focused primarily on the final-stage implant (main.dat), including its backdoor commands and plugin framework, while the first-stage loader (libngs.dll) and second-stage component (loader.dat) received only a brief overview. In the latest variant CoolClient, loader.dat and main.dat have been renamed to loadcert.ini and cert.ini, respectively. This article revisits those earlier stages, focusing on the second-stage component and the newly introduced kernel-mode driver that extends CoolClient with rootkit capabilities.

 

Overview of the new variant of CoolClient

First stage: libngs.dll

Execution begins when the legitimate Sangfor application (defender.exe or Sang.exe) loads the malicious libngs.dll through DLL sideloading. As in previous CoolClient variants, the malware continues to abuse the same Sangfor application to execute its first-stage loader.

To make the DLL appear legitimate, libngs.dll exports numerous dummy functions. Each export simply calls OutputDebugStringA with its corresponding function name before immediately invoking ExitProcess, serving no functional purpose other than mimicking the expected export table of the legitimate DLL.

Dummy export functions in libngs.dll invoking OutputDebugStringA and ExitProcess

The actual malicious logic is executed from DllMain (DllEntryPoint). Although heavily obfuscated through control flow flattening and numerous unconditional jumps, the routine ultimately performs a straightforward task: loading, decrypting, and executing the encrypted second-stage DLL, loadcert.ini.

The loader resolves the required Windows APIs, reads loadcert.ini into memory, and decrypts it using a 0x32-byte repeating XOR keystream derived from a transformed seed value of 0xA4. After decryption, the DLL is loaded directly into memory, and execution is transferred to loadcert.ini.

Second stage: loadcert.ini (before synchost.exe injection)

The second-stage DLL, loadcert.ini, is responsible for preparing the execution environment before the malware transitions into its injected process. It first determines its execution context by checking whether the current module is synchost.exe.

If the DLL is running under the original sideloaded process (for example, Sang.exe), it performs the initial setup, including persistence, UAC bypass, registry modifications, and process injection.

If the DLL is already executing inside synchost.exe, it follows a different execution path that decrypts time.ini, deploys the kernel-mode driver, and loads the final-stage implant (cert.ini).

Command handler

The command handler remains largely unchanged from previous CoolClient variants, with one notable difference: the malware now injects into synchost.exe instead of write.exe.

Execution is controlled through three command-line parameters:

Parameter Purpose install Performs the initial setup, including persistence, privilege checks, and preparation for the injected execution path. work Executes the primary second-stage functionality from the injected synchost.exe process, including driver deployment and third-stage loading. passuac Continues execution after privilege elevation.

If no parameter is supplied, the malware creates a new Sang.exe process with the install parameter using CreateProcessW.

Establishing AutoRun persistence

When executed with the install parameter, CoolClient creates an AutoRun entry under:

HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run

The registry value, named goopdate, launches Sang.exe (or defender.exe, depending on the deployment) with the work parameter whenever the user logs on.

Process injection into synchost.exe

Upon establishing the AutoRun registry entry, CoolClient decrypts loadcert.ini using a 0x32-byte repeating XOR keystream derived from the hardcoded base key 0x4D.

The decrypted DLL is then injected into a newly created suspended instance of synchost.exe. The malware allocates memory in the target process, writes the decrypted payload, redirects the thread context to the injected code, resumes execution, and finally terminates the original process with ExitProcess.

From this point onward, execution continues entirely within synchost.exe, where the malware proceeds with kernel-mode driver deployment before loading the final-stage implant (cert.ini).

Service installation

When executed with the install parameter, CoolClient establishes an additional persistence mechanism by installing itself as a Windows service. Before doing so, it verifies that it has sufficient access to the Service Control Manager and that no 360 Total Security software processes (360sd.exe, zhudongfangyu.exe, or 360desktopservice64.exe) are running.

Function to check for running 360 Total Security software processes

If both checks succeed, the malware decrypts time.ini to retrieve the service configuration, including the service name and description. It then checks whether the service media_updaten already exists. If found, the existing service is stopped and deleted before a new one is created.

The new service is configured to execute Sang.exe<.code> with the work parameter using CreateServiceA. The malware then starts the service by executing "sc start media_updaten" via WinExec.

Administrator privilege check

If the service installation path is not taken, CoolClient checks whether the current process is running with administrator privileges by verifying membership in the local Administrators group.

When administrative privileges are available, the malware relaunches itself with the passuac parameter before continuing with the remaining execution flow.

Elevated relaunch and UAC bypass

To continue execution with elevated privileges while concealing its true parent process, CoolClient implements an RPC-based process creation technique similar to the method described by Google Project Zero. The technique combines RPC process creation with parent process ID (PPID) spoofing to launch a new elevated instance of itself.

The malware first checks for the presence of escanmon.exe. If the process is running, it constructs the path to C:\Windows\System32\winver.exe and establishes a connection to the local ncalrpc endpoint (201ef99a-7fa0-444c-9399-19ba84f12a1a). It then invokes NdrAsyncClientCall to launch winver.exe through the RPC interface.

Authenticated RPC binding used during the RPC-based UAC bypass

After winver.exe is created, CoolClient retrieves its debug object using NtQueryInformationProcess, detaches the debugger through NtRemoveProcessDebug, and terminates the process. The obtained debug object is later reused during the remainder of the UAC bypass routine.

Next, the malware repeats the same RPC-based process creation technique to launch computerdefaults.exe. It associates the previously obtained debug object with the current thread using DbgUiSetThreadDebugObject, waits for the resulting process creation event through WaitForDebugEvent, and duplicates the process handle using NtDuplicateObject, obtaining a handle with full access rights.

Finally, CoolClient relaunches itself as Sang.exe passuac using CreateProcessW with an extended startup attribute list. By configuring PROC_THREAD_ATTRIBUTE_PARENT_PROCESS through UpdateProcThreadAttribute, the duplicated process handle is assigned as the parent of the new process. As a result, the new Sang.exe passuac instance executes with an elevated context while appearing to have been spawned by the trusted Windows process instead of the original CoolClient process.

Second stage: loadcert.ini (Injected Execution)

After being injected into synchost.exe, loadcert.ini follows its injected execution path, where it deploys the kernel-mode driver and launches the final-stage implant (cert.ini). If administrative privileges are unavailable, the malware skips driver deployment and proceeds directly to the third-stage injection.

Kernel-Mode driver deployment

The deployment routine begins by decrypting time.ini. CoolClient then verifies that it has sufficient privileges to install a kernel-mode driver by checking for full access to the Service Control Manager (SCM) and the presence of SeTcbPrivilege.

If both conditions are met, CoolClient extracts an embedded LZMA-compressed driver from loadcert.ini, decompresses it, and writes it to disk as msagent.sys in the same directory as cert.ini, for example:

C:\Program Files\Microsoft\Windows Defender\msagent.sys

Next, the malware checks whether a service named msagent already exists. If present, the existing service is stopped and deleted before a new driver service is created and started, loading the kernel-mode component into the operating system.

Driver initialization

After the driver is loaded, CoolClient establishes communication with it by opening the device \\.\msagent using CreateFileW. The user-mode component then initializes the driver by issuing three DeviceIoControl requests.

IOCTL Purpose 0x222120 Registers the current CoolClient process with the driver. 0x2221E0 Sends the configured C2 IPv4 address to the driver. 0x2220F0 Registers filesystem and registry paths that should be protected or hidden.

The first request (0x222120) registers the current CoolClient process as a trusted process within the driver. The request includes the process ID, an operation code, and a flag that marks the process as trusted, allowing it to interact with protected files, registry keys, and processes.

The second request (0x2221E0) passes the configured C2 IPv4 address extracted from time.ini.

Finally, 0x2220F0 registers the CoolClient installation directory (for example, C:\Program Files\Microsoft\Windows Defender\) together with the service registry path (\Registry\Machine\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\media_updaten). These entries allow the driver to protect the malware’s files and registry objects from inspection, modification, and deletion.

As part of the initialization, CoolClient updates the HKLM\SYSTEM\RNG\Wid_H1deF5Dirs registry value by appending its installation directory if it is not already present. This registry value is later used by the driver when applying its hiding and protection mechanisms.

The implementation of these IOCTL handlers and the corresponding driver functionality are discussed in the msagent.sys section.

Cert.ini process injection

Once the driver has been initialized, CoolClient proceeds to launch the final-stage implant (cert.ini). Before creating the target process, the malware enumerates active WinStation sessions to identify a suitable interactive user session.

After selecting a session, CoolClient duplicates its access token, updates the session identifier, and creates a new synchost.exe process using CreateProcessAsUserA. The decrypted cert.ini DLL is then injected into the suspended process using the same memory allocation, thread context modification, and ResumeThread technique described earlier.

This marks the final transition in the execution chain, where the third-stage implant takes over C2 communication and the remaining backdoor functionality.

Msagent.sys driver

Analysis of the deployed kernel-mode driver reveals an embedded PDB path:

PDB Path

E:\work\南京实验室\2024项目\张雪杰云南m\研发\FTool\Tool\x64\Release\FTool.pdb
The path contains several notable strings, including “Nanjing Laboratory” (南京实验室) and “Zhang Xuejie Yunnan m” (张雪杰云南m), which likely refer to the driver’s development environment. However, our OSINT analysis did not identify any information linking these strings to a known organization, developer, or threat actor.

The driver is digitally signed with a certificate issued to "Nanjing Ranyi Technology Co., Ltd.", with serial number 3E 62 DC 5D 8D 61 2A 26 33 E7 6B DF D6 07 19 DD. The certificate was valid from August 2013 to September 2014.

We identified several older malicious drivers signed with the same certificate that were compiled around 2013. However, we found no evidence directly linking those samples to the CoolClient activity described in this article.

Driver configuration

During initialization, the driver loads its stealth configuration from the registry key \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\RNG. The configuration defines which system objects should be hidden or protected and controls the driver’s operating mode.

Registry configuration loaded by the driver during initialization

Two REG_DWORD values control the driver’s operating mode:

Registry Value Default Description Hid_State 1 Enables the driver’s rootkit functionality. Hid_StealthMode 0 Controls additional stealth features used by selected driver routines.

In addition, the driver loads several REG_MULTI_SZ values that define the objects to be hidden or protected.

Registry Value Purpose Wid_H1deF5Dirs Directories to hide Wid_H1deF5Files Files to hide Wid_H1deRegKeys Registry keys to hide Wid_H1deRegValues Registry values to hide Hid_IgnoredImages Processes to ignore Hid_ProtectedImages Processes to protect

Together, these registry values determine which filesystem paths, registry objects, and processes are managed by the driver’s protection mechanisms.
After loading the configuration, the driver converts the registry entries into internal lookup structures that are shared across its various protection components.

These structures are later referenced by the filesystem minifilter, registry callback, process callback, object callback, image load callback, and IOCTL handlers to determine whether a file, registry object, or process should be hidden, protected, or ignored.

Preparation for process hiding

Next, the driver dynamically locates the ActiveProcessLinks (LIST_ENTRY) field within the EPROCESS structure instead of relying on hardcoded offsets. It first validates several predefined offsets and, if none match, performs a linear scan of the EPROCESS structure to identify the correct location. This approach allows the driver to remain compatible across different Windows versions, where the layout of EPROCESS may differ.

The driver validates candidate ActiveProcessLinks layouts before enabling process hiding

Once the correct offset has been identified, it is stored for later use by the process hiding routines. During process hiding and restoration, the driver uses IOCTLs 0x22219C and 0x2221A0 to unlink and relink entries in the Windows active process list, effectively hiding or restoring processes on demand.

Process, object, and image load callbacks

After preparing its process tracking structures, the driver initializes several AVL trees and populates them with configuration entries loaded from the registry, including Wid_H1deF5Dirs, Wid_H1deF5Files, Wid_H1deRegKeys, Wid_H1deRegValues, Hid_IgnoredImages, Hid_ProtectedImages, and Hid_HideImages.

These AVL trees provide efficient lookups for protected files, registry objects, and tracked processes, and are shared by the callback routines and IOCTL handlers.
The driver then registers three types of kernel callbacks that form the foundation of its protection and monitoring mechanisms:

• Object callbacks using ObRegisterCallbacks
• Process creation and termination callbacks using PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutineEx
• Image load callbacks using PsSetLoadImageNotifyRoutine

Registration of object, process, and image load callbacks during driver initialization

After registration, these callbacks maintain the driver’s internal tracking structures as processes, threads, and images are created or loaded.

Object callbacks

To protect selected processes, the driver registers object callbacks for process (PsProcessType) and thread (PsThreadType) objects using ObRegisterCallbacks with an altitude of 1203. These callbacks intercept requests to open process and thread handles. If the target process is protected, the driver reduces the access rights granted to the requesting process, preventing operations such as process termination, code injection, and other forms of process manipulation. In this sample, the protected process is the injected CoolClient code running inside synchost.exe.

Process and image load callbacks

The driver registers process creation and termination callbacks using PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutineEx, together with an image load callback via PsSetLoadImageNotifyRoutine.

When a process is created, its image name is compared against the configuration lists Hid_IgnoredImages, Hid_ProtectedImages, and Hid_HideImages. Matching processes are added to the driver’s internal tracking structures, allowing them to be protected, hidden, or managed through subsequent IOCTL requests. When a tracked process terminates, its entry is removed from the tracking structures.

The image load callback monitors modules loaded into tracked processes and updates the driver’s internal state to support subsequent protection and hiding operations.

To ensure that processes already running before the driver is initialized are also tracked, the driver performs a one-time enumeration of all active processes after registering the callbacks and adds any matching processes to the tracking structures.

MiniFilter registration

To protect files and directories, the driver registers a filesystem minifilter. During initialization, it creates internal path filter lists, loads the configured directory and file entries (Wid_H1deF5Dirs and Wid_H1deF5Files), and creates the required minifilter registry entries under HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\msagent\Instances. To avoid altitude conflicts, the driver dynamically assigns a filter altitude and retries registration until a unique value is obtained.

Retrying minifilter registration with incrementing filter altitude values until FltRegisterFilter succeeds

The driver then activates the minifilter using FltRegisterFilter. The filter works together with the IOCTL interface, which dynamically adds, removes, or clears protected path entries (0x2220F0, 0x2220F4, and 0x2220F8). During filesystem operations, the minifilter compares accessed paths against its internal path lists and denies access to matching entries, effectively hiding protected files and directories from users and applications.

Registry callback registration

To protect registry keys and values, the driver registers a registry callback using CmRegisterCallbackEx with an altitude of 320000. During initialization, it creates separate lookup structures for protected registry keys and values, then populates them using the configured entries from Wid_H1deRegKeys and Wid_H1deRegValues.

Registration of the registry callback using CmRegisterCallbackEx with an altitude of 320000

Once registered, the callback intercepts registry operations and compares the target key or value against the protected entries. For enumeration requests, matching keys and values are removed from the results before they are returned to user mode, effectively hiding them from registry viewers. For direct access requests, such as opening, modifying, or deleting protected registry objects, the callback returns STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED, preventing the operation.

Before applying these restrictions, the driver verifies whether the requesting process is trusted. Processes registered through IOCTL 0x222120, including the CoolClient user-mode component, bypass the filtering logic and retain unrestricted access, while all other processes remain subject to the driver’s registry protection rules.

IOCTL command dispatcher

To communicate with the user-mode component, the driver creates a device object named \Device\ToolTool together with the symbolic link \DosDevices\ToolTool to allow the user-mode CoolClient component to communicate with the driver through DeviceIoControl requests.

The driver implements 33 IOCTL handlers, although the analyzed CoolClient sample uses only three during normal execution:

• 0x222120: registers the current CoolClient process with the driver.
• 0x2221E0: passes the configured C2 IPv4 address.
• 0x2220F0: registers filesystem and registry paths for protection.

The remaining IOCTL handlers were not invoked by the analyzed sample.

IOCTL Handler Functionality 0x222000 0x140001E04 Enable or disable the rootkit. 0x222004 0x1400020B0 Query the current rootkit state. 0x2220F0 0x140002320 ●       Register protected filesystem or registry paths
●       Used by CoolClient to register its installation directory and service registry key. 0x2220F4 0x1400034DC Remove a protected filesystem or registry path. 0x2220F8 0x140003464 Clear all protected filesystem and registry path entries. 0x222118 0x1400024B0 Register process or path protection entries. 0x22211C 0x140002A20 Query registered protection entries. 0x222120 0x140003794 Update process protection entries. Used by CoolClient to register itself as a trusted process. 0x222124 0x14000362C Remove a protection entry. 0x222128 0x14000349C Clear all process protection entries. 0x222130 0x14000265C Register a protected process by PID. 0x222134 0x140010E88 Inject shellcode into a target process using NtCreateThreadEx. 0x222138 0x14000F498 Hide a kernel module by unlinking it from PsLoadedModuleList. 0x222144 0x14000270C Delete a file. 0x222148 0x14000286C Decrypt an embedded buffer and write it to disk. 0x22214C 0x1400027F4 Read and decrypt an encrypted file. 0x222168 0x140002780 Unmap the image section of a target process. 0x22216C 0x140013984 Terminate a process by PID. 0x222194 0x140011F50 Remove Protected Process Light (PPL) protection. 0x222198 0x140002940 Create or modify a registry value. 0x22219C 0x140010630 Hide a process by unlinking it from the active process list. 0x2221A0 0x140010670 Restore a previously hidden process. 0x2221A4 0x14000F8A0 Hide a module within a process. 0x2221A8 0x14000F954 Restore a hidden module. 0x2221AC 0x140016368 Enumerate and restore kernel notification callbacks. 0x2221B0 0x140016458 Disable or restore kernel notification callbacks. 0x2221B4 0x140012408 Manually load a secondary kernel driver. 0x2221B8 0x14001262C Debug/test handler. 0x2221BC 0x1400165F6 Write to an arbitrary kernel address. 0x2221C0 0x14000BB00,  0x14000BB78 Enables deny-rootkit mode by registering image-load monitoring and enabling the patching logic. 0x2221C4 0x14000BB6C,  0x14000BB10 Disables deny-rootkit mode by clearing state and unregistering/removing the monitoring logic. 0x2221E0 0x1400126C0 Register a C2 IPv4 address. 0x2221E4 0x140012E50 Delete a C2 IPv4 address.

After initializing the IOCTL dispatcher, the driver releases the temporary configuration buffer that was previously loaded from \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\RNG.

Kernel module enumeration and hiding

To support kernel module hiding, the driver resolves the address of the non-exported kernel variable PsLoadedModuleList at runtime using MmGetSystemRoutineAddress. This global linked list maintains information about all loaded kernel modules and drivers, allowing the rootkit to enumerate and manipulate module entries.

Driver initialization routine resolving the address of PsLoadedModuleList for subsequent kernel module hiding

This functionality is exposed through IOCTL 0x222138, which accepts a module name or path from the user-mode component. When a matching module is found, the driver locates the corresponding entry in PsLoadedModuleList and unlinks it by updating its Flink and Blink pointers. As a result, the hidden module no longer appears in standard kernel module enumeration routines.

Nsiproxy hooking and data filtering

The driver also hooks the Nsiproxy driver to filter network-related data returned to user mode. This functionality is connected to IOCTL 0x2221E0, which allows the user-mode component to register C2 IPv4 addresses with the driver.

To install the hook, the driver obtains a reference to \Driver\Nsiproxy using ObReferenceObjectByName and replaces one of the Nsiproxy handler pointers with its own filtering routine. The hook preserves the original handler and forwards execution after processing the returned data.

Installing the Nsiproxy hook by resolving \Driver\Nsiproxy and replacing the original handler with the driver’s filtering routine

When the hooked routine processes network information, the driver compares the returned entries against its registered C2 address list. Matching IP addresses are removed before the data is returned to user mode, preventing applications that rely on Nsiproxy-provided network information from seeing the malware’s C2 addresses.

Finally, the driver registers a DriverUnload routine to release allocated resources when the driver is unloaded.

Victimology

The latest CoolClient variant continues to target organizations consistent with previously observed HoneyMyte activity. Based on our investigations, we identified victims in Myanmar, Mongolia, Pakistan, and Russia, including confirmed government entities.

Across the observed intrusions, CoolClient was consistently deployed as a secondary backdoor following a PlugX infection, indicating that HoneyMyte continues to use PlugX as its initial post-compromise implant before transitioning to CoolClient.

Attribution

Our analysis confirms that the investigated malware is a new CoolClient variant associated with the HoneyMyte threat group. While the overall execution flow remains consistent with previously documented CoolClient variants, this sample introduces a previously undocumented kernel-mode driver that significantly expands the malware’s stealth capabilities.

The deployment chain observed in this investigation is also consistent with previous HoneyMyte campaigns, in which PlugX serves as the initial foothold before CoolClient is deployed as a secondary backdoor, further reinforcing the attribution.

Conclusion

The latest CoolClient variant represents a significant evolution of the malware. Rather than operating solely as a user-mode backdoor with plugin support, it now deploys and communicates with a kernel-mode driver that extends its capabilities beyond earlier versions. Through this driver, CoolClient can hide and protect processes, files, and registry objects, as well as filter selected network information, making detection and analysis considerably more difficult.

HoneyMyte has previously introduced kernel-mode functionality in ToneShell. The addition of a kernel-mode driver to CoolClient suggests that the group continues to expand its use of rootkit capabilities to improve stealth, persistence, and defense evasion during post-compromise operations.

IOCs

2d7c8780e97409770a9d4f31c66c9d63 msagent.sys
9460E150E1981D5C165043520C5C12FE msagent.sys
9717F005C5FB98E08D2AD983D88F94EE libngs.dll
F518D8E5FE70D9090F6280C68A95998F libngs.dll
EB79558B037669792652A816E2C669DE ctxmui.dll

C:\Program Files\microsoft\windows defender\
C:\Program Files\windows media player\mediares\
C:\ProgramData\symantecdir\
C:\ProgramData\virtualstore\
C:\Windows\identitycrl\production\
C:\Windows\serviceprofiles\networkservice\
C:\Users\<user>\AppData\Local\viber24.8\
C:\Users\<user>\AppData\Roaming\dsassistant\
C:\Program Files\common files\microsoft shared\office14\
C:\programdata\msdn\

cloudtroe.giize[.]com
employers.theworkpc[.]com
freeread.casacam[.]net
us.lenovoappstore[.]com
sundanish.freeddns[.]org
torinarlabs.webredirect[.]org
news.dursamjbataar[.]org
video.dursamjbataar[.]org
black-popular[.]com
whatismybestthing[.]com

Scotland's public prosecution service has warned 300 staff that their personal information may have been caught up in a cyberattack on one of its suppliers. The Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service (COPFS) disclosed the incident on Thursday, saying an unnamed third-party supplier detected suspicious activity on August 5 and subsequently launched an investigation. COPFS said its own systems were not compromised and that the incident involves information provided for an online data maturity assessment completed by the prosecution service last year. The Scottish government organized the assessment, which was managed by the affected supplier. COPFS said the potentially exposed information is limited to employment-related data submitted for the exercise, including staff names, roles, and work email addresses. In a statement to The Register, a COPFS spokesperson said: "COPFS is aware that a Scottish Government partner has been subject to a data security breach. We understand that this has affected around 300 COPFS colleagues who participated in a public sector data maturity survey. "This is unconnected to casework and did not involve sensitive or confidential case information. There is no impact on the work of the prosecution service. "Colleagues have been reminded of guidance on responding to any phishing or scam attempts which may arise from this third-party breach." According to COPFS, the supplier has taken steps to secure its systems and is still investigating how the intrusion happened and precisely what information may have been accessed. COPFS said it would provide further updates if "significant new information" emerges. It is unclear whether the incident is connected to the recent exploitation of a zero-day vulnerability in business intelligence platform Metabase. The Scottish government did not answer our question about whether the affected supplier used the software. Metabase disclosed this month that attackers had exploited a previously unknown vulnerability in its cloud service, potentially allowing them to gain administrator access and reach connected databases. As we reported earlier this week, modular laptop maker Framework was among those affected. For now, the supplier breach leaves plenty of questions and few answers about who got in or what they accessed. ®

**ChatGPT si nově může pamatovat, co jste dělali na počítači. **Funkce Computer History sleduje aktivitu v aplikacích a na webech. **Díky tomu dokáže lépe navázat na vaši práci.

ChatGPT si nově může pamatovat, co jste dělali na počítači. • Funkce Computer History sleduje aktivitu v aplikacích a na webech. • Díky tomu dokáže lépe navázat na vaši práci.

A former data analyst contractor for Brightly Software has been sentenced to two years in prison for targeting his employer in a $2.5 million extortion scheme. [...]

Po zvyšování cen DRAM, NAND Flash / SSD, mechanických pevných disků, grafických karet, zdrojů i licencí Windows 11, rostou i ceny monitorů…

The China-linked threat actor known as Jewelbug has been observed carrying out cyber espionage operations targeting governments and militaries, while simultaneously engaging in cryptocurrency fraud. "Both missions are administered from a single control panel, XG-Web, a browser-centric remote-access and information-stealing framework that turns a victim's browser into a full remote-control Ravie Lakshmananhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/[email protected]

Qualcomm upřesnil specifikace nového čipu Snapdragon C, který představil letos v květnu a kterým chce proniknout do lowendových pater počítačů – desktopů i notebooků. Stále ještě neznáme datum uvedení takových strojů, ale nabízí se září, kdy by mohli výrobci prezentovat nová PC na berlínském ...

Nákladní Boeing 737 se patrně po poruše navigace zřítil do Arabského moře • Černé skříňky leží v hloubce tři tisíce metrů a nejspíš už nevysílají signál • Vyšetřovatelé nevydali předběžnou zprávu a příčina nehody zůstává neznámá

O procesorech Diamond Rapids se mluví již šest let. Jejich architektura i výbava se však opakovaně nejednou měnila a dlouho to vypadalo, že půjde o 256 jader Panther Cove, z nichž bude aktivních 192…

Na všech herních platformách je každou chvíli nějaká slevová akce. Každý týden proto vybíráme ty nejatraktivnější, které by vám neměly uniknout. Pokud chcete získat hry zdarma nebo s výhodnou slevou, podívejte se na aktuální přehled akcí!

New Zealand’s Security Intelligence Service (NZSIS) has claimed Chinese companies are building space facilities in the nation to gather military intelligence. Director-general of security Andrew Hampton yesterday made that allegation in the SIS’s annual threat environment assessment. The document points out that New Zealand’s space sector is booming, because the nation’s location makes it “an ideal place to install Ground Based Space Infrastructure (GBSI) … to track satellites and space debris, as well as for collecting a range of other scientific data.” The NZSIS has also found that GBSI is “attractive for foreign states seeking to advance military capabilities and intelligence operations.” The report offers a case study of a China-based organization called “Purple Mountain Observatory” that has “close links” to Beijing and tried to install GBSI in New Zealand. “They worked with a local company that was likely unaware of the equipment’s capability to collect intelligence of military value and would have no idea who was receiving the data,” the report states, before noting that Chinese laws mean Purple Mountain could be compelled to provide information to China’s government. The intelligence agency believes Purple Mountain “would have … willingly passed on” data it collected. “NZSIS, working with other agencies was able to disrupt this activity, but it was not the first time this organisation has attempted to install its own GBSI in New Zealand and is unlikely to be the last.” The report rates China as the only country targeting New Zealand at scale, based on activity NZSIS has been able to observe. “We have observed increased targeting of professional networking sites and online job platforms for espionage purposes by China’s military intelligence services,” the assessment finds. "PRC (People’s Republic of China) intelligence officers, or their affiliates, use an aggressive strategy where they pose as consultants or employees of think tanks, or recruitment firms. They place online job advertisements looking for analysts in foreign policy, international relations, defence or security,” the document states. “Candidates are then vetted by PRC intelligence to determine what information they have had access to and whether they would divulge it. The job offers are lucrative, but the intelligence officers often encourage their candidates to keep their government jobs both to keep the information tap running and to open up opportunities to recruit their colleagues.” The report also observes that some recent cyber-attacks were probably the work of state-backed groups trying to destabilize New Zealand. “Looking for the sharpest needle in endless giant stacks of needles” The document also addresses domestic threats, especially violent extremism. “Part of our job is to work out whether someone’s vitriolic and violent online pronouncements have any link to New Zealand,” the report states. “This is a narrow focus but the pool of information and intelligence we are working with is vast.” “We used to describe our work as finding a needle in a haystack. However, the internet has changed. Large volumes of toxic content, widespread anonymity, and hidden locations mean our job is now like looking for the sharpest needle in endless giant stacks of needles.” “Extremist rhetoric, particularly online, has become more mainstream, a development which has made it even more challenging to differentiate between genuine support for violent extremism, hateful language designed to shock, or online content created simply to drive engagement or ‘likes’.” NZSIS also has to keep an eye on encrypted messaging services and even gaming platforms, to counter violent online communities. “Algorithms on various social media platforms can link non-violent content to progressively more extreme material,” the report states. “The gateway subject matter can quickly expose people to violent extremist content that can support radicalisation.” Kiwis aren’t just recipients of this vile material. “NZSIS has observed New Zealand violent extremists use encrypted messaging systems, social media and online gaming platforms to circulate violent material including weapon tutorials and objectionable content. Their presence on these platforms, many of which are mainstream, also helps them to find like-minded individuals or supporters.” ® Bootnote: Readers interested in New Zealand’s intelligence services might enjoy 2026 comedy series New Zealand Spy, a deadpan delight.

One of AI vendor DeepSeek’s biggest selling points has been its ultra-low price point, but that party’s about to end.

The Chinese model provider is raising API pricing for its V4 model family by notable margins, in some cases by more than 1,100%. The increases may not be that dramatic for all, though; the company is encouraging “more flexible workload scheduling,” with peak rates and half-price off-peak rates.

The news was tucked into the announcement of the general availability (GA) of DeepSeek V4-Pro and upgrades to VR-Flash. The new pricing takes effect for most parts of the world on August 16.

“On paper, at peak, against the right comparator, DeepSeek’s price advantage does disappear, and in places inverts,” said Sanchit Vir Gogia, chief analyst at Greyhound Research. But in practice, “the schedule’s own clock and cache hand most of it back to any buyer paying attention.”

How Flash and Pro compare now

The new API pricing structure is as follows:

• Flash is now $0.22 per million input tokens (cache miss) and $0.66 per million output tokens off-peak; and $0.44 per million input tokens (cache miss) and $1.32 per million output tokens at peak.
  This is up from the flat rate of $0.14 for inputs (cache miss), representing a 57% to 214% increase, and $0.28 per million tokens for outputs, a 136% to 371% increase.
•  Pro is now $0.66 per million input tokens (cache miss) and $1.98 per million output tokens off-peak; and $1.32 per million input tokens (cache miss) and $3.96 per million output tokens at peak.
  This represents an input increase of between 51% and 203% (up from $0.435) and output increase between 127% and 355% (up from $0.87).

Inputs with cache hits, when apps reuse stored prompts rather than processing similar requests from scratch, have even more dramatic pricing increases of 52% to 1,100%.

Mark Tauschek, VP of research fellowships and distinguished analyst at Info-Tech Research Group, pointed out that the increase does eliminate the price advantage that 4.0 Flash has over OpenAI 5.6 Luna at peak pricing, but not at off-peak pricing, as OpenAI has dropped Luna API pricing by 80%, off-peak.

It also doesn’t eliminate Deepseek 4.0 Pro’s price advantage over Terra, OpenAI’s GPT-5.6 mid-tier reasoning model, even at peak pricing, nor its advantage over GPT-5.6 Sol released in July, Tauschek said.

Greyhound Research’s Gogia noted that, off-peak, V4 Flash is “marginally more expensive” on input and 45% cheaper on output than Luna. Pro at peak, meanwhile, runs close to 5x Luna’s price on a representative coding-agent workload.

DeepSeek’s roughly 98% cache-hit discount, against an industry norm nearer to 90%, is the mechanism that has kept its measured cost per task at about 60% below Luna, even after Luna’s cost cut, he said.

“The schedule re-prices exactly that mechanism,” Gogia said. Flash’s edge over Luna decreases from roughly sevenfold to threefold off-peak, and 1.4 times at peak. “The cache is where the advantage genuinely erodes.”

Encouraging users to rethink their schedules

DeepSeek’s V4-Pro is now generally available, and V4-Flash is in beta. Both models have new flexible reasoning capabilities (low, high, max) and ‘thinking modes’ that use chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning to improve answer accuracy. V4 Pro is now available on app, web, and via API, and users can try it using “Expert Mode.” V4 Flash is now in beta.

The general availability “completes a two-tier structure in which Flash serves volume and Pro is priced for complexity,” Gogia noted.

DeepSeek’s peak/off-peak pricing is a means to “allocate resources more reasonably,” the company said, to encourage users to “schedule their tasks based on actual usage.”

Gogia pointed out that with the new model, 17 of every 24 hours stay at half price, so timing becomes an economic variable, and work that can wait moves into the cheap hours. In fact, the new pricing schedule hits DeepSeek’s home market hardest and its export market lightest; Western buyers largely pay the off-peak rates.

“Usage is following economics at least as much as capability, and economics can change by schedule,” Gogia noted.

Simple supply and demand

Reading between the lines provides a more nuanced picture, Tauschek noted. “While it’s alarming to see the headlines saying DeepSeek is raising API pricing by 50%-1100%, it doesn’t really tell the whole story.”

Part of that story is demand, which is increasing exponentially. DeepSeek can’t keep up with compute requirements, and Anthropic also had a price increase for the same reason in April. And, while third-party providers have not yet reflected that trend, they’ll eventually have to, Tauschek said.

“This isn’t unexpected at all,” he noted. “It’s simple supply and demand: when demand goes up, pricing goes up, because supply becomes constrained.”

For enterprises that do use DeepSeek (many in the US do not, or can not), the new pricing is not likely to change anything, he said. Cost increases will mostly impact developers, but it will still be less expensive than most alternatives.

He pointed out that enterprises are adapting to model routing, which is critical for developers using agentic workloads. Just a few months ago, organizations were paying per-seat pricing and running up usage as a matter of course, but the market move to usage-based pricing has resulted in sticker shock akin to that of the early cloud days.

“Pricing will continue to be a big deal because CFOs are starting to ask what they’re getting for the massive AI spend,” Tauschek said.

DeepSeek pricing doesn’t change the need for compatibility, multi-modality

CIOs should read the schedule with “relief and unease,” Gogia noted. Relief because the bill is largely schedulable; unease because “a supplier that has learned to price the clock has learned something about its own leverage.”

Going forward, he predicted, Flash keeps the volume usage, Pro handles complexity, and interface compatibility lowers the cost of adoption and departure. The real question becomes whether lower economic floors, open weights, and compatible interfaces, when taken together with multi-model routing, make foundation model intelligence materially easier to substitute.

Capable inference can be produced “far below the price structures that once surrounded frontier AI,” Gogia noted, and open weights mean model developers become one of just several parties able to serve inference requirements. “The traditional software dependency changes shape when that happens,” he said.

The vendor still matters, as do capability and support, but once a workload can move between providers, and enterprises manage their own orchestration and governance, the vendor no longer owns the whole dependency, Gogia said.

The most lasting effect of DeepSeek is unlikely to be that it stayed cheapest, he noted. “It is that every provider must now explain why intelligence should command a premium once near-equivalent capability is available through several technical and commercial routes.”

This article originally appeared on InfoWorld.