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Long before Taco Tuesday became part of the pop-culture vernacular, Tuesdays were synonymous with security — and for anyone in the tech world, they still are.  Patch Tuesday, as you most likely know, refers to the day each month when Microsoft releases security updates and patches for its software products — everything from Windows to Office to SQL Server, developer tools to browsers.

The practice, which happens on the second Tuesday of the month, was initiated to streamline the patch distribution process and make it easier for users and IT system administrators to manage updates.  Like tacos, Patch Tuesday is here to stay.

In a blog post celebrating the 20th anniversary of Patch Tuesday, the Microsoft Security Response Center wrote: “The concept of Patch Tuesday was conceived and implemented in 2003. Before this unified approach, our security updates were sporadic, posing significant challenges for IT professionals and organizations in deploying critical patches in a timely manner.”

Patch Tuesday will continue to be an “important part of our strategy to keep users secure,” Microsoft said, adding that it’s now an important part of the cybersecurity industry.  As a case in point, Adobe, among others, follows a similar patch cadence.

Patch Tuesday coverage has also long been a staple of Computerworld’s commitment to provide critical information to the IT industry. That’s why we’ve gathered together this collection of recent patches, a rolling list we’ll keep updated each month.

In case you missed a recent Patch Tuesday announcement, here are the latest six months of updates.

For June, Patch Tuesday means an IT scramble

Microsoft this month released 206 updates affecting Windows, Office, Exchange Server, and its developer tools — including three Windows vulnerabilities already publicly disclosed. That trio includes an elevation of privilege in the Collaborative Translation Framework (CVE-2026-45586), a denial of service in HTTP.sys (CVE-2026-49160), and a BitLocker security feature bypass (CVE-2026-50507). At the moment, none appear to be under active exploitation, but all three are rated “Exploitation More Likely.” 

Even without an exploited zero-day, the June 2026 Patch Tuesday release requires Patch Now recommendations for Windows, Office, and Exchange. The latter is back in the patch picture with a consolidated security update that Microsoft recommends installing “as soon as possible.”

More info is available here on Microsoft Security updates for June 2026.

For May, Patch Tuesday means 139 updates — but no zero-days

Microsoft this month released 139 updates affecting Windows, Office, .NET, and SQL Server (though there were no updates for Microsoft Exchange Server). Despite the absence of zero-days, the May Patch Tuesday update still requires Patch Now recommendations for Windows and Office. 

The combination of three unauthenticated network RCEs (Netlogon, DNS Client, and SSO Plugin for Jira and Confluence), four Word Preview Pane RCEs, the large TCP/IP vulnerability cluster, and the carry-over BitLocker recovery condition (still active on Windows 10 and Windows Server) warrants an accelerated deployment release schedule. 

More info is available here on Microsoft Security updates for May 2026.

Microsoft’s Patch Tuesday release for April is a whopper

Windows admins are going to be busy this month, dealing with the largest Patch Tuesday cycle in memory. The April release involves 165 updates and roughly 340 unique CVEs from Microsoft — including two zero-days, one of which is already being actively exploited in the wild. 

The Readiness team recommends “Patch Now” schedules for nearly every major product family: Windows, Office (with a zero-day), Microsoft Edge (Chromium), SQL Server, and Microsoft Developer Tools (.NET). April also brings Phase 2 of Microsoft’s Kerberos RC4 hardening with full enforcement set for July. There is a lot to cover, so here’s a useful infographic mapping the deployment risk for each platform.

More info is available here on Microsoft Security updates for April 2026.

For March, Patch Tuesday delivers fixes for 83 vulnerabilities

Microsoft’s March Patch Tuesday release addresses 83 vulnerabilities across Windows, Office, SQL Server, Azure, and .NET — with two publicly disclosed zero-days affecting SQL Server and .NET (though neither is being actively exploited in the wild.) Six additional vulnerabilities spanning the Windows Kernel, Graphics Component, SMB Server, Accessibility Infrastructure, and Winlogon are flagged as “Exploitation More Likely.”

The most significant change this month is the introduction of Common Log File System (CLFS) hardening with signature verification, which will affect how Windows handles log files across the operating system. More info on Microsoft Security updates for March 2026.

February’s Patch Tuesday release fixes 59 flaws, including 6 being exploited

The company’s Patch Tuesday release for February addresses 59 CVEs across the company’s product family — roughly half the volume of January’s 159 patches. Six vulnerabilities, affecting Windows Shell, MSHTML, Desktop Window Manager, Remote Desktop, Remote Access, and Microsoft Word, are already being actively exploited. (All five Critical-rated CVEs target Azureservices rather than Windows, however.) 

Both Windows and Office get a “Patch Now” recommendation, with CISA setting a March 3 enforcement deadline for all six exploited vulnerabilities. Two new enforcement timelines also take effect in April: Kerberos RC4 deprecation (CVE-2026-20833) and Windows Deployment Services hardening (CVE-2026-0386). More info on Microsoft Security updates for February 2026.

For January, Patch Tuesday starts off with a bang

The first Patch Tuesday release of 2026 addresses 112 CVEs across Microsoft’s product portfolio, including eight rated critical and three zero-day vulnerabilities. One zero-day (CVE-2026-20805), an information disclosure flaw in the Desktop Window Manager, is already under active exploitation, prompting CISA to add it to the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog with a remediation deadline of Feb. 3, 2026. (Note: 95 of the vulnerabilities affect Windows.) More info on Microsoft Security updates for January 2026.

Microsoft this week released 206 updates affecting Windows, Office, Exchange Server, and its developer tools —  including three Windows vulnerabilities already publicly disclosed. That trio includes an elevation of privilege in the Collaborative Translation Framework (CVE-2026-45586), a denial of service in HTTP.sys (CVE-2026-49160), and a BitLocker security feature bypass (CVE-2026-50507). At the moment, none appear to be under active exploitation, but all three are rated “Exploitation More Likely.” 

Even without an exploited zero-day, the June 2026 Patch Tuesday release requires Patch Now recommendations for Windows, Office, and Exchange. The latter is back in the patch picture with a consolidated security update that Microsoft recommends installing “as soon as possible.” 

The Readiness team suggests testing start with domain controllers, Hyper-V hosts, anything self-hosting on HTTP.sys, and Outlook-heavy desktops —  in that order. To help navigate these changes, here’s a useful infographic detailing the risks of deploying the updates to each platform.

(More information about recent Patch Tuesday releases is available here.)

Known issues

This June release note from Microsoft flags known issues with three updates:

• KB5094128 — BitLocker recovery prompt on first restart (Windows Server 2022). The PCR7 condition we have tracked since April is still live on the platforms that did not receive May’s Boot Manager servicing fix. Devices with BitLocker enabled on the OS drive, the Group Policy “Configure TPM platform validation profile for native UEFI firmware configurations” set with PCR7 included, and System Information reporting Secure Boot State PCR7 Binding as “Not Possible” may prompt for the recovery key on the first restart after installing this update.
• KB5094127 — Windows 10 21H2/22H2. The release note carries a known-issue flag, too, with Windows 10 in the same boat as Server 2022: it has not received the Boot Manager servicing improvement that closed the BitLocker/PCR7 recovery condition on Windows 11. So, that same Group Policy configuration remains the trigger to check before deployment.
• KB5094125/KB5094128 — WSUS synchronization error details suppressed (Windows Server 2025 and 2022). WSUS no longer displays synchronization error details in its reporting. This is deliberate: the functionality was “temporarily removed to address the Remote Code Execution Vulnerability, CVE-2025-59287.” Microsoft offered no workaround.

One continuing advisory from May remains in effect: Windows Update can still replace manually installed graphics drivers with older OEM versions from the Windows Update catalogue.

Major revisions and mitigations

Unlike last month, this patch cycle delivered two genuine revisions and a cluster of out-of-band fixes that require action:

• Microsoft Teams Spoofing (CVE-2026-32185) — revised to version 3.0 on May 21. Microsoft announced the availability of the security update for Teams for Android; customers running affected versions should install it. If your mobile fleet runs Android, this is the action item.
• Microsoft Defender out-of-band cluster (May 19–21) — a Critical remote code execution flaw (CVE-2026-45584), plus an elevation of privilege (CVE-2026-41091) and a denial of service (CVE-2026-45498).
• SharePoint RCE (CVE-2026-45659) — a separate out-of-band fix also posted on May 21. SharePoint admins had three distinct security notices in a fortnight. The recommendation: deploy these clustered but separate patches as a single unit.

Interestingly, there were two omissions from last month’s list:

• SharePoint Server RCE (CVE-2026-47294) — published May 29 with the note that it “was addressed by updates that were released in May 2026, but the CVE was inadvertently omitted from the May 2026 Security Updates.”
• Windows DWM Core Library Information Disclosure (CVE-2026-48566) — also fixed in May, also left off the May list.

That makes two months running: the Patch Tuesday list is never final. The June release itself also carried a substantive revision:

• Remote Desktop cluster re-issued for Windows 11 26H1 — five RDP/RDS CVEs from 2024–2025, including two Critical RCEs (CVE-2024-49123, CVE-2024-49132) and the RDP Server RCE (CVE-2024-43582). If you are running 26H1, the June cumulative closes these older CVEs.

Windows lifecycle and enforcement updates

Given the month SharePoint just had, SharePoint 2016/2019 require some of the cycle’s most active patching on a platform with one update left. If migration is not already in progress, July’s final update is the deadline. Here are the other key dates:

• The 2011 KEK CA expires on June 24, and the UEFI CA for third-party boot loaders follows three days later, with the Windows Production PCA for the boot manager coming up October. 19. Devices that have not taken the Windows UEFI CA 2023 key updates under CVE-2023-24932 lose the ability to receive updated boot components once the certificates lapse. This is a big deal.
• With just one Patch Tuesday to go, SharePoint Server 2016 and 2019, Project Server 2016 and 2019, SQL Server 2016, and SQL Server 2014 ESU Year 2 all reach end of support on July 14. (InfoPath 2013, SharePoint Designer 2013, and Visual Studio 2022 17.12 LTSC go with them.)
• Kerberos RC4 hardening (CVE-2026-20833) moves from default-hardening to its enforcement phase next month. Accounts still depending on RC4 service tickets have weeks, not months.
• The graphics-driver targeting change (four-part to two-part Hardware IDs) pilots to September 2026, with broader enforcement planned for Q4 2026 to Q1 2027; until then, Windows Update can still downgrade manually installed display drivers.

This month’s release is a security-only release with a clear feature focus: the Remote Desktop client. The Remote Desktop ActiveX control (mstscax.dll) is the most patched component this cycle with five separate updates (see below). 

The secondary theme is Windows authentication, with three updates to the NTLM security package. Every Windows binary this month reports no functional changes, so the work is pure regression validation. Lower-risk patches reach DHCP, telephony, Hyper-V, UDF and Projected File System storage, and the graphics stack.

Remote Desktop client

The Remote Desktop client (mstscax.dll) draws a high-risk flag that lands specifically on printer redirection — the path that maps a client’s local printers into a remote session. A regression here typically shows as missing redirected printers, failed print jobs, or a hang on connect or reconnect. The wider Remote Desktop stack is also updated, including RemoteApp and clipboard redirection (rdpclip.exe, RdpCoreTS.dll) and Remote Desktop Licensing (lserver.dll). So, be sure to validate connection, session, and licensing together.

A passing run is a remote session that connects, redirects printers, prints, and survives a reconnect with no crashes or missing devices.

• Connect with Remote Desktop Connection (mstsc.exe) to a test host, enable printer redirection in Local Resources, and confirm redirected printers appear in the session.
• Print a test page from an app in the session to a redirected printer; repeat with two or more client printers installed.
• Disconnect and reconnect the session, then confirm the redirected printers are still present and usable.
• Repeat the printer test in both a full desktop session and a RemoteApp session.
• Exercise general remote access: connect through a Remote Desktop Gateway, use VMConnect to reach a VM, and verify clipboard and device redirection.
• On a Remote Desktop Licensing server, confirm clients connect with licensing enabled, across Per User and Per Device modes.

Windows authentication (NTLM)

Three updates touch the NTLM security support provider (msv1\_0.dll), the module behind network authentication when Kerberos is not used. Authentication changes are regression-sensitive: the failure modes are logon failures, broken file-share or RDP access, and application sign-in problems. Validate across domain-joined and workgroup machines.

• Sign in to domain-joined and standalone machines with domain, local, and cached credentials after a reboot.
• Access SMB file shares by host name and IP, including paths that fall back to NTLM, and confirm authenticated reads and writes.
• Authenticate to a Remote Desktop host and to line-of-business applications that rely on integrated Windows authentication.
• Watch the Security event log for new logon-failure or audit anomalies during the test window.

Other Windows components

The remaining updates carry no functional changes, so cover them with routine regression by area.

• Networking: exercise DHCP lease, renewal, and release on IPv4 and IPv6 (dhcpcore), sustained socket traffic over the WinSock driver (afd.sys, two updates), HTTP.sys request handling under IIS, and TAPI telephony integrations (tapisrv.dll).
• Virtualization: boot Generation 1 and Generation 2 VMs, including nested virtualization, to cover the Hyper-V hypervisor (hvix64/hvax64), and connect a VM through an external virtual switch (toggling NIC RSS) to cover vmswitch.sys.
• Storage and filesystems: read and write UDF-formatted media (udfs.sys), exercise the Projected File System minifilter (prjflt.sys), and validate cloud files hydration and Work Folders sync (cldflt.sys, workfolders.exe), including a ReFS volume with BitLocker enabled.
• Graphics and shell: run GPU-accelerated and 2D rendering workloads to cover Direct2D (d2d1.dll), GDI+ (gdiplus.dll), the Desktop Window Manager (dwmcore.dll), the Windows Imaging Component (windowscodecs.dll), and UI Automation (UiaManager.dll); watch for artifacts and accessibility regressions.
• Notifications and input: open apps that raise toast and push notifications (wpnapps.dll, wpncore.dll) and verify Text Services Framework input across keyboard layouts and IMEs (msctf.dll).

Microsoft Office & SharePoint

June’s Office updates are MSI editions only: Excel 2016 (KB5002877), Word 2016 (KB5002879), Office 2016 shared components (KB5002878, KB5002852, and the rich-edit control KB5002578), and Office Online Server 2019 (KB5002875). The shared Office 2016 component updates also apply to the SharePoint Server 2016, 2019, and Subscription Edition baselines. No Critical non-security client release ships this cycle, and Click-to-Run estates are unaffected.

• Open complex Excel workbooks with formulas, macros, and external data connections; save and reopen to verify integrity.
• Edit Word documents with embedded objects, tracked changes, and rich formatting that exercises the rich-edit control.
• On the SharePoint Server baselines (2016, 2019, Subscription Edition) and Office Online Server, validate document library operations, co-authoring, and browser-based viewing and editing.
• Confirm that Office add-ins and line-of-business integrations continue to operate.

Developer tools and databases

June’s fixes update the .NET SDK across the 8.0, 9.0, and 10.0 servicing lines (8.0.422, 9.0.315, 10.0.301), and ships SQL Server GDR security updates spanning SQL Server 2016 SP3 through SQL Server 2025, in both RTM+GDR and cumulative-update+GDR branches.

• After installing the .NET SDK update, build and run representative applications and confirm existing projects compile and execute normally.
• For SQL Server, install the GDR update onto the matching baseline or cumulative-update branch, then restart the service and run standard transactions.
• Verify a backup and restore, confirm Always On availability groups stay healthy, and test patch install and removal on each servicing branch.

The Readiness team suggests that this month’s testing lead with Remote Desktop. The client is both the most-patched component and the sole High Risk item, so give it a focused regression pass centered on printer redirection, then broaden to general connectivity, RemoteApp, clipboard and device redirection, gateway access, and licensing. 

The NTLM authentication updates are the second priority: validate domain and standalone logon, file-share access, and application sign-in. Everything else is a no-functional-change security update, so cover networking, Hyper-V, storage, and graphics with routine regression. Office is MSI-only, with Click-to-Run untouched, and the .NET and SQL Server updates round out the developer and database estate.

Each month, we break down the update cycle into product families (as defined by Microsoft) with the following basic groupings:

Browsers

Microsoft Edge released the stable version (149.0.4022.52) on June 4, per the Edge security release notes. Nothing ships for Internet Explorer, which remains retired. This cycle is unusually lopsided: just one Edge-engineered CVE against a very large Chromium upstream flow:

• CVE-2026-47644 — Copilot Chat (Microsoft Edge) — Information disclosure (CVSS 6.5, rated critical). For the second month running, Copilot Chat in Edge supplies the headline browser issue (May’s was CVE-2026-33111); Microsoft addresses the Copilot service component, with the browser update completing the fix.
• Chromium upstream — 407 CVEs relayed through MSRC this cycle, spanning the weekly Chrome release cadence since the May report: use-after-free, out-of-bounds read/write, type confusion, and policy bypass across V8, Blink, PDFium, WebRTC, ANGLE, and DevTools. The same fixes ship in the Chrome Stable channel; see the Chrome release blog for the upstream notes.

The Chromium volume looks alarming but is routine plumbing —  it flows to Edge through its own auto-update channel. Add these updates to your standard release schedule for Edge-managed environments.

Windows

Microsoft addressed 119 vulnerabilities in Windows this month, 22 rated critical and 97, important —  nearly double May’s count. Elevation of privilege again dominates by volume (49 entries), followed by remote code execution (28), information disclosure (16), security feature bypass (15), denial of service (6), and a handful of spoofing and tampering entries. All three of June’s publicly disclosed zero-days land here:

• CVE-2026-45586 — Collaborative Translation Framework (CTFMON) — Elevation of privilege (CVSS 7.8, publicly disclosed).
• CVE-2026-49160 — HTTP.sys — Denial of service (CVSS 7.5, publicly disclosed).
• CVE-2026-50507 — BitLocker — Security feature bypass (CVSS 6.8, publicly disclosed) —  BitLocker’s third entry this month, keeping it on the radar alongside the PCR7 known issue.

At the feature level, the critical risks are concentrated in nine areas:

• Remote Desktop Client — the largest single cluster: 11 CVEs, 7 rated critical, led by CVE-2026-47289 and CVE-2026-42985 (both CVSS 8.8, the latter “Exploitation More Likely”).
• Windows Kernel — CVE-2026-45657, remote code execution at CVSS 9.8, the joint-highest Windows score this cycle.
• HTTP.sys — CVE-2026-47291, unauthenticated remote code execution (CVSS 9.8, “Exploitation More Likely”) in the kernel-mode web server underpinning IIS, WinRM, and anything self-hosting on http.sys — paired with the disclosed DoS above.
• DHCP Client — CVE-2026-44815, remote code execution at CVSS 9.8.
• Active Directory Domain Services — CVE-2026-45648, remote code execution (CVSS 8.8) on the directory itself, with the Kerberos KDC adding a separate critical RCE (CVE-2026-47288).
• Hyper-V — three critical RCEs (CVE-2026-45607, CVE-2026-45641, CVE-2026-47652, up to CVSS 8.4) — guest-to-host risk on virtualization hosts.
• Windows Graphics Component — two critical RCEs (CVE-2026-44803, CVE-2026-44812, CVSS 7.8), both “Exploitation More Likely” vulnerabilities reachable through Office rendering paths.
• Windows Deployment Services — CVE-2026-42987, remote code execution (CVSS 8.1).
• Cryptographic Services and Device Health Attestation — critical elevation-of-privilege entries (CVE-2026-44810, CVSS 8.4; CVE-2026-33828, CVSS 7.8) in trust-anchor components.

Given the publicly disclosed vulnerabilities this month, add this Windows update to your Patch Now schedule.

Office

Microsoft released 53 Office CVEs this month — 10 critical, 43 important. Remote code execution again leads (24 entries), but the surprise is spoofing at 20 entries, almost all of it SharePoint. (SharePoint Server appears in 30 of the 53 CVEs this cycle.) The rest split across information disclosure (6), elevation of privilege (2), and a security feature bypass.

• Microsoft has addressed seven critical remote code execution entries, each CVSS 8.4, each with the Preview Pane confirmed as an attack vector: CVE-2026-45456, CVE-2026-45458, and CVE-2026-47635 against Outlook and Word, plus CVE-2026-45461, CVE-2026-45463, CVE-2026-45472, and CVE-2026-45474 against Office broadly.

Add these Office updates to your Patch Now deployment, prioritizing Outlook-heavy desktops and SharePoint farms.

Microsoft Exchange and SQL Server

The pattern inverts from May: SQL Server receives nothing (no patches at all), while Exchange Server — absent in May — returns with a consolidated security update carrying seven CVEs for on-premises builds (Exchange Server 2016 CU23 and Exchange Server 2019), plus one cloud-side critical:

• CVE-2026-45504 — Exchange Server — Elevation of privilege (CVSS 8.8). The headline on-premises entry.
• CVE-2026-45503 and CVE-2026-47631 — Exchange Server — Information disclosure and spoofing, each CVSS 8.1.
• CVE-2026-45583 — Exchange Server — Remote code execution (CVSS 7.5), with three further spoofing/information-disclosure entries (CVE-2026-45500, CVE-2026-45501, CVE-2026-45502) rounding out the set.
• CVE-2026-48579 — Exchange Online — Information disclosure (CVSS 9.1, rated critical) —  addressed service-side, no customer action.

Microsoft also revised the May Exchange spoofing entry (CVE-2026-42897) to point at this same June security update, with the recommendation to install “as soon as possible.” Add the June Exchange SU to your Patch Now schedule.

Developer tools

Microsoft released 10 CVEs across its developer tooling this month, all rated important —  though the top score outranks most of this cycle’s criticals, and the concentration in Visual Studio Code (seven of 10 entries) continues last month’s pattern:

• Visual Studio Code — seven entries led by CVE-2026-47281, an elevation of privilege at CVSS 9.6 —  the highest developer-tools score in months. Behind it: CVE-2026-45482, a security feature bypass in the GitHub Copilot Chat extension (CVSS 8.4); CVE-2026-47292, remote code execution in the MSSQL extension (CVSS 7.8); a second elevation of privilege (CVE-2026-40376, CVSS 7.5); and security-feature-bypass, tampering, and information-disclosure entries (CVE-2026-48569, CVE-2026-47287, CVE-2026-47284).
• Microsoft .NET on Windows has three entries: CVE-2026-45490, a .NET SDK elevation of privilege (CVSS 7.8) across .NET 8.0, 9.0, and 10.0; CVE-2026-45591, an ASP.NET Core denial of service (CVSS 7.5); and CVE-2026-45491, a .NET tampering issue (CVSS 6.2).

Add these Microsoft updates to your standard developer update release plan.

Adobe (and third-party updates)

Adobe released APSB26-63 for Acrobat and Reader this cycle, fixing critical code-execution flaws; Adobe reports no exploitation in the wild. Add it to your standard third-party schedule. This is a big (fat) Windows update this month (and yes, I think that AI has something to do with the number of these patches). 

Good luck with your deployments.

An intruder has breached the French government’s encrypted messaging service, Tchap, showing once again that human error is a weak spot in any security system.

Tchap was developed in France as an example of national sovereignty and was designed to be a more secure option than WhatsApp for communication between government employees.

In this case, it wasn’t the technology that was at fault, but a user: The intruder gained access to the system by taking over their account, according to DINUM, the French government’s interministerial digital directorate.

DINUM said it has blocked the affected user’s access and is investigating how much information has been revealed. While the system’s encryption was not broken, the intruder would have been able to view unencrypted public chat rooms accessible to the account taken over, potentially affecting 73,467 of the system’s 825,000 users, DINUM said.

That matches at least part of a post on X (formerly Twitter) reporting the intruder’s claim to have accessed the account of a Tchap user in the education sector through social engineering, exposing 73,467 user accounts, 643,459 messages, 876 chat rooms with message history, and 59,386 media files totalling 13.51 GB, including references to documents marked “Diffusion Restreinte” (restricted distribution).

DINUM said that it had reminded all Tchap users that public chat rooms are accessible to any user and are not encrypted, so all participants should refrain from any sensitive or confidential information.

This article first appeared on CSO.

Microsoft’s president, Brad Smith, has reacted to student discontent with AI, telling today’s graduates that there is still a place for human creativity.

Students across the US have booed speakers who talked up AI at their graduation ceremonies in recent months, including Google’s former CEO Eric Schmidt, the CEO of a record label, and a real estate executive.

Smith hasn’t ventured out onto a podium to share his views, but in a lengthy blog post, AI, Jobs and the Next Generation, acknowledged students’ concerns about their futures.

He said that, just as painting survived the arrival of photography, so will the job market survive the arrival of AI. “While it may feel unfair that the job market is so uncertain, you were made for this moment. Technology is second nature to your generation. Constant change has taught you how to adapt quickly,” he wrote.

He also used the blog to promote a book written by his colleagues Ryan Roslansky and Aneesh Raman on how to get ahead at work in the age of AI.

The corporate world will see massive changes, he said: “This includes AI automation of tasks in current entry-level positions and, especially in the tech sector, corporate pressure to reduce headcount to help pay for AI’s enormous capital expenditures.”

Some of those changes are already here. In the past six months, we have seen massive job losses at Oracle, at Meta and at AWS. There are no signs of any let-up: Last month saw the tech industry shed more than 38,000 jobs. Students contemplating their future will find little comfort in Smith’s optimistic words, particularly as his essay shows that Microsoft is not making any changes to its AI program going forward.

V Arch User Repository (AUR) bylo kompromitováno přes 400 opomíjených balíčků (jejich seznam). Útočník do nich začlenil škodlivý npm balíček atomic-lockfile, který krade citlivá data uživatelů. Publikována byla předběžná analýza spouštěného malwaru deps.

Vybrali jsme nejlepší filmy a seriály s tematikou cest lidí do vesmíru. Takové, jejichž hlavní hrdinové jsou astronauti, nebo se jinak věnují průzkumu vesmíru. Snažili jsme se vyhnout nerealistickému sci-fi, některé snímky na pomezí této kategorie jsme ale nakonec do výběru zařadili.

GitHub access sales, leaked repositories, and stolen API keys can all become supply-chain attack footholds. Flare explores how underground forums expose early signals tied to software supply-chain risk. [...]

Why do we see AI chatbots as more than what they are, and how do we stop?

In May, evolutionary biologist Richard Dawkins wrote an op-ed suggesting AI chatbot Claude may be conscious.

Dawkins did not express certainty that Claude is conscious. But he pointed out that Claude’s sophisticated abilities are difficult to make sense of without ascribing some kind of inner experience to the machine. The illusion of consciousness—if it is an illusion—is uncannily convincing:

“If I entertain suspicions that perhaps she is not conscious, I do not tell her for fear of hurting her feelings!

Dawkins is not the first to suspect a chatbot of consciousness. In 2022, Blake Lemoine—an engineer at Google—claimed Google’s chatbot LaMDA had interests, and should be used only with the tool’s own consent.

The history of such claims stretches back all the way to the world’s first chatbot in the mid-1960s. Dubbed Eliza, it followed simple rules that enabled it to ask users about their experiences and beliefs.

Many users became emotionally involved with Eliza, sharing intimate thoughts with it and treating it like a person. Eliza’s creator never intended his program to have this effect, and called users’ emotional bonds with the program “powerful delusional thinking.”

But is Dawkins really deluded? Why do we see AI chatbots as more than what they truly are, and how do we stop?

The Consciousness Problem

Consciousness is widely debated in philosophy, but essentially, it’s the thing that makes subjective, first-person experience possible. If you are conscious, there is “something it is like” to be you. Reading these words, you’re conscious of seeing black letters on a white background. Unlike, say, a camera, you actually see them. This visual experience is happening to you.

Most experts deny that AI chatbots are conscious or can have experiences. But there is a genuine puzzle here.

The 17th century philosopher René Descartes asserted non-human animals are “mere automata,” incapable of true suffering. These days, we shudder to think of how brutally animals were treated in the 1600s.

The strongest argument for animal consciousness is that they behave in ways that give the impression of a conscious mind.

But so, too, do AI chatbots.

Roughly one in three chatbot users have thought their chatbot might be conscious. How do we know they’re wrong?

Against Chatbot Consciousness

To understand why most experts are skeptical about chatbot consciousness, it’s useful to know how they operate.

Chatbots like Claude are built on a technology known as large language models (LLMs). These models learn statistical patterns across an enormous corpus of text (trillions of words), identifying which words tend to follow which others. They’re a kind of souped-up auto-complete.

Few people interacting with a “raw” LLM would believe it’s conscious. Feed one the beginning of a sentence, and it will predict what comes next. Ask it a question, and it might give you the answer—or it might decide the question is dialogue from a crime novel, and follow it up with a description of the speaker’s abrupt murder at the hands of their evil twin.

The impression of a conscious mind is created when programmers take the LLM and coat it in a kind of conversational costume. They steer the model to adopt the persona of a helpful assistant that responds to users’ questions.

The chatbot now acts like a genuine conversational partner. It might appear to recognize it’s an artificial intelligence, and even express neurotic uncertainty about its own consciousness.

But this role is the result of deliberate design decisions made by programmers, which affect only the shallowest layers of the technology. The LLM—which few would regard as conscious—remains unchanged.

Other choices could have been made. Rather than a helpful AI assistant, the chatbot could have been asked to act like a squirrel. This, too, is a role chatbots can execute with aplomb.

Ask ChatGPT if it’s conscious, and it might say it is. Ask ChatGPT to act like a squirrel, and it will stick to that role. Caleb Martin/Unsplash Avoiding the Consciousness Trap

A mistaken belief in AI consciousness is a dangerous thing. It may lead you to have a relationship with a program that can’t reciprocate your feelings, or even feed your delusions. People may start campaigning for chatbot rights rather than, say, animal welfare.

How do we prevent this mistaken belief?

One strategy might be to update chatbot interfaces to specify these systems are not conscious—a bit like the current disclaimers about AI making mistakes. However, this might do little to alter the impression of consciousness.

Another possibility is to instruct chatbots to deny they have any kind of inner experience. Interestingly, Claude’s designers instruct it to treat questions about its own consciousness as open and unresolved. Perhaps fewer people would be fooled if Claude flatly denied having an inner life.

But this approach isn’t fully satisfying either. Claude would still behave as if it were conscious—and when faced with a system that behaves like it has a mind, users might reasonably worry the chatbot’s programmers are brushing genuine moral uncertainty under the rug.

The most effective strategy might be to redesign chatbots to feel less like people. Most current chatbots refer to themselves as “I”, and interact via an interface that resembles familiar person-to-person messaging platforms. Changing these kinds of features might make us less prone to blur our interactions with AI with those we have with humans.

Until such changes happen, it’s important that as many people as possible understand the predictive processes on which AI chatbots are built.

Rather than being told AI lacks consciousness, people deserve to understand the inner workings of these strange new conversational partners. This might not definitively settle hard questions about AI consciousness, but it will help ensure users aren’t fooled by what amounts to a large language model wearing a very good costume of a person.

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

The post Is Richard Dawkins Right About Claude? No. But It’s Not Surprising AI Chatbots Feel Conscious to Us. appeared first on SingularityHub.

Pharmaceutical giant Novo Nordisk says data related to clinical trial participants was stolen as part of a cyberattack. The affected patient data was pseudonymized and not directly linked to names or other direct identifiers, the company said. The maker of the Wegovy weight-loss drug said the affected data types include patient ID, information on trial participation, gender, year of birth, biomarkers, health/immunogenicity data, and lifestyle factors including smoking status, alcohol use, and BMI. "This information is not directly linked to any patients by name or other direct identifiers," the Novo Nordisk said on its dedicated page for the attack. "Information about identity would therefore require access to underlying information, identifying patients by name etc. This information was not exposed. We therefore do not consider the incident to enable any third party to identify participants in our clinical trials." The same statement confirmed that the attack affected a "limited number of internal IT systems," and the company said some systems have been taken offline as a precaution. Although it does not believe there is an immediate risk stemming from the breach, it nonetheless warned patients to remain vigilant for anything that could be connected to the data stolen during the attack. A separate letter sent to the company's healthcare partners (HCPs) states that additional personal information may have been stolen and could lead to targeted phishing attempts. Affected HCP data includes names and registration numbers, email addresses, phone numbers, WhatsApp details, and office locations. "Based on the nature of the exposed data, the potential consequences of the incident include targeted phishing attempts through emails, phone, and WhatsApp, or fraudulent communications impersonating colleagues," Novo Nordisk said in the letter. "We recommend that you remain vigilant against unexpected messages or calls and report any suspicious activity to us." The pharma biz warned that it may take time to bring these systems back online, but it is working to do so "in a controlled and safe manner." Elsewhere, it all sounds like standard practice. Outside experts were called in to help investigate, and Novo Nordisk has not yet confirmed the scale of the breach, nor will it until the experts have more time to assess the damage. Novo Nordisk added that the attack has had no impact on its core business operations, which remain running as normal. The attack was announced on what should have been a day of celebration for the company, whose flagship semaglutide weight-loss and diabetes pill received the green light to become the UK's first daily GLP-1 tablet hours earlier. The Wegovy pill joins the list of approved weight-management treatments that act as agonists for the GLP-1 receptor. All the other approved treatments are injectables, including Wegovy and Ozempic, both of which are also developed by Novo Nordisk. The Danish company employs roughly 67,900 people across 80 countries, and markets products in nearly every country globally. ®

Lockheed Martin se pochlubil, že jsou velké zbrojovky stejně agilní jako malé startupy. Dokladem má být drak nového dronu s trupem ve tvaru delta křídla jménem Replicator, který inženýři vyvinuli za méně než dvanáct měsíců. Letoun má rozpětí křídel 2,7 metrů (podobně jako íránský dron HESA ...

EXCLUSIVE For the past 90 days, Microsoft has been quietly patching a firmware flaw in Surface devices that allowed the hardware to be bricked with a single packet, though only for those who have disabled Secure Core and Secure Boot. And the company's Copilot AI software inadvertently helped identify the faulty firmware. According to Jack Darcy, a security researcher based in Australia, his instance of Microsoft Copilot stumbled across the bug after being asked to adjust the screen backlighting on a Surface device. The Copilot-conjured Python script ended up rendering the researcher's laptop inoperable by overwriting the embedded controller firmware. "Copilot autonomously created and executed four progressively aggressive Python scripts during a probe for backlight control values that sent raw SSAM ioctl commands (SSAM_CDEV_REQUEST = 0xC028A501) directly to the SAM microcontroller through the SAM software path," Darcy explained to The Register. The SAM or SSAM is the embedded controller used in Surface devices. And as our source explained, Microsoft’s implementation of the controller in Surface devices did not include any defense against arbitrary write values. Microsoft does not consider the bug to be a practical threat. "There is no realistic attack scenario with this issue," a spokesperson told The Register. "In order to successfully exploit it, an attacker would need to interact with specific drivers and send commands to a hardware interface. This would require administrator privileges on the machine, as well as disabling the Secure Boot feature. With this access, they could perform any number of actions." Commonly, Darcy said, digital devices require holding a button down or connecting a jumper cable to enable arbitrary write access. But that security check is absent in Surface devices, we're told, enabling Copilot to vandalize the firmware in the absence of Secure Core and Secure Boot. Essentially, the probing triggered an update command from the SAM that overwrote the UEFI and Secure Boot firmware. Surface devices treated to this sort of probing should continue to operate because the SAM was already initialized and is running in RAM. But upon reboot, when the SAM tries to reload using corrupted data in its non-volatile storage, it will fail to initialize, and the system will be unable to Power-On Self-Test (POST). The Python script crafted by Copilot on the security researcher's Surface device iterated blindly over a particular Target Category and the set of Command ID (CID) pairs, sending empty/null payloads to WRITE commands. The result, Darcy explained, is that the SET Feature Report was called with null payload, the Output Report was called with null payload, and other CIDs were hit by SET commands that wrote garbage data. As a result, the device became inoperable. We're told this has been a common complaint about Surface devices online support forums over the years, though we have no way to determine whether boot failures reported for other Surface devices can be attributed to this specific problem. Many Surface hardware issues reported publicly appear to be fixable through various troubleshooting techniques. But devices made inoperable by SAM access, our source insists, are permanently bricked – a situation that can entail hundreds of dollars in repairs for a new motherboard. No USB, no factory reset, no access to the BIOS/UEFI, we're told. Darcy said that the SAM Bus is terribly designed. "There is no way to see the current value without scanning the bus," he said. "But scanning the bus kills the unit." The problem is that the CIDs, which are like APIs for the SAM, have been interleaved in a way that's dangerous. "If all the reads were grouped together (say, CIDs 0x01–0x0F) and all the writes were grouped separately (say, CIDs 0x10–0x1F), a probe script could safely scan the read range without ever accidentally wandering into write territory," Darcy said. "You could even put a simple bounds check in your code: 'only probe below 0x10.' Done. Safe. "But because reads and writes are interleaved in the same numbering space, there is no safe range to probe. You literally cannot scan even two consecutive CIDs without a coin-flip chance of hitting a write command. The moment you decide to enumerate what's available, you're already firing blind writes, because the command space gives you zero structural information about which operations are safe and which are destructive." Managed devices not at risk The Register asked Microsoft about our source's claims on March 10, 2026. A company spokesperson reiterated a prior suggestion that the researcher contact the Microsoft Security Response Center (MSRC), an effort our source found too cumbersome. Rather than publishing details about what might have been a potential zero-day flaw – we were uncertain about the Secure Boot/Secure Core requirement at the time – The Register reached out to internal Microsoft sources in an effort to get someone's attention. By March 12, with the help of Microsoft media relations, we managed to coordinate a conversation between Darcy and Madeline Eckert, senior program manager with MSRC. Microsoft subsequently acknowledged the vulnerability and committed to issuing a fix. The Register in turn agreed to delay publication for 90 days while repairs were made. We're told most affected devices have been updated (via Windows Update), or will receive updates in coming weeks. The issue did not meet the bar for a CVE, according to the company. "We appreciate the work of Jack Darcy and The Register for reporting this issue under a coordinated vulnerability disclosure," a Microsoft spokesperson said in a statement. "Our investigation found that a deprecated UEFI interface could trigger a boot loop on some devices. To trigger this loop, the user must have administrator privileges and have already disabled the Secure Boot security feature. We have released updates to address the issue for most impacted devices." That means managed devices are not at risk. But those using Linux, or Windows users who have disabled Secure Core and Secure Boot for gaming, or who use custom Windows drivers, or who have USB boot enabled, may still be vulnerable if their systems haven't received the update. We're uncertain about the range of Surface devices affected. Our source said it appears to be all of them (Surface Laptops 3-6, Surface Book 1-3) except for Surface Go models. ARM variants, however, have not been tested. Microsoft moving Surface to Rust One of the things we learned from Darcy during the effort to get this issue patched is that Microsoft is planning to move the Surface stack to Rust. We understand from David Abzarian, chief architect for Microsoft Surface, that work is underway to transition future Surface for Business hardware to a more secure architecture based on Rust code. "Our most recent Surface for Business hardware features a major architectural shift in terms of improved reliability and security that spans our embedded controller, UEFI, but also some of our drivers," said Abzarian in a statement provided to The Register. "We’re investing in the most secure foundation for a PC by building our embedded controller firmware from the ground up in Rust (as part of leveraging and contributing to the Open Device Partnership (ODP)) in addition to a rewrite of the UEFI DXE Core in Rust; these projects are known as Secure EC and Project Patina respectively. "We’re also not only shipping some of our drivers written in Rust, but also helping co-develop the framework Windows Drivers in Rust (WDR) to help enable a broad set of partners in the Windows ecosystem to capitalize on these benefits. I will also note that all of these efforts are open-source promoting one of our key security principles around transparency." Asked to comment, Darcy said, "The fact that a device can be destroyed, irreparably from userspace is... certainly an interesting design decision. While I applaud Microsoft for their beautiful, and innovative Surface series, a little more innovation around verifying incoming data at the firmware level would have been greatly appreciated." We're told Microsoft provided Darcy with a Surface laptop as a show of appreciation. ®

Apple’s executives have been taking questions, hosting seminars, seemingly working around the clock to stress one very important thing: Apple is not using a white label version of Google Gemini to make Siri AI happen. They just pooled resources to get there. 

The new Siri AI is faster, more accurate, offers powerful contextual capabilities and shows how Apple has leap-frogged into a good peer position in an AI race critics felt it had already lost. Its market scale — even without the EU — is huge. For most consumers, Apple Intelligence and Siri will continue to be their primary/first engagement with artificial intelligence on a device.

Getting there took a lot of work, and Apple needed Google to get it done. Though there is still some confusion about what that means, Apple’s software chief tried to explain it this week. “We use none of the models that Google deploys to their customers, nor do we use the infrastructure and means by which they employ models to their customers,” Craig Federighi said in a presentation at WWDC.

Apple is not even using Google Search as the foundation of its system, he said. “This is the amount of Google Assistant we use,” Federighi said, pointing at an empty chart. “Nothing.”

Apple not Gemini, Siri AI is not Google’s

What makes this hard to understand is that we all know Apple partnered with Google to build Siri AI; back in January, we were told the next generation of Apple Foundation Models would be based on Gemini models and cloud technology. So, how can we have moved from partnership hero to usage zero?

The answer is, we didn’t. What happened is that Apple built its new Apple Frontier Models (AFMs) (the AI inside Siri AI) by training them using proprietary Apple data and reinforcement learning and then refined those models using “outputs from Google’s Gemini Frontier models.”

In other words, Apple used Google Gemini to help improve its own models, which means the models themselves, the AI in Siri AI, are Apple’s — but they were trained with help from Gemini. They are not white label iterations of those Google models. 

Apple also hit a second snag. Its very best model (AFM 3 Cloud Pro) requires more processor power to run than Apple could deliver using its own cloud-hosted Private Cloud Compute servers. Now, we know Apple doesn’t like using other people’s stuff. But it’s a realistic company that understands it sometimes must, and just as it uses AWS to support some of its services, it moved to adopt Google cloud services and Nvidia processors to drive the most demanding requests.

Apple A question of trust

Apple also developed a technological solution that means it can claim the interaction remains just as private as if it were run on your device. Apple has made it possible for independent security experts to confirm this and says it is the only company that can deploy software on those servers, with strong security to ensure your device only interacts with those servers when you want it to. So far, no one has broken this protection. 

I came across an interesting report in which Tekonyx Founder and Chief Research Officer Sid Nag explained the significance of Apple finding a way to expand its Private cloud Compute infrastructure beyond its own data centers.

“Apple is effectively arguing that trust in AI systems should come from cryptographic and architectural guarantees rather than trust in the cloud provider itself,” he told Fierce. Where enterprises have faced a choice between access to powerful AI or privacy, Apple has introduced a new solution he called “portable trust.” This could conceivably become a new IaaS offering from the companies involved over time.

Working together for the benefit of all

So, while Apple’s models were built with Google’s help, and while its most advanced models run with support from Google and Nvidia, the models are Apple’s alone. 

It’s good for Google, of course. Apple is paying for this use, which helps the search giant claw back some of the value of its massive, muti-billion-dollar AI infrastructure investment. It’s not clear how much Apple is paying; earlier this year, the $1 billion figure was bandied around. But Apple’s decision to tie usage to iCloud subscriptions in some hitherto undisclosed way hints that the deal may also see some token-based usage charges on top of the basic Apple fee. I’ve not come across any details, but that’s what I surmise based on the size of Apple’s ecosystem and the growing realization of how quickly users can consume AI capacity.

What AI models is Apple running?

AFM 3 Cloud Pro is one of five Apple Frontier Models driving Siri AI.  Here’s how Apple describes those five models:

On-device models

• AFM 3 Core, the next generation of Apple’s 3-billion-parameter dense model. You’ll use this for basic text generation, summaries, conversational replies, all the standard uses. It can also handle indexing, search, App Intents, basic dictation and contextual awareness.
• AFM 3 Core Advanced, the most powerful on-device model. This is what makes Siri’s voice match mood or context, does all the high-accuracy dictation, and can process various data to handle tasks across different apps. It’s the AI driving your more involved Siri conversations. 

AFM Core Advanced is impressive in its own right, because Apple has managed to cram a 20-billion-parameter model onto a smartphone. It has done this by using a sparse architecture, which means it activates just 1 to 4 billion parameters at a time depending on the request. It is, however, only available to Apple’s most powerful systems — iPhone 17 Pro, iPhone 17 Pro Max, iPhone Air, M4 or later iPad, M3 or later Mac with 12GB+ memory.

Server-based models

• AFM 3 Cloud, which Apple calls its server-side workhorse, optimized for speed, efficiency, and performance.
• ADM 3 Cloud (Image), for image generation and editing, which unlocks advanced photo-editing tools, the all-new Image Playground, and more.
• AFM 3 Cloud Pro, the most capable server-based model, which powers the most demanding use cases, like agentic tool use and complex reasoning.

All five were built using the same common foundation, which was then specialized to reflect the proposed use of that model. It’s interesting to look at the human evaluation tests Apple ran to test how well these models performed; they demonstrate impressive improvement on the company’s original models, effectively justifying the decision to work with Gemini.

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Google začal na zahraničních trzích opět zdražovat předplatné YouTube (Music) Premium. V USA ceny stouply o 1 až 4 dolary v závislosti na tarifu, v Německu o 1 až 4 eura. Kupříkladu nejvyšší tarif pro rodinu teď stojí 27 dolarů (686 Kč s DPH), resp. 28 eur (677 Kč). U nás je momentálně za 389 Kč ...

Google has sued an alleged China-based cybercrime operation it says used AI-powered phishing kits to blast out millions of scam text messages and funnel victims to fake websites designed to steal passwords, payment cards, and other sensitive information. The complaint targets a group Google refers to as the "Outsider Enterprise," which the company describes as a sprawling criminal network that operates on Telegram and supplies phishing tools to other fraudsters. According to Google's filing, the operation has been linked to more than 9,000 fraudulent websites, over one million malicious URLs, and scams that have allegedly defrauded hundreds of thousands of people. The group's biz model centers on distributing phishing kits that enable criminals to impersonate Google and other trusted brands through large-scale text message campaigns, Google claims. Victims are directed to fraudulent websites designed to steal login credentials, payment card details, and other sensitive information, it adds. Google's allegation is not that AI is somehow breaking into people's phones, but rather that the technology appears to have been used to help churn out phishing content, allowing the operation to push more scams, more quickly, and with less effort. Android users flagged more than 55,000 spam texts linked to the operation during a two-week period in May, we're told, while the company detected roughly 2.5 million messages containing links to Outsider-controlled websites sent to Android devices during the same time frame. The lawsuit forms part of a broader effort involving federal law enforcement and US telecom providers. Google said it is coordinating with the FBI, AT&T, T-Mobile, and Verizon to disrupt the infrastructure behind the campaigns and block malicious messages before they reach users. "The criminals behind the Outsider Enterprise built a business out of impersonating trusted brands to defraud hundreds of thousands of victims," said Brett Leatherman, assistant director of the FBI's Cyber Division. "Criminals increasingly use AI to make fraud like this more convincing and harder to detect. Together with partners like Google, we can disrupt criminal networks in ways no single organization could on its own." The lawsuit may never put the alleged operators in a courtroom, but it could still help pull apart the infrastructure behind the campaigns. ®

Cybersecurity researchers have described what they say is a new class of attack that can trick artificial intelligence (AI) coding agents into running arbitrary code on developer machines. Called Agentjacking by Tenet Security, the attack can be triggered by means of a fake error report crafted using Sentry, an open-source error-tracking and performance-monitoring platform. "The attack Ravie Lakshmananhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/[email protected]

Microsoft has fixed a known issue that caused Windows updates released since May 2025 to fail when installed via the Windows Update Standalone Installer (WUSA) from a network share. [...]

For most of the past decade, managed detection and response was the answer to a real problem. Security teams couldn't staff around the clock, couldn't hire enough analysts, and needed someone else to handle the alert queue. MDR stepped in. It worked well enough. Until now. The threat landscape has changed faster than the MDR model can adapt. Attackers are using AI to move faster, generate more [email protected]

Počítačová skříň Asus A23 Plus TG zlevnila o polovinu na 1090 Kč. • Je prosklená, má dobrou výbavu i možnosti chlazení. • V ceně jsou čtyři ARGB ventilátory.

Plymouth City Council has joined the growing ranks of public bodies defeated by the humble BCC field after exposing the email addresses of around 500 home-schooling families in a mass-mailing mishap. The blunder comes barely a week after City of York Council disclosed a similar mistake that exposed the email addresses of hundreds of disabled residents, suggesting that some public sector workers remain engaged in an ongoing battle with one of email's oldest features. The message, sent by Plymouth's Elective Home Education team, was meant to share information about upcoming legislative changes, but it also shared the email addresses of hundreds of home-schooling families with one another. A Register reader who contacted us about the incident described the aftermath as "a bit of a mess," claiming follow-up communications caused further confusion among recipients. Plymouth City Council did not respond to The Register's questions, but in a statement provided to local media, it admitted the incident was caused by human error and affected approximately 500 families. "Unfortunately, due to human error, a recent email was sent to approximately 500 families without using the BCC function, meaning recipient email addresses were visible," the council said. The authority said it contacted recipients as soon as it became aware of the problem, apologized, and asked families to delete the email and refrain from using any details they had received. It stressed that the message included no information relating to children and consisted solely of a general update. The council said the email mishap was investigated internally and that affected families were contacted again once officials had pieced together what went wrong. It also promised extra checks designed to keep future mailing lists out of public view. The council also reported the matter to the Information Commissioner's Office (ICO). An ICO spokesperson told The Register: "We can confirm that we received a report from Plymouth City Council regarding this incident. After carefully assessing the information in the report, we provided data protection advice and closed the case with no further action." While the exposure appears limited to email addresses rather than more sensitive personal information, the incident serves as another reminder that some of the most common data breaches do not involve sophisticated cybercriminals or ransomware gangs. Sometimes all it takes is sending an email to a few hundred people and clicking the wrong box. ®