Viry a Červi

Facebook cracks opens its bottle of Fizz – a carbonated TLS 1.3 lib

The Register - Anti-Virus - 6 Srpen, 2018 - 18:00
Crypto-code unleashed to inflict security, performance and stability on devs

Looking for a TLS 1.3 library? Facebook has you covered. On Monday, the ads and data peddler plans to release Fizz, a TLS 1.3 library written in C++14, as an open source project.…

Kategorie: Viry a Červi

Top iPhone Supplier Battles WannaCry Infection - 6 Srpen, 2018 - 16:28
Production lines were halted for two days, and the effects to the global supply chain for mobile phones could be felt for the third quarter and beyond.
Kategorie: Viry a Červi

Windows 10 updates under fire from unhappy security admins

Sophos Naked Security - 6 Srpen, 2018 - 14:58
Windows 10 is on track to be the most popular Microsoft OS but some security professionals aren't happy.

Man arrested for blackmailing women with porn fakes

Sophos Naked Security - 6 Srpen, 2018 - 14:46
Police have arrested a man for blackmailing women through Facebook using digitally manipulated images of them.

‘Unhackable’ Bitfi hardware rooted within a week

Sophos Naked Security - 6 Srpen, 2018 - 14:26
Getting root access and patching firmware doesn't count as successful hacking, apparently.

Guilty! Court sinks children’s hospital attacker found stranded on a boat

Sophos Naked Security - 6 Srpen, 2018 - 13:59
Martin Gottesfeld set off DDoS attacks against hospitals in #opJustina, fled the country in a boat, and had to be rescued by a Disney ship.

IT threat evolution Q2 2018

Kaspersky Securelist - 6 Srpen, 2018 - 12:00

Targeted attacks and malware campaigns Operation Parliament

In April, we reported the workings of Operation Parliament, a cyber-espionage campaign aimed at high-profile legislative, executive and judicial organizations around the world – with its main focus in the MENA (Middle East and North Africa) region, especially Palestine. The attacks, which started early in 2017, target parliaments, senates, top state offices and officials, political science scholars, military and intelligence agencies, ministries, media outlets, research centers, election commissions, Olympic organizations, large trading companies and others.

The attackers have taken great care to stay under the radar, imitating another attack group in the region. The targeting of victims is unlike that of previous campaigns in the Middle East, by Gaza Cybergang or Desert Falcons, and points to an elaborate information-gathering exercise that was carried out prior to the attacks (physical and/or digital). The attackers have been particularly careful to verify victim devices before proceeding with the infection, safeguarding their C2 (Command-and-Control) servers. The attacks seem to have slowed down since the start of 2018, probably after the attackers achieved their objectives.

The malware basically provides a remote CMD/PowerShell terminal for the attackers, enabling them to execute any scripts or commands and receive the result via HTTP requests.

This campaign is a further symptom of escalating tensions in the Middle East.

Energetic Bear

Crouching Yeti (aka Energetic Bear) is an APT group that has been active since at least 2010, mainly targeting energy and industrial companies. The group targets organizations around the world, but with a particular focus on Europe, the US and Turkey – the latter being a new addition to the group’s interests during 2016-17. The group’s main tactics include sending phishing e-mails with malicious documents and infecting servers for different purposes, including hosting tools and logs and watering-hole attacks. Crouching Yeti’s activities against US targets have been publicly discussed by US-CERT and the UK National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC).

In April, Kaspersky Lab ICS CERT provided information on identified servers infected and used by Crouching Yeti and presented the findings of an analysis of several web servers compromised by the group during 2016 and early 2017.

Our findings are as follows.

  1. With rare exceptions, the group’s members get by with publicly available tools. The use of publicly available utilities by the group to conduct its attacks renders the task of attack attribution without any additional group ‘markers’ very difficult.
  2. Potentially, any vulnerable server on the internet is of interest to the attackers when they want to establish a foothold in order to develop further attacks against target facilities.
  3. In most cases that we have observed, the group performed tasks related to searching for vulnerabilities, gaining persistence on various hosts, and stealing authentication data.
  4. The diversity of victims may indicate the diversity of the attackers’ interests.
  5. It can be assumed with some degree of certainty that the group operates in the interests of or takes orders from customers that are external to it, performing initial data collection, the theft of authentication data and gaining persistence on resources that are suitable for the attack’s further development.

You can read the full report here.


The use of mobile platforms for cyber-espionage has been growing in recent years – not surprising, given the widespread use of mobile devices by businesses and consumers alike. ZooPark is one such operation. The attackers have been focusing on targets in the Middle East since at least June 2015, using several generations of malware to target Android devices, which we have labelled versions one to four.

Each version marks a progression – from very basic first and second versions, to the commercial spyware fork in the third version and then to the complex spyware that is the fourth version. The last step is especially interesting, showing a big leap from straightforward code functionality to highly sophisticated malware.

This suggests that the latest version may have been bought from a vendor of specialist surveillance tools. This wouldn’t be surprising, since the market for these espionage tools is growing, becoming popular among governments, with several known cases in the Middle East. At this point, we cannot confirm attribution to any known threat actor. If you would like to learn more about our intelligence reports, or request more information on a specific report, contact us at

We have seen two main distribution vectors for ZooPark – Telegram channels and watering-holes. The second of these has been the preferred method: we found several news websites that have been hacked by the attackers to redirect visitors to a downloading site that serves malicious APKs. Some of the themes observed in the campaign include ‘Kurdistan referendum’, ‘TelegramGroups’ and ‘Alnaharegypt news’, among others.

The target profile has evolved in the last few years of the campaign, focusing on victims in Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Lebanon and Iran.

Some of the samples we have analyzed provide clues about the intended targets. For example, one sample mimics a voting application for the independence referendum in Kurdistan. Other possible high-profile targets include the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) for Palestine refugees in the Near East in Amman, Jordan.

The king is dead, long live the king!

On April 18, someone uploaded an interesting exploit to VirusTotal. This was detected by several security vendors, including Kaspersky Lab – using our generic heuristic logic for some older Microsoft Word documents.

This turned out to be a new zero-day vulnerability for Internet Explorer (CVE-2018-8174) –patched by Microsoft on May 8, 2018. Following processing of the sample in our sandbox system, we noticed that it successfully exploited a fully patched version of Microsoft Word. This led us to carry out a deeper analysis of the vulnerability.

The infection chain consists of the following steps. The victim receives a malicious Microsoft Word document. After opening it, the second stage of the exploit is downloaded – an HTML page containing VBScript code. This triggers a UAF (Use After Free) vulnerability and executes shellcode.

Despite the initial attack vector being a Word document, the vulnerability is actually in VBScript. This is the first time we have seen a URL Moniker used to load an IE exploit in Word, but we believe that this technique will be heavily abused by attackers in the future, since it allows them to force victims to load IE, ignoring the default browser settings. It’s likely that exploit kit authors will start abusing it in both drive-by attacks (through the browser) and spear-phishing campaigns (through a document).

To protect against this technique, we would recommend applying the latest security updates and using a security solution with behavior detection capabilities.


In May, researchers from Cisco Talos published the results of their investigation into VPNFilter, malware used to infect different brands of routers – mainly in Ukraine, although affecting routers in 54 countries in total. Initially, they believed that the malware had infected around 500,000 routers – Linksys, MikroTik, Netgear and TP-Link networking equipment in the small office/home office (SOHO) sector, and QNAP network-attached storage (NAS) devices. However, it later became clear that the list of infected routers was much longer – 75 in total, including ASUS, D-Link, Huawei, Ubiquiti, UPVEL and ZTE.

The malware is capable of bricking the infected device, executing shell commands for further manipulation, creating a TOR configuration for anonymous access to the device or configuring the router’s proxy port and proxy URL to manipulate browsing sessions.

Further research by Cisco Talos showed that the malware is able to infect more than just targeted devices. It is also spread into networks supported by the device, thereby extending the scope of the attack. Researchers also identified a new stage-three module capable of injecting malicious code into web traffic.

The C2 mechanism has several stages. First, the malware tries to visit a number of gallery pages hosted on ‘photobucket[.]com’ and fetches the image from the page. If this fails, the malware tries to fetch an image from the hard-coded domain ‘toknowall[.]com’ (this C2 domain is currently sink-holed by the FBI). If this fails also, the malware goes into passive backdoor mode, in which it processes network traffic on the infected device, waiting for the attacker’s commands. Researchers in the Global Research and Analysis Team (GReAT) at Kaspersky Lab analyzed the EXIF processing mechanism.

One of the interesting questions is who is behind this malware. Cisco Talos indicated that a state-sponsored or state affiliated threat actor is responsible. In its affidavit for sink-holing the C2, the FBI suggests that Sofacy (aka APT28, Pawn Storm, Sednit, STRONTIUM, and Tsar Team) is the culprit. There is some code overlap with the BlackEnergy malware used in previous attacks in Ukraine (the FBI’s affidavit makes it clear that they see BlackEnergy (aka Sandworm) as a sub-group of Sofacy).


In March 2018, we detected an ongoing campaign targeting a national data center in Central Asia. The choice of target of the campaign, which has been active since autumn 2017, is especially significant – it means that the attackers were able to gain access to a wide range of government resources in one fell swoop. We think they did this by inserting malicious scripts into the country’s official websites in order to conduct watering-hole attacks.

We attribute this campaign to the Chinese-speaking threat actor LuckyMouse (aka EmissaryPanda and APT27) because of the tools and tactics used in the campaign, because the C2 domain, update.iaacstudio[.]com, was previously used by this group and because they have previously targeted government organizations, including those in Central Asia.

The initial infection vector used in the attack against the data centre is unclear. Even where we observed LuckyMouse using weaponized documents with CVE-2017-118822 (Microsoft Office Equation Editor, widely used by Chinese-speaking actors since December 2017), we couldn’t prove that they were related to this particular attack. It’s possible that the attackers used a watering hole to infect data center employees.

The attackers used the HyperBro Trojan as their last-stage, in-memory remote administration tool (RAT) and their anti-detection launcher and decompressor makes extensive use of the Metasploit ‘shikata_ga_nai’ encoder as well as LZNT1 compression.

The main C2 used in this campaign is bbs.sonypsps[.]com, which resolved to an IP address that belongs to a Ukrainian ISP network, held by a MikroTik router using version 6.34.4 (March 2016) of the firmware with SMBv1 on board. We suspect that this router was hacked as part of the campaign in order to process the malware’s HTTP requests.

The initial module drops three files that are typical for Chinese-speaking threat actors – a legitimate Symantec pcAnywhere file (‘intgstat.exe’) for DLL side-loading, a DLL launcher (‘pcalocalresloader.dll’) and the last-stage decompressor (‘thumb.db’). As a result of all these steps, the last-stage Trojan is injected into the process memory of ‘svchost.exe’.

The launcher module, obfuscated with the notorious Metasploit ‘shikata_ga_nai’ encoder, is the same for all the droppers. The resulting de-obfuscated code performs typical side-loading: it patches the pcAnywhere image in memory at its entry-point. The patched code jumps back to the second ‘shikata_ga_nai’ iteration of the decryptor, but this time as part of the white-listed application.

The Metasploit encoder obfuscates the last part of the launcher’s code, which in turn resolves the necessary API and maps ‘thumb.db’ into the memory of the same process (i.e. pcAnywhere). The first instructions in the mapped ‘thumb.db’ are for a new iteration of ‘shikata_ga_nai’. The decrypted code resolves the necessary API functions, decompresses the embedded PE file with ‘RtlCompressBuffer()’ using LZNT1 and maps it into memory.

Olympic Destroyer

In our first report on Olympic Destroyer, the cyberattack on the PyeongChang Winter Olympics, we highlighted a specific spear-phishing attack as the initial infection vector. The threat actor sent weaponized documents, disguised as Olympic-related content, to relevant persons and organizations.

We have continued to track this APT group’s activities and recently noticed that they have started a new campaign with a different geographical distribution and using new themes. Our telemetry, and the characteristics of the spear-phishing documents we have analysed, indicate that the attackers behind Olympic Destroyer are now targeting financial and biotechnology-related organizations based in Europe – specifically, Russia, the Netherlands, Germany, Switzerland and Ukraine.

The group continues to use a non-executable infection vector and highly obfuscated scripts to evade detection.

The earlier Olympic Destroyer attacks – designed to destroy and paralyse infrastructure of the Winter Olympic Games and related supply chains, partners and venues – were preceded by a reconnaissance operation. It’s possible that the new activities are part of another reconnaissance stage that will be followed by a wave of destructive attacks with new motives. This is why it is important for all bio-chemical threat prevention and research companies and organizations in Europe to strengthen their security and run unscheduled security audits.

The variety of financial and non-financial targets could indicate that the same malware is being used by several groups with different interests. This could also be a result of cyberattack outsourcing, which is not uncommon among nation state threat actors. However, it’s also possible that the financial targets might be another false flag operation by a threat actor that has already shown that they excel at this during their last campaign.

It would be possible to draw certain conclusions about who is behind this campaign, based on the motives and selection of targets. However, it would be easy to make a mistake with only the fragments of the picture that are visible to researchers. The appearance of Olympic Destroyer at the start of this year, with its sophisticated deception efforts, changed the attribution game forever. In our view, it is no longer possible to draw conclusions based on a few attribution vectors discovered during a regular investigation. The response to threats such as Olympic Destroyer should be based on co-operation between the private sector and governments across national borders. Unfortunately, the current geo-political situation in the world only boosts the global segmentation of the internet and introduces many obstacles for researchers and investigators. This will encourage APT attackers to continue marching into the protected networks of foreign governments and commercial companies.

Malware stories Leaking ads

When we download popular apps with good ratings from official app stores, we assume they are safe. This is partially true, because usually these apps have been developed with security in mind and have been reviewed by the app store’s security team. Recently, we looked at 13 million APKs and discovered that around a quarter of them transmit unencrypted data over the internet. This was unexpected, because most apps were using HTTPS to communicate with their servers. But among the HTTPS requests, there were unencrypted requests to third-party servers. Some of these apps were very popular – in some cases they could boast hundreds of millions of downloads. On further inspection, it became clear that the apps were exposing customer data because of third-party SDKs – with advertising SDKs usually to blame. They collect data so that they can show relevant ads, but often fail to protect that data when sending it to their servers.

In most cases the apps were exposing IMEI, IMSI, Android ID, device information (e.g. manufacturer, model, screen resolution, system version and app name). Some apps were also exposing personal information, mostly the customer’s name, age, gender, phone number, e-mail address and even their income.

Information transmitted over HTTP is sent in plain text, allowing almost anyone to read it. Moreover, there are likely to be several ‘transit points’ en route from the app to the third-party server – devices that receive and store information for a certain period of time. Any network equipment, including your home router, could be vulnerable. If hacked, it will give the attackers access to your data. Some of the device information gathered (specifically IMEI and IMSI numbers) is enough to monitor your further actions. The more complete the information, the more of an open book you are to outsiders — from advertisers to fake friends offering malicious files for download. However, data leakage is only part of the problem. It’s also possible for unencrypted information to be substituted. For example, in response to an HTTP request from an app, the server might return a video ad, which cybercriminals can intercept and replace with a malicious version. Or they might simply change the link inside an ad so that it downloads malware.

You can find the research here, including our advice to developers and consumers.

SynAck targeted ransomware uses the Doppelganging technique

In April 2018, we saw a version of the SynAck ransomware Trojan that employs the Process Doppelganging technique. This technique, first presented in December 2017 at the BlackHat conference, has been used by several threat actors to try and bypass modern security solutions. It involves using NTFS transactions to launch a malicious process from the transacted file so that it looks like a legitimate process.

Malware developers often use custom packers to try and protect their code. In most cases, they can be effortlessly packed to reveal the original Trojan executable so that it can then be analyzed. However, the authors of SynAck obfuscated their code prior to compilation, further complicating the analysis process.

SynAck checks the directory where its executable is started from. If an attempt is made to launch it from an ‘incorrect’ directory, the Trojan simply exits. This is designed to counter automatic sandbox analysis.

The Trojan also checks to see if is being launched on a PC with the keyboard set to a Cyrillic script. If it is, it sleeps for 300 seconds and then exits, to prevent encryption of files belonging to victims from countries where Cyrillic is used.

Like other ransomware, SynAck uses a combination of symmetric and asymmetric encryption algorithms. You can find the details here.

The attacks are highly targeted, with a limited number of attacks observed against targets in the US, Kuwait, Germany and Iran. The ransom demands can be as high as $3,000.

Roaming Mantis

In May we published our analysis of a mobile banking Trojan, Roaming Mantis. We called it this because of its propagation via smartphones roaming between different Wi-Fi networks, although the malware is also known as ‘Moqhao’ and ‘XLoader’. This malicious Android app is spread using DNS hijacking through compromised routers. The victims are redirected to malicious IP addresses used to install malicious apps – called ‘facebook.apk’ and ‘chrome.apk’. The attackers count on the fact that victims are unlikely to be suspicious as long as the browser displays the legitimate URL.

The malware is designed to steal user information, including credentials for two-factor authentication, and give the attackers full control over compromised Android devices. The malware seems to be financially motivated and the low OPSEC suggests that this is the work of cybercriminals.

Our telemetry indicates that the malware was detected more than 6,000 times between February 9 and April 9, although the reports came from just 150 unique victims – some of whom saw the same malware appear again and again on their network. Our research revealed that there were thousands of daily connections to the attackers’ C2 infrastructure.

The malware contains Android application IDs for popular mobile banking and game applications in South Korea. It seems the malicious app was initially targeted at victims in South Korea and this is where the malware was most prevalent. We also saw infections in China, India and Bangladesh.

It’s unclear how the attackers were able to hijack the router settings. If you are concerned about DNS settings on your router, you should check the user manual to verify that your DNS settings haven’t been tampered with, or contact your ISP for support. We would also strongly recommend that you change the default login and password for the admin web interface of the router, don’t install firmware from third-party sources and update the router firmware regularly to prevent similar attacks.

Some clues left behind by the attackers – for example, comments in the HTML source, malware strings and a hardcoded legitimate website – point to Simplified Chinese. So we believe the cybercriminals are familiar with both Simplified Chinese and Korean.

Following our report, we continued to track this campaign. Less than a month later, Roaming Mantis had rapidly expanded its activities to include countries in Europe, the Middle East and beyond, supporting 27 languages in total.

The attackers also extended their activities beyond Android devices. On iOS, Roaming Mantis uses a phishing site to steal the victim’s credentials. When the victim connects to the landing page from an iOS device, they are redirected to fake ‘’ webpage where the attackers steal user ID, password, card number, card expiry date and CVV.

On PCs, Roaming Mantis runs the CoinHive mining script to generate crypto-currency for the attackers – drastically increasing the victim’s CPU usage.

The evasion techniques used by Roaming Mantis have also become more sophisticated. They include a new method of retrieving the C2 by using the e-mail POP protocol, server-side dynamic auto-generation of APK file/filenames and the inclusion of an additional command to potentially assist in identifying research environments.

The rapid growth of the campaign implies that those behind it have a strong financial motivation and are probably well-funded.

If it’s smart, it’s potentially vulnerable

Our many years of experience in researching cyberthreats suggests that if a device is connected to the internet, eventually someone will try to hack it. This includes children’s CCTV cameras, baby monitors, household appliances and even children’s toys.

This also applies to routers – the gateway into a home network. In May, we described four vulnerabilities and hardcoded accounts in the firmware of the D-Link DIR-620 router – this runs on various D-Link routers supplied to customers by one of the biggest ISPs in Russia.

The latest versions of the firmware have hardcoded default credentials that can be exploited by an unauthenticated attacker to gain privileged access to the firmware and to extract sensitive data – for example, configuration files with plain-text passwords. The vulnerable web interface allows an unauthenticated attacker to run arbitrary JavaScript code in the user environment and run arbitrary commands in the router’s operating system. The issues were originally identified in firmware version 1.0.37, although some of the discovered vulnerabilities were also identified in other version of the firmware.

You can read the details on the vulnerabilities here.

In May, we also investigated smart devices for animals – specifically, trackers to monitor the location of pets. These gadgets are able to access the pet owner’s home network and phone, and their pet’s location. We wanted to find out how secure they are. Our researchers looked at several popular trackers for potential vulnerabilities.

Four of the trackers we looked at use Bluetooth LE technology to communicate with the owner’s smartphone. But only one does so correctly. The others can receive and execute commands from anyone. They can also be disabled, or hidden from the owner – all that’s needed is proximity to the tracker. Only one of the tested Android apps verifies the certificate of its server, without relying solely on the system. As a result, they are vulnerable to Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attacks—intruders can intercept transmitted data by ‘persuading’ victims to install their certificate.

GPS trackers have been used successfully in many areas, but using them to track the location of pets is a step beyond their traditional scope of application. For this, they need to be upgraded with new ‘user communication interfaces’ and ‘trained’ to work with cloud services, etc. If security is not properly addressed, user data becomes accessible to intruders, potentially endangering both users and pets.

Some of our researchers recently looked at human wearable devices – specifically, smart watches and fitness trackers. We were interested in a scenario where a spying app installed on a smartphone could send data from the built-in motion sensors (accelerometer and gyroscope) to a remote server and use the data to piece together the wearer’s actions – walking, sitting, typing, etc. We started with an Android-based smartphone, created a simple app to process and transmit the data and then looked at what we could get from this data.

Not only was it possible to work out if the wearer is sitting or walking, but also figure out if they are out for a stroll or changing subway trains, because the accelerometer patterns differ slightly – this is how fitness trackers distinguish between walking and cycling. It is also easy to see when someone is typing. However, finding out what they are typing would be hard and would require repeated text entry. Our researchers were able to determine the moments when a computer password entered with 96 per cent accuracy and a PIN code entered at an ATM with 87 per cent accuracy. However, it would be much harder to obtain other information – for example, a credit card number or CVC code – because of the lack of predictability about when the victim would type such information.

In reality, the difficulty involved in obtaining such information means that an attacker would have to have a strong motive for targeting someone specific. Of course, there are situations where this might be worthwhile for attackers.

An MitM extension for Chrome

Many browser extensions make our lives easier, hiding obtrusive advertising, translating text, helping us to choose the goods we want in online stores, etc. Unfortunately, there are also less desirable extensions that are used to bombard us with advertising or collect information about our activities. Then there are extensions whose main aim is to steal money. In the course of our work, we analyse a large number of extensions from different sources. Recently, a particular browser extension caught our eye because it communicated with a suspicious domain.

This extension, named ‘Desbloquear Conteúdo’ (which means ‘Unblock Content’ in Portuguese) targeted customers of Brazilian online banking services – all the attempted installations that we traced occurred in Brazil.

The aim of this malicious extension is to harvest logins and passwords and then steal money from the victims’ bank accounts. Such extensions are quite rare, but they need to be taken seriously because of the potential damage they can cause. You should only install verified extensions with large numbers of installations and reviews in the Chrome Web Store or other official service. Even so, in spite of the protection measures implemented by the owners of such services, malicious extensions can still end up being published there. So it’s a good idea to use an internet security product that gives you a warning if an extension acts suspiciously.

By the time we published our report on this malicious extension, it had already been removed from the Chrome Web Store.

The World Cup of fraud

Fraudsters are always on the lookout for opportunities to make money off the back of major sporting events. The FIFA World Cup is no different. Long before anyone kicked a football in Russia, cybercriminals had started to create phishing websites and send messages exploiting World Cup themes.

This included notifications of fake lottery wins, informing recipients that they had won cash in a lottery supposedly held by FIFA or official partners and sponsors.

They typically contain attached documents congratulating the ‘winner’ and asking for personal details such as name, address, e-mail address, telephone number, etc. Sometimes such messages also contain malicious programs, such as banking Trojans.

Sometimes recipients are invited to take part in a ticket giveaway, or they are offered the chance to win a trip to a match. Such messages are sent in the name of FIFA, usually from addresses on recently registered domains. The purpose of such schemes is mainly to update e-mail databases used to distribute more spam.

One of the most popular ways to steal banking and other credentials is to create counterfeit imitations of official partner websites. Partner organizations often arrange ticket giveaways for clients, and attackers exploit this to lure their victims onto fake promotion sites. Such pages look very convincing: they are well-designed, with a working interface, and are hard to distinguish from the real thing. Some fraudsters buy SSL certificates to add further credibility to their fake sites. Cybercriminals are particularly keen to target clients of Visa, the tournament’s commercial sponsor, offering prize giveaways in Visa’s name. To take part, people need to follow a link that points to a phishing site where they are asked to enter their bank card details, including the CVV/CVC code.

Cybercriminals also try to extract data by mimicking official FIFA notifications. The victim is informed that the security system has been updated and all personal data must be re-entered to avoid being locked out. The link in the message takes the victim to a fake account and all the data they enter is harvested by the scammers.

In the run up to the tournament, we also registered a lot of spam advertising soccer-related merchandise, though sometimes the scammers try to sell other things too – for example, pharmaceutical products.

You can find our report on the ways cybercriminals have exploited the World Cup in order to make money here. We’ve provided some tips on how to avoid phishing scams – advice that holds good for any phishing scams, not just for those related to the World Cup.

In the run up to the tournament, we also analyzed wireless access points in 11 cities hosting FIFA World Cup matches – nearly 32,000 Wi-Fi hotspots in total. While checking encryption and authentication algorithms, we counted the number of WPA2 and open networks, as well as their share among all the access points.

More than a fifth of Wi-Fi hotspots use unreliable networks. This means that criminals simply need to be located near an access point to intercept the traffic and get their hands on people’s data. Around three quarters of all access points use WPA/WPA2 encryption, considered to be one of the most secure. The level of protection mostly depends on the settings, such as the strength of the password set by the hotspot owner. A complicated encryption key can take years to successfully hack. However, even reliable networks, like WPA2, cannot be automatically considered totally secure. They are still susceptible to brute-force, dictionary and key reinstallation attacks, for which there are a large number of tutorials and open source tools available online. Any attempt to intercept traffic from WPA Wi-Fi in public access points can also be made by penetrating the gap between the access point and the device at the beginning of the session.

You can read our report here, together with our recommendations on the safe use of Wi-Fi hotspots, advice that holds good wherever you may be – not just at the World Cup.

Monday review – the hot 23 stories of the week

Sophos Naked Security - 6 Srpen, 2018 - 12:00
From the routers turning into zombie cryptojackers and the prisoners exploiting a vulnerability to steal $225K to SamSam, the $6 million ransomware, and more!

IT threat evolution Q2 2018. Statistics

Kaspersky Securelist - 6 Srpen, 2018 - 12:00

Q2 figures

According to KSN:

  • Kaspersky Lab solutions blocked 962,947,023 attacks launched from online resources located in 187 countries across the globe.
  • 351,913,075 unique URLs were recognized as malicious by Web Anti-Virus components.
  • Attempted infections by malware designed to steal money via online access to bank accounts were logged on the computers of 215,762 users.
  • Ransomware attacks were registered on the computers of 158,921 unique users.
  • Our File Anti-Virus logged 192,053,604 unique malicious and potentially unwanted objects.
  • Kaspersky Lab products for mobile devices detected:
    • 1,744,244 malicious installation packages
    • 61,045 installation packages for mobile banking Trojans
    • 14,119 installation packages for mobile ransomware Trojans.
Mobile threats General statistics

In Q2 2018, Kaspersky Lab detected 1,744,244 malicious installation packages, which is 421,666 packages more than in the previous quarter.

Number of detected malicious installation packages, Q2 2017 – Q2 2018

Distribution of detected mobile apps by type

Distribution of newly detected mobile apps by type, Q1 2018

Distribution of newly detected mobile apps by type, Q2 2018

Among all the threats detected in Q2 2018, the lion’s share belonged to potentially unwanted RiskTool apps (55.3%); compared to the previous quarter, their share rose by 6 p.p. Members of the RiskTool.AndroidOS.SMSreg family contributed most to this indicator.

Second place was taken by Trojan-Dropper threats (13%), whose share fell by 7 p.p. Most detected files of this type came from the families Trojan-Dropper.AndroidOS.Piom and Trojan-Dropper.AndroidOS.Hqwar.

The share of advertising apps continued to decreased by 8%, accounting for 9% (against 11%) of all detected threats.

A remarkable development during the reporting period was that SMS Trojans doubled their share up to 8.5% in Q2 from 4.5% in Q1.

TOP 20 mobile malware

Note that this malware rating does not include potentially dangerous or unwanted programs such as RiskTool or Adware.

  Verdict %* 1 DangerousObject.Multi.Generic 70.04 2 Trojan.AndroidOS.Boogr.gsh 12.17 3 Trojan-Dropper.AndroidOS.Lezok.p 4.41 4 Trojan.AndroidOS.Agent.rx 4.11 5 Trojan.AndroidOS.Piom.toe 3.44 6 Trojan.AndroidOS.Triada.dl 3.15 7 Trojan.AndroidOS.Piom.tmi 2.71 8 Trojan.AndroidOS.Piom.sme 2.69 9 Trojan-Dropper.AndroidOS.Hqwar.i 2.54 10 2.42 11 Trojan-Dropper.AndroidOS.Agent.ii 2.25 12 1.80 13 Trojan.AndroidOS.Agent.pac 1.73 14 Trojan.AndroidOS.Dvmap.a 1.64 15 Trojan-Dropper.AndroidOS.Lezok.b 1.55 16 Trojan-Dropper.AndroidOS.Tiny.d 1.37 17 Trojan.AndroidOS.Agent.rt 1.29 18 1.26 19 Trojan.AndroidOS.Piom.rfw 1.20 20 Trojan-Dropper.AndroidOS.Lezok.t 1.19

* Unique users attacked by the relevant malware as a percentage of all users of Kaspersky Lab’s mobile antivirus that were attacked.

As before, first place in our TOP 20 went to DangerousObject.Multi.Generic (70.04%), the verdict we use for malware detected using cloud technologies. In second place was Trojan.AndroidOS.Boogr.gsh (12.17%). This verdict is given to files recognized as malicious by our system based on machine learning. Third was Dropper.AndroidOS.Lezok.p (4.41%), followed by a close 0.3 p.p. margin by Trojan.AndroidOS.Agent.rx (4.11%), which was in the third position in Q1.

Geography of mobile threats

Map of attempted infections using mobile malware, Q2 2018

TOP 10 countries by share of users attacked by mobile malware:

  Country* %** 1 Bangladesh 31.17 2 China 31.07 3 Iran 30.87 4 Nepal 30.74 5 Nigeria 25.66 6 India 25.04 7 Indonesia 24.05 8 Ivory Coast 23.67 9 Pakistan 23.49 10 Tanzania 22.38

* Excluded from the rating are countries with relatively few users of Kaspersky Lab’s mobile antivirus (under 10,000).
** Unique users attacked in the country as a percentage of all users of Kaspersky Lab’s mobile antivirus in the country.

In Q2 2018, Bangladesh (31.17%) topped the list by share of mobile users attacked. China (31.07%) came second with a narrow margin. Third and fourth places were claimed respectively by Iran (30.87%) and Nepal (30.74%).

Russia (8.34%) this quarter was down in 38th spot, behind Taiwan (8.48%) and Singapore (8.46%).

Mobile banking Trojans

In the reporting period, we detected 61,045 installation packages for mobile banking Trojans, which is 3.2 times more than in Q1 2018. The largest contribution was made by Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Hqwar.jck – this verdict was given to nearly half of detected new banking Trojans. Second came Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Agent.dq, accounting for about 5,000 installation packages.

Number of installation packages for mobile banking Trojans detected by Kaspersky Lab, Q2 2017 – Q2 2018

TOP 10 mobile bankers

  Verdict %* 1 Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Agent.dq 17.74 2 Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Svpeng.aj 13.22 3 Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Svpeng.q 8.56 4 Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Asacub.e 5.70 5 Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Agent.di 5.06 6 4.65 7 Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Faketoken.z 3.66 8 3.03 9 Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Hqwar.t 2.83 10 2.77

* Unique users attacked by the relevant malware as a percentage of all users of Kaspersky Lab’s mobile antivirus that were attacked by banking threats.

The most popular mobile banking Trojan in Q2 was Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Agent.dq (17.74%), closely followed by Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Svpeng.aj (13.22%). These two Trojans use phishing windows to steal information about user’s banking cards and online banking credentials. Besides, they steal money through abuse of SMS services, including mobile banking. The popular banking malware Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Svpeng.q (8.56%) took third place in the rating, moving one notch down from its second place in Q2.

Geography of mobile banking threats, Q2 2018

TOP 10 countries by share of users attacked by mobile banking Trojans

  Country* %** 1 USA 0.79 2 Russia 0.70 3 Poland 0.28 4 China 0.28 5 Tajikistan 0.27 6 Uzbekistan 0.23 7 Ukraine 0.18 8 Singapore 0.16 9 Moldova 0.14 10 Kazakhstan 0.13

* Excluded from the rating are countries with relatively few users of Kaspersky Lab’s mobile antivirus (under 10,000).
** Unique users attacked by mobile banking Trojans in the country as a percentage of all users of Kaspersky Lab’s mobile antivirus in this country.

Overall, the rating did not see much change from Q1: Russia (0.70%) and USA (0.79%) swapped places, both remaining in TOP 3.

Poland (0.28%) rose from ninth to third place thanks to activation propagation of two Trojans: and Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Marcher.w. The latter was first detected in November 2017 and uses a toolset typical of banking malware: SMS interception, phishing windows and Device Administrator privileges to ensure its persistence in the system.

Mobile ransomware Trojans

In Q2 2018, we detected 14,119 installation packages for mobile ransomware Trojans, which is larger by half than in Q1.

Number of installation packages for mobile ransomware Trojans detected by Kaspersky Lab, Q2 2017 – Q2 2018

  Verdict %* 1 Trojan-Ransom.AndroidOS.Zebt.a 26.71 2 19.15 3 Trojan-Ransom.AndroidOS.Fusob.h 15.48 4 5.99 5 Trojan-Ransom.AndroidOS.Egat.d 4.83 6 Trojan-Ransom.AndroidOS.Svpeng.snt 4.73 7 Trojan-Ransom.AndroidOS.Svpeng.ab 4.29 8 3.32 9 2.61 10 Trojan-Ransom.AndroidOS.Small.cj 1.80

* Unique users attacked by this malware as a percentage of all users of Kaspersky Lab’s mobile antivirus attacked by ransomware Trojans.

The most popular mobile ransomware is Q2 was Trojan-Ransom.AndroidOS.Zebt.a (26.71%), encountered by more than a quarter of all users who got attacked by this type of malware. Second came (19.15%), nudging ahead of once-popular Trojan-Ransom.AndroidOS.Fusob.h (15.48%).

Geography of mobile ransomware Trojans, Q2 2018

TOP 10 countries by share of users attacked by mobile ransomware Trojans

  Country* %** 1 USA 0.49 2 Italy 0.28 3 Kazakhstan 0.26 4 Belgium 0.22 5 Poland 0.20 6 Romania 0.18 7 China 0.17 8 Ireland 0.15 9 Mexico 0.11 10 Austria 0.09

* Excluded from the rating are countries where the number of users of Kaspersky Lab’s mobile antivirus is relatively small (fewer than 10,000)
** Unique users in the country attacked by mobile ransomware Trojans as a percentage of all users of Kaspersky Lab’s mobile antivirus in the country.

First place in the TOP 10 went to the United States (0.49%); the most active family in this country was Trojan-Ransom.AndroidOS.Svpeng:

  Verdict %* 1 53.53% 2 16.37% 3 Trojan-Ransom.AndroidOS.Svpeng.snt 11.49% 4 Trojan-Ransom.AndroidOS.Svpeng.ab 10.84% 5 Trojan-Ransom.AndroidOS.Fusob.h 5.62% 6 Trojan-Ransom.AndroidOS.Svpeng.z 4.57% 7 Trojan-Ransom.AndroidOS.Svpeng.san 4.29% 8 2.45% 9 Trojan-Ransom.AndroidOS.Svpeng.h 0.43% 10 Trojan-Ransom.AndroidOS.Zebt.a 0.37%

* Unique users in USA attacked by this malware as a percentage of all users of Kaspersky Lab’s mobile antivirus in this country who were attacked by ransomware Trojans.

Italy (0.28%) came second among countries whose residents were attacked by mobile ransomware. In this country, most attacks were the work of Trojan-Ransom.AndroidOS.Zebt.a. Third place was claimed by Kazakhstan (0.63%), where was the most popular mobile ransomware.

Attacks on IoT devices

Judging by the data from our honeypots, brute forcing Telnet passwords is the most popular method of IoT malware self-propagation. However, recently there has been an increase in the number of attacks against other services, such as control ports. These ports are assigned services for remote control over routers – this feature is in demand e.g. with internet service providers. We have observed attempts to launch attacks on IoT devices via port 8291, which is used by Mikrotik RouterOS control service, and via port 7547 (TR-069), which was used, among other purposes, for managing devices in the Deutsche Telekom network.

In both cases the nature of attacks was much more sophisticated than plain brute force; in particular, they involved exploits. We are inclined to think that the number of such attacks will only grow in the future on the back of the following two factors:

  • Brute forcing a Telnet password is a low-efficiency strategy, as there is a strong competition between threat actors. Each few seconds, there are brute force attempts; once successful, the threat actor blocks such the access to Telnet for all other attackers.
  • After each restart of the device, the attackers have to re-infect it, thus losing part of the botnet and having to reclaim it in a competitive environment.

On the other hand, the first attacker to exploit a vulnerability will gain access to a large number of device, having spent minimum time.

Distribution of attacked services’ popularity by number of unique attacking devices, Q2 2018

Telnet attacks

The scheme of attack is as follows: the attackers find a victim device, check if Telnet port is open on it, and launch the password brute forcing routine. As many manufacturers of IoT devices neglect security (for instance, they reserve service passwords on devices and do not leave a possibility for the user to change them routinely), such attacks become successful and may affect entire lines of devices. The infected devices start scanning new segments of networks and infect new, similar devices or workstations in them.

Geography of IoT devices infected in Telnet attacks, Q2 2018

TOP 10 countries by shares of IoT devices infected via Telnet   Country %* 1 Brazil 23.38 2 China 17.22 3 Japan 8.64 4 Russia 7.22 5 USA 4.55 6 Mexico 3.78 7 Greece 3.51 8 South Korea 3.32 9 Turkey 2.61 10 India 1.71

* Infected devices in each specific country as a percentage of all IoT devices that attack via Telnet.

In Q2, Brazil (23.38%) took the lead in the number of infected devices and, consequently, in the number of Telnet attacks. Next came China (17.22%) by a small margin, and third came Japan (8.64%).

In these attacks, the threat actors most often downloaded Backdoor.Linux.Mirai.c (15.97%) to the infected devices.

TOP 10 malware downloaded to infected IoT devices in successful Telnet attacks   Verdict %* 1 Backdoor.Linux.Mirai.c 15.97 2 Trojan-Downloader.Linux.Hajime.a 5.89 3 Trojan-Downloader.Linux.NyaDrop.b 3.34 4 Backdoor.Linux.Mirai.b 2.72 5 1.94 6 Trojan-Downloader.Shell.Agent.p 0.38 7 0.27 8 Backdoor.Linux.Mirai.n 0.27 9 0.24 10 0.20

*Proportion of downloads of each specific malware program to IoT devices in successful Telnet attacks as a percentage of all malware downloads in such attacks

SSH attacks

Such attacks are launched similarly to Telnet attacks, the only difference being that they require to bots to have an SSH client installed on them to brute force credentials. The SSH protocol is cryptographically protected, so brute forcing passwords require large computational resources. Therefore, self-propagation from IoT devices is inefficient, and full-fledged servers are used to launch attacks. The success of an SSH attack hinges on the device owner or manufacturers’ faults; in other words, these are again weak passwords or preset passwords assigned by the manufacturer to an entire line of devices.

China took the lead in terms of infected devices attacking via SSH. Also, China was second in terms of infected devices attacking via Telnet.

Geography of IoT devices infected in SSH attacks, Q2 2018

TOP 10 countries by shares of IoT devices attacked via SSH   Country %* 1 China 15.77% 2 Vietnam 11.38% 3 USA 9.78% 4 France 5.45% 5 Russia 4.53% 6 Brazil 4.22% 7 Germany 4.01% 8 South Korea 3.39% 9 India 2.86% 10 Romania 2.23%

*The proportion of infected devices in each country as a percentage of all infected IoT devices attacking via SSH

Online threats in the financial sector Q2 events New banking Trojan DanaBot

The Trojan DanaBot was detected in May. It has a modular structure and is capable of loading extra modules with which to intercept traffic, steal passwords and crypto wallets – generally, a standard feature set for this type of a threat. The Trojan spread via spam messages containing a malicious office document, which subsequently loaded the Trojans’ main body. DanaBot initially targeted Australian users and financial organizations, however in early April we noticed that it had become active against the financial organizations in Poland.

The peculiar BackSwap technique

The banking Trojan BackSwap turned out much more interesting. A majority of similar threats including Zeus, Cridex and Dyreza intercept the user’s traffic either to inject malicious scripts into the banking pages visited by the victim or to redirect it to phishing sites. By contrast, BackSwap uses an innovative technique for injecting malicious scripts: using WinAPI, it emulates keystrokes to open the developer console in the browser, and then it uses this console to inject malicious scripts into web pages. In a later version of BackSwap, malicious scripts are injected via the address bar, using JavaScript protocol URLs.

Carbanak gang leader detained

On March 26, Europol announced the arrest of a leader of the cybercrime gang behind Carbanak and Cobalt Goblin. This came as a result of a joint operation between Spain’s national police, Europol and FBI, as well as Romanian, Moldovan, Belorussian and Taiwanese authorities and private infosecurity companies. It was expected that the leader’s arrest would reduce the group’s activity, however recent data show that no appreciable decline has taken place. In May and June, we detected several waves of targeted phishing against banks and processing companies in Eastern Europe. The email writers from Carbanak masquerades as support lines of reputable anti-malware vendors, European Central Bank and other organizations. Such emails contained attached weaponized documents exploiting vulnerabilities CVE-2017-11882 and CVE-2017-8570.

Ransomware Trojan uses Doppelgänging technique

Kaspersky Lab experts detected a case of the ransomware Trojan SynAck using the Process Doppelgänging technique. Malware writers use this complex technique to make it stealthier and complicate its detection by security solutions. This was the first case when it was used in a ransomware Trojan.

Another remarkable event was the Purga (aka Globe) cryptoware propagation campaign, during which this cryptoware, alongside with other malware including a banking Trojan, was loaded to computers infected with the Trojan Dimnie.

General statistics on financial threats

These statistics are based on detection verdicts of Kaspersky Lab products received from users who consented to provide statistical data.

In Q2 2018, Kaspersky Lab solutions blocked attempts to launch one or more malicious programs designed to steal money from bank accounts on the computers of 215,762 users.

Number of unique users attacked by financial malware, Q2 2018

Geography of attacks

Geography of banking malware attacks, Q2 2018

TOP 10 countries by percentage of attacked users Country* % of users attacked** 1 Germany 2.7% 2 Cameroon 1.8% 3 Bulgaria 1.7% 4 Greece 1.6% 5 United Arab Emirates 1.4% 6 China 1.3% 7 Indonesia 1.3% 8 Libya 1.3% 9 Togo 1.3% 10 Lebanon 1.2%

These statistics are based on Anti-Virus detection verdicts received from users of Kaspersky Lab products who consented to provide statistical data.

*Excluded are countries with relatively few Kaspersky Lab’ product users (under 10,000).
** Unique Kaspersky Lab users whose computers were targeted by banking Trojans or ATM/PoS malware as a percentage of all unique users of Kaspersky Lab products in the country.

TOP 10 banking malware families Name Verdicts* % of attacked users** 1 Nymaim Trojan.Win32. Nymaim 27.0%   2 Zbot Trojan.Win32. Zbot 26.1%   3 SpyEye Backdoor.Win32. SpyEye 15.5%   4 Emotet Backdoor.Win32. Emotet 5.3%   5 Caphaw Backdoor.Win32. Caphaw 4.7%   6 Neurevt Trojan.Win32. Neurevt 4.7%   7 NeutrinoPOS Trojan-Banker.Win32.NeutrinoPOS 3.3%   8 Gozi Trojan.Win32. Gozi 2.0%   9 Shiz Backdoor.Win32. Shiz 1.5%   10 ZAccess Backdoor.Win32. ZAccess 1.3%  

* Detection verdicts of Kaspersky Lab products. The information was provided by Kaspersky Lab product users who consented to provide statistical data.
** Unique users attacked by this malware as a percentage of all users attacked by financial malware.

In Q2 2018, the general makeup of TOP 10 stayed the same, however there were some changes in the ranking. Trojan.Win32.Zbot (26.1%) and Trojan.Win32.Nymaim (27%) remain in the lead after swapping positions. The banking Trojan Emotet ramped up its activity and, accordingly, its share of attacked users from 2.4% to 5.3%. Conversely, Caphaw dramatically downsized its activity to only 4.7% from 15.2% in Q1, taking fifth position in the rating.

Cryptoware programs Number of new modifications

In Q2, we detected 7,620 new cryptoware modifications. This is higher than in Q1, but still well below last year’s numbers.

Number of new cryptoware modifications, Q2 2017 – Q2 2018

Number of users attacked by Trojan cryptors

In Q2 2018, Kaspersky Lab products blocked cryptoware attacks on the computers of 158,921 unique users. Our statistics show that cybercriminals’ activity declined both against Q1 and on a month-on-month basis during Q2.

Number of unique users attacked by cryptors, Q2 2018

Geography of attacks

TOP 10 countries attacked by Trojan cryptors Country* % of users attacked by cryptors** 1 Ethiopia 2.49 2 Uzbekistan 1.24 3 Vietnam 1.21 4 Pakistan 1.14 5 Indonesia 1.09 6 China 1.04 7 Venezuela 0.72 8 Azerbaijan 0.71 9 Bangladesh 0.70 10 Mongolia 0.64

* Excluded are countries with relatively few Kaspersky Lab users (under 50,000).
** Unique users whose computers were attacked by Trojan cryptors as a percentage of all unique users of Kaspersky Lab products in the country.

The list of TOP 10 countries in Q2 is practically identical to that in Q1. However, some place trading occurred in TOP 10: Ethiopia (2.49%) pushed Uzbekistan (1.24%) down from first to second place, while Pakistan (1.14%) rose to fourth place. Vietnam (1.21%) remained in third position, and Indonesia (1.09%) remained fifth.

TOP 10 most widespread cryptor families Name Verdicts* % of attacked users** 1 WannaCry Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Wanna 53.92   2 GandCrab Trojan-Ransom.Win32.GandCrypt 4.92   3 PolyRansom/VirLock Virus.Win32.PolyRansom 3.81   4 Shade Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Shade 2.40   5 Crysis Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Crusis 2.13   6 Cerber Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Zerber 2.09   7 (generic verdict) Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Gen 2.02   8 Locky Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Locky 1.49   9 Purgen/GlobeImposter Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Purgen 1.36   10 Cryakl Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Cryakl 1.04  

* Statistics are based on detection verdicts of Kaspersky Lab products. The information was provided by Kaspersky Lab product users who consented to provide statistical data.
** Unique Kaspersky Lab users attacked by a particular family of Trojan cryptors as a percentage of all users attacked by Trojan cryptors.

WannaCry further extends lead over other cryptor families, its share rising to 53.92% from 38.33% in Q1. Meanwhile, the cybercriminals behind GandCrab (4.92%, emerged only in Q1 2018) put so much effort into its distribution that it rose all the way up to second place in this TOP 10, displacing the polymorphic worm PolyRansom (3.81%). The remaining positions, just like in Q1, are occupied by the long-familiar cryptors Shade, Crysis, Purgen, Cryakl etc.


As we already reported in Ransomware and malicious cryptominers in 2016-2018, ransomware is shrinking progressively, and cryptocurrency miners is starting to take its place. Therefore, this year we decided to begin to publish quarterly reports on the situation around type of threats. Simultaneously, we began to use a broader range of verdicts as a basis for collecting statistics on miners, so the Q2 statistics may not be consistent with the data from our earlier publications. It includes both stealth miners which we detect as Trojans, and those which are issued the verdict ‘Riskware not-a-virus’.

Number of new modifications

In Q2 2018, Kaspersky Lab solutions detected 13,948 new modifications of miners.

Number of new miner modifications, Q2 2018

Number of users attacked by cryptominers

In Q2, we detected attacks involving mining programs on the computers of 2,243,581 Kaspersky Lab users around the world.

Number of unique users attacked by cryptominers, Q2 2018

In April and May, the number of attacked users stayed roughly equal, and in June there was a modest decrease in cryptominers’ activity.

Geography of attacks

Geography of cryptominer attacks, Q2 2018

TOP 10 countries by percentage of attacked users Country* % of attacked users** 1 Ethiopia 17.84 2 Afghanistan 16.21 3 Uzbekistan 14.18 4 Kazakhstan 11.40 5 Belarus 10.47 6 Indonesia 10.33 7 Mozambique 9.92 8 Vietnam 9.13 9 Mongolia 9.01 10 Ukraine 8.58

*Excluded are countries with relatively few Kaspersky Lab’ product users (under 50,000).
** Unique Kaspersky Lab users whose computers were targeted by miners as a percentage of all unique users of Kaspersky Lab products in the country.

Vulnerable apps used by cybercriminals

In Q2 2018, we again observed some major changes in the distribution of platforms most often targeted by exploits. The share of Microsoft Office exploits (67%) doubled compared to Q1 (and quadrupled compared with the average for 2017). Such a sharp growth was driven primarily by massive spam messages distributing documents containing an exploit to the vulnerability CVE-2017-11882. This stack overflow-type vulnerability in the old, deprecated Equation Editor component existed in all versions of Microsoft Office released over the last 18 years. The exploit still works stably in all possible combinations of the Microsoft Office package and Microsoft Windows. On the other hand, it allows the use of various obfuscations for bypassing the protection. These two factors made this vulnerability the most popular tool in cybercriminals’ hands in Q2. The shares of other Microsoft Office vulnerabilities did no undergo much change since Q1.

Q2 KSN statistics also showed a growing number of Adobe Flash exploits exploited via Microsoft Office. Despite Adobe and Microsoft’s efforts to obstruct exploitation of Flash Player, a new 0-day exploit CVE-2018-5002 was discovered in Q2. It propagated in an XLSX file and used a little-known technique allowing the exploit to be downloaded from a remote source rather than carried in the document body. Shockwave Flash (SWF) files, like many other file formats, are rendered in Microsoft Office documents in the OLE (Object Linking and Embedding) format. In the case of a SWF file, the OLE object contains the actual file and a list of various properties, one of which points to the path to the SWF file. The OLE object in the discovered exploit did not contain an SWF file in it, but only carried a list of properties including a web link to the SWF file, which forced Microsoft Office to download the missing file from the provided link.

Distribution of exploits used in cybercriminals’ attacks by types of attacked applications, Q2 2018

In late March 2018, a PDF document was detected at VirusTotal that contained two 0-day vulnerabilities: CVE-2018-4990 and CVE-2018-8120. The former allowed for execution of shellcode from JavaScript via exploitation of a software error in JPEG2000 format image processor in Acrobat Reader. The latter existed in the win32k function SetImeInfoEx and was used for further privilege escalation up to SYSTEM level and enabled the PDF viewer to escape the sandbox. Ana analysis of the document and our statistics show that at the moment of uploading to VirusTotal, this exploit was at the development stage and was not used for in-the-wild attacks.

In late April, Kaspersky Lab experts using an in-house sandbox have found the 0-day vulnerability CVE-2018-8174 in Internet Explorer and reported it to Microsoft. An exploit to this vulnerability used a technique associated with CVE-2017-0199 (launching an HTA script from a remote source via a specially crafted OLE object) to exploit a vulnerable Internet Explorer component with the help of Microsoft Office. We are observing that exploit pack creators have already taken this vulnerability on board and actively distribute exploits to it both via web sites and emails containing malicious documents.

Also in Q2, we observed a growing number of network attacks. There is a growing share of attempts to exploit the vulnerabilities patched with the security update MS17-010; these make up a majority a of the detected network attacks.

Attacks via web resources

The statistics in this chapter are based on Web Anti-Virus, which protects users when malicious objects are downloaded from malicious/infected web pages. Malicious websites are specially created by cybercriminals; web resources with user-created content (for example, forums), as well as hacked legitimate resources, can be infected.

Top 10 countries where online resources are seeded with malware

The following statistics are based on the physical location of the online resources used in attacks and blocked by our antivirus components (web pages containing redirects to exploits, sites containing exploits and other malware, botnet command centers, etc.). Any unique host could be the source of one or more web attacks. In order to determine the geographical source of web-based attacks, domain names are matched against their actual domain IP addresses, and then the geographical location of a specific IP address (GEOIP) is established.

In the second quarter of 2018, Kaspersky Lab solutions blocked 962,947,023 attacks launched from web resources located in 187 countries around the world. 351,913,075 unique URLs were recognized as malicious by web antivirus components.

Distribution of web attack sources by country, Q2 2018

In Q2, the TOP 4 of web attack source countries remain unchanged. The US (45.87%) was home to most sources of web attacks. The Netherlands (25.74%) came second by a large margin, Germany (5.33%) was third. There was a change in the fifth position: Russia (1.98%) has displaced the UK, although its share has decreased by 0.55 p.p.

Countries where users faced the greatest risk of online infection

To assess the risk of online infection faced by users in different countries, for each country we calculated the percentage of Kaspersky Lab users on whose computers Web Anti-Virus was triggered during the quarter. The resulting data provides an indication of the aggressiveness of the environment in which computers operate in different countries.

This rating only includes attacks by malicious programs that fall under the Malware class; it does not include Web Anti-Virus detections of potentially dangerous or unwanted programs such as RiskTool or adware.

Country* % of attacked users** 1 Belarus 33.49 2 Albania 30.27 3 Algeria 30.08 4 Armenia 29.98 5 Ukraine 29.68 6 Moldova 29.49 7 Venezuela 29.12 8 Greece 29.11 9 Kyrgyzstan 27.25 10 Kazakhstan 26.97 11 Russia 26.93 12 Uzbekistan 26.30 13 Azerbaijan 26.12 14 Serbia 25.23 15 Qatar 24.51 16 Latvia 24.40 17 Vietnam 24.03 18 Georgia 23.87 19 Philippines 23.85 20 Romania 23.55

These statistics are based on detection verdicts returned by the Web Anti-Virus module that were received from users of Kaspersky Lab products who consented to provide statistical data.
Excluded are countries with relatively few Kaspersky Lab users (under 10,000).
** Unique users targeted by Malware-class attacks as a percentage of all unique users of Kaspersky Lab products in the country.

Geography of malicious web attacks in Q2 2018 (percentage of attacked users)

On average, 19.59% of Internet user computers worldwide experienced at least one Malware-class web attack.

Local threats

Local infection statistics for user computers are an important indicator: they reflect threats that have penetrated computer systems by infecting files or removable media, or initially got on the computer in an encrypted format (for example, programs integrated in complex installers, encrypted files, etc.).

Data in this section is based on analyzing statistics produced by Anti-Virus scans of files on the hard drive at the moment they were created or accessed, and the results of scanning removable storage media.

In Q2 2018, our File Anti-Virus detected 192,053,604 malicious and potentially unwanted objects.

Countries where users faced the highest risk of local infection

For each country, we calculated the percentage of Kaspersky Lab product users on whose computers File Anti-Virus was triggered during the reporting period. These statistics reflect the level of personal computer infection in different countries.

The rating includes only Malware-class attacks. It does not include File Anti-Virus detections of potentially dangerous or unwanted programs such as RiskTool or adware.

Country* % of attacked users** 1 Uzbekistan 51.01 2 Afghanistan 49.57 3 Tajikistan 46.21 4 Yemen 45.52 5 Ethiopia 43.64 6 Turkmenistan 43.52 7 Vietnam 42.56 8 Kyrgyzstan 41.34 9 Rwanda 40.88 10 Mongolia 40.71 11 Algeria 40.25 12 Laos 40.18 13 Syria 39.82 14 Cameroon 38.83 15 Mozambique 38.24 16 Bangladesh 37.57 17 Sudan 37.31 18 Nepal 37.02 19 Zambia 36.60 20 Djibouti 36.35

These statistics are based on detection verdicts returned by OAS and ODS Anti-Virus modules received from users of Kaspersky Lab products who consented to provide statistical data. The data include detections of malicious programs located on user computers or removable media connected to computers, such as flash drives, camera and phone memory cards, or external hard drives.
Excluded are countries with relatively few Kaspersky Lab users (under 10,000).
** Unique users on whose computers Malware-class local threats were blocked, as a percentage of all unique users of Kaspersky Lab products in the country.

Geography of malicious web attacks in Q2 201 (ranked by percentage of users attacked)

On average, 19.58% of computers globally faced at least one Malware-class local threat in Q2.

TSMC chip fab tools hit by virus, payment biz BGP hijacked, CCleaner gets weird – and more

The Register - Anti-Virus - 4 Srpen, 2018 - 12:03
What else is gong on in infosec this week...

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Security world to hit Las Vegas for a week of hacking, cracking, fun

The Register - Anti-Virus - 4 Srpen, 2018 - 03:20
Black Hat, DEF CON and Bsides come to Nevada

About a quarter of a century ago, a handful of hackers decided to have a party in a cheap hotel, and had a whale of a time.…

Kategorie: Viry a Červi

Security world to hit Las Vegas for a week of hacking, cracking, fun

The Register - Anti-Virus - 4 Srpen, 2018 - 03:20
Black Hat, DEF CON and Bsides come to Nevada

About a quarter of a century ago, a handful of hackers decided to have a party in a cheap hotel, and had a whale of a time.…

Kategorie: Viry a Červi

Consumer DNA Testing Takes a Step Towards Privacy, Transparency - 3 Srpen, 2018 - 21:50
Ancestry, MyHeritage and others have committed to a policy framework for the collection, protection, sharing and use of consumer genetic data.
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Ever seen printer malware in action? Install this HP Ink patch – or you may find out

The Register - Anti-Virus - 3 Srpen, 2018 - 21:24
Firmware update tackles remote code bugs in InkJet machines

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Potentially impacted customers include organizations like Aldo, Dunkin Donuts, GE, HauteLook, Nestle Waters, News Corp Australia and Sony.
Kategorie: Viry a Červi

Threatlist: SMB Security Challenges Grow with the Cloud - 3 Srpen, 2018 - 19:06
Top IT security barriers cited by respondents include budget constraints, and limited time to research and understand new threats.
Kategorie: Viry a Červi

Web doc iCliniq plugs leaky S3 bucket stuffed full of medical records

The Register - Anti-Virus - 3 Srpen, 2018 - 15:34
Even the file names exposed sensitive info, claim researchers

Exclusive  Online medical consultation service iCliniq left thousands of medical documents in a publicly accessible Amazon Web Services S3 bucket.…

Kategorie: Viry a Červi

Routers turned into zombie cryptojackers – is yours one of them?

Sophos Naked Security - 3 Srpen, 2018 - 14:58
A patch was turned into an exploit and the exploit was turned into... why, CRYPTOCOINS, of course! Fortunately, there's an easy fix.

Alleged “high-ranking” members of the Fin7 cybercrime group arrested

Sophos Naked Security - 3 Srpen, 2018 - 13:21
The DOJ says it's arrested three members of the highly professional Fin7 group.

How safe is your DNA data?

Sophos Naked Security - 3 Srpen, 2018 - 12:51
A group of DNA collection and genealogy websites have agreed on new guidelines for handling sensitive genetic and family data.
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