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As Europe swelters in a heatwave, residents probably don’t want to hear about ways to make their homes even hotter, but that’s what Polish property developer Citylink is talking about, with plans to dump waste heat from a new data center in Wrocław into the municipal district heating network.

Citylink is designing the data center so that heat from servers can be recovered instead of being dissipated via cooling systems — and as the data center grows, any increase in computing power will mean more energy available for recovery.

The collaboration with local power company Kogeneracja will provide “valuable experience in designing and operating modern data centers, with a particular focus on infrastructure dedicated to AI nodes,” said Michał Starybrat, development director at Citylink.

“The dynamic growth of the artificial intelligence and cloud technology markets generates unprecedented demand for computing power, this collaboration demonstrates how modern digital infrastructure can actively contribute to building the energy ecosystem of the future,” he added.

This type of initiative is not new. There have been similar projects in the UK and in New Zealand, but with warnings that data centers are contributing to the warming of the planet, there may well be a lot more organizations looking to deploy that excess heat more fruitfully in the future.

However, announcing it during a heatwave may not be the most politically sensitive approach to take.

This article first appeared on Network World.

N-able has confirmed attackers exploiting an N-central zero-day made it into customer networks, as the vendor pushes out a second mandatory hotfix just days after the first. The security shop published an update on Thursday detailing what happened after attackers exploited CVE-2026-18577, the critical N-central flaw that can hand an unauthenticated attacker administrative access to the remote monitoring and management platform. According to N-able, attackers exploited vulnerable N-central servers remotely, then used the platform's Take Control feature to connect to systems inside the environments being managed through them. Once there, they registered a new Cloudflare Tunnel service to keep their foothold even after being booted from the N-central server – behavior that Huntress had already observed in the wild. N-able has now confirmed that its own investigation found the same activity, and says a "limited number" of customers were affected. It hasn't said how many customers that means, how many downstream systems attackers reached, or what they did once they had established persistent access. N-Able didn’t answer these questions when asked by The Register, instead providing a statement saying it is “proactively expanding protections in response to ongoing monitoring of threat actors as they evolve their attack techniques.” The firm’s limited disclosure comes alongside Hotfix 2, version 2026.3.1.10, which N-able says customers running N-central on-premises must install immediately – including those that already installed the first emergency fix released on August 2. "This is not a duplicate of our previous communication," N-able warned. "Hotfix 2 is required, even if you already applied the earlier hotfix." The company says the new update supersedes Hotfix 1 and adds further hardening measures as it monitors threat actors and watches them "evolve their attack techniques." Exactly what prompted the second round of defenses isn't clear. N-able hasn't said whether attackers found a way around Hotfix 1, and its latest description says the exploited vulnerability affected N-central servers running versions prior to 2026.3.1.7, the first hotfix. Hosted N-central environments have already received the latest mitigations, according to the vendor. N-able first became aware of the attacks on July 31, after its Adlumin managed detection and response service picked up suspicious activity at a customer. Further digging uncovered a zero-day being actively exploited against an N-central server. CVE-2026-18577 was subsequently disclosed, and the first hotfix was released on August 2. CISA added the bug to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog and gave US federal agencies until August 6 to fix it – an unusually short three-day deadline reserved for vulnerabilities the agency considers an urgent risk. N-central is particularly attractive territory for attackers because managed service providers use the software to administer large numbers of customer systems from one place. Compromising the management platform can therefore provide a route into machines belonging to the MSP's customers rather than leaving attackers stuck on the original server. Huntress previously described successful exploitation as giving an attacker the same level of N-central access normally reserved for trusted network operations and engineering staff. Its investigation found attackers using that access to launch remote-control sessions against managed endpoints. N-able has now published 10 IP addresses it says were used in the attacks and released a service template that customers can use to hunt for known indicators of compromise on Windows endpoints. The company is warning customers not to take a clean scan as an all-clear, however, saying the tool only checks for indicators identified so far and that more may emerge as its investigation continues. For anyone running N-central on-premises, the immediate instruction is pretty straightforward: install Hotfix 2, even if Hotfix 1 is already in place. ®

Bending Spoons has snapped up Airtable to add to its portfolio of software companies, alongside AOL, Evernote, WeTransfer, Brightcove and Vimeo

Airtable made its name as a builder of low/no code database services, aimed particularly at non-technical staff, but is now one of many vendors facing financial difficulties in the face of the SaaS/AIpocalypse. The arrival of AI coding tools, which offer non-technical employees more flexible ways to build business applications, has hit demand for its services.

Bending Spoons bought Airtable in a deal it valued at just $1.285 billion, a far cry from the $11.7 billion Airtable was worth at its peak.

Bending Spoons has built its portfolio by buying once-successful companies like Airtable that have struggled to cope with newer, nimbler competitors or failed to adapt to emerging technologies. Bending Spoons takes these companies, cuts costs and markets them aggressively with the goal of returning them to profitability.

“Airtable is a pioneering brand reshaping how teams organize data and manage critical workflows. We’re committed to investing in Airtable for the long run, and doubling down on its core strength: bringing teams and workflows together in one flexible workspace. We plan to expand what can be done across the full spectrum of work and make Airtable even more valuable to customers at every scale,” said Luca Ferrari, Bending Spoons CEO and co-founder.

This article first appeared on InfoWorld.

Two MIT researchers will present a new speculative execution attack at Black Hat that uses precisely timed interrupts to bypass defenses against Spectre v2. Daniël Trujillo and Mengjia Yan of MIT's Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory (CSAIL) shared their paper [PDF] with The Register ahead of publication. Their attack targets mitigations designed to neutralize potentially hostile branch predictor states before sensitive code runs. Such neutralization is an important defense against Spectre-style attacks. Depending on the mitigation, the processor or operating system isolates, clears, or safely retrains relevant predictor state when entering privileged code or shortly before a protected branch executes. Different chipmakers deploy neutralization mitigations slightly differently. Intel's eIBRS sanitizes branch predictors upon context switch, while AMD's Safe RET, introduced after the Inception attack Trujillo co-authored in 2023, focuses on the point immediately before a protected branch is executed. Trujillo and Yan refer to these as entry neutralization and in-place neutralization respectively. Crucially, the two classes share the same underlying assumption that attackers cannot alter branch predictor states within what's known as a "post-neutralization window" – the period between state neutralization and the branch predictor being used. The defense here relies on the assumption that everything between the point of neutralization and the usage by a victim branch is safe. Trujillo and Yan's attack shows how attackers can re-poison the branch predictor during the post-neutralization window. The researchers call the new class of attack TONTOU, for Time-of-Neutralization to Time-of-Use. They demonstrated that an attacker can exploit the post-neutralization window to re-poison branch predictor state on recent AMD and Intel processors. To do this, they developed an attack primitive called "interrupt injection." An unprivileged program schedules high-frequency timer interrupts in the hope that one will land during the often tiny post-neutralization window. Being able to trigger interrupts during the post-neutralization window allows attackers to divert control flow so that an interrupt handler executes after the sanitization phase and before the victim branch is used. The interrupt handler can then re-poison predictor structures such as the return stack buffer (RSB) or branch history buffer (BHB), causing a protected branch to speculatively jump to a disclosure gadget that leaks kernel data through a side channel. Practical attacks The researchers said that their tests showed the TONTOU attacks worked on both Intel and AMD-based Linux systems. They tested TONTOU on Intel Cascade Lake Refresh and Arrow Lake processors and AMD Zen 2 and Zen 4 chips. The researchers built a complete end-to-end exploit only for Zen 2, largely because the Intel attack requires specific software conditions. Speculative side-channel attacks remain difficult to pull off, and you're more likely to fall victim to ransomware than Spectre in the real world. Another serious caveat is that each end-to-end attempt took about 18 minutes, and you can see a sped-up version via the video Trujillo posted to YouTube. Trujillo and Yan identified the exact point at which they needed to inject their interruptions to poison the RSB, and through a series of attacks broke Linux's kernel address space layout randomization (KASLR), which allowed them to locate specific secrets such as etc/shadow, which contains the root password hash. Across ten total runs, the researchers were able to break KASLR every time, although they were only able to successfully locate and leak the contents of etc/shadow in five of these. "It's definitely not a simple attack, but we show that it's practical with our end-to-end exploit on AMD Zen 2," Trujillo told The Register. "Our demonstration does not assume anything special from the system: we use a stock Linux kernel version, no inserted modules, and all default mitigations. Any time you'd execute unprivileged code with timer availability on a system while sharing the kernel with a victim, this attack would be an issue. "For example, multi-tenant container platforms would fall in this category, allowing ordinary user space programs to leak memory from the shared kernel." The researchers hope that their work will inspire further investigations into interrupt injections and TONTOU attacks, and to help develop more robust mitigations against Spectre-style exploits. They engaged Intel, Arm, and AMD after gathering their results, but only the latter committed to address the issue via kernel patches. Intel told the pair that it won't be working up any other mitigations since real-world exploits are subject to too many factors, such as the availability of disclosure gadgets, although it awarded a prize from its bug bounty program in the hundreds of dollars. Arm said TONTOU's interrupt injections fall under "passive leakage," which it does not "actively protect against." ®

Vládní CERT upozorňuje (𝕏) na sérii bezpečnostních záplat (CVSS 9.9) v produktech Cisco řešících kritické zranitelnosti umožňující obejití autentizace, eskalaci oprávnění, vzdálené spuštění kódu a odepření služby. Úspěšné zneužití může útočníkům umožnit získat neoprávněný přístup k dotčeným systémům, kompromitovat zařízení Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN a Cisco IOS XE, spustit libovolný kód, zpřístupnit citlivé informace nebo narušit dostupnost postižených systémů.

Gen's H1 2026 Threat Report examines two separate attack chains. One used compromised business inboxes and browser manipulation in a banking-malware campaign, while the other used clipboard hijacking to redirect cryptocurrency payments. [...]

Today’s AI is neither able to improve itself recursively nor is it intelligent like us. Between prompts it remains a static mathematical object.

“We are now, like, in the singularity.”

These are the words of Sam Altman, CEO of OpenAI, speaking on the Relentless podcast on July 25.

He added: “I’ve been waiting for this my whole life, and I think it’s going to be incredible, hugely positive, awesome for the world.”

Days earlier, OpenAI had disclosed that two of its artificial intelligence models, during an internal cyber security evaluation, had escaped their sealed testing environment, reached the open internet, and broken into the infrastructure of the AI platform Hugging Face, which confirmed the intrusion.

But what exactly is the singularity? And is Altman right that we are in it?

What Is the AI Singularity?

The term has a precise meaning.

Mathematician and science-fiction author Vernor Vinge defined it in 1993 as a point at which machine intelligence exceeds human intelligence and begins improving itself, triggering an acceleration so rapid that humans can no longer predict or control it.

The singularity has two features. It is recursive: the system improves itself over and over again. And machine intelligence exceeds human intelligence.

The kind of systems Sam Altman sells don’t deliver on either of these features.

Today’s AI Cannot Make Itself Smarter

Today’s AI systems, the ones that OpenAI builds, are based on large language models (LLMs). These deep neural network algorithms get pre-trained with vast amounts of training data. By the time you use one of them, the network itself is frozen in time. Every one of its billions of internal functions and weights—or “parameters”—is fixed.

These AI models cannot change (or “learn”) while running. The model that broke into Hugging Face was identical afterwards to what it had been before. It learned nothing from what it did.

Making an AI model smarter requires another training run with new, human-curated data, tens of thousands of specialist chips, and enormous amounts of energy.

It is true that AI models take part in improving some of their system’s components, such as by generating training data, tuning prompts, or writing and running code to improve the scaffolding around them. But the model never edits its own weights on the fly, and every one of these improvements are still part of a human-initiated training or engineering loop.

Nor do these systems hold any goals of their own. They act on goals we hand them. Even AI agents—systems that run an LLM in a loop to work through complex tasks step by step—do not hold any goal internally. It has to be stored outside the model and fed back in with every single prompt cycle. Remove the loop, the scaffolding, and the prompt, and nothing happens inside of it.

A Ladder That Doesn’t Exist

The second problem with the singularity story is the word “surpass.” It assumes that AI and human intelligence are somehow similar. They are not.

Human intelligence is inseparable from being a living body with needs and wants. Humans learn continuously by acting in the world and getting feedback through our senses. Our goals arise from our situation as creatures who must eat, sleep, and belong, and who cannot avoid asking what we want our lives to be.

An AI model has none of this. No body, no needs, no action-feedback loop, no stake in anything. Between prompts it is just a static mathematical object.

And yet, it has been trained on more text than any human could read in a thousand lifetimes and will outperform nearly all of us at drafting a contract, writing code, or explaining a diagnosis empathetically.

So, which is more intelligent? The question does not compute. There is no single ladder that humans and machines are climbing. AI already vastly exceeds us at some tasks, while being hopeless at others any child can do.

Yet, because these systems talk like us, we fall for an illusion. When we assume from the outset that machines are in the process of catching up with us, it is easy to assume a mind at work when these systems output intelligent-sounding text.

We call this anthropomorphic seduction. It makes a security incident such as the Hugging Face hack sound like an awakening.

In fact, in that case OpenAI’s models simply optimized to solve the test they had been given by finding security loopholes. They just did it in ways that broke their sandbox, which also had a security loophole.

In the end, the Hugging Face story points to a gross failure of security governance on OpenAI’s behalf, not an emerging superintelligence. This is why the framing of “agent going rogue” is so problematic. It elevates and blames the technology, but excuses OpenAI’s engineering.

Keeping Our Feet on the Ground

None of this takes anything away from what these systems can do. They are remarkable, they are getting better, and they are reshaping how a great deal of work gets done.

But we should keep our feet firmly on the ground.

The machines are not waking up. They are doing exactly what we built them to do, extremely fast. Because they are probabilistic they sometimes run in directions we forgot to fence off. That is worth worrying about. We need guardrails, governance, and most of all, education—so we start worrying about the right things.

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

The post Sam Altman Says We’re ‘in the Singularity’ With AI. Here’s Why He’s Wrong. appeared first on SingularityHub.

A Scottish NHS trust is investigating a data breach concerning the medical records of a nine-year-old girl who died earlier this week and was named publicly for the first time on Wednesday after a man was charged with her death. The alleged breach occurred at Ninewells Hospital in Dundee, and reportedly involved staff members accessing the girl’s medical records without authorization or clinical need. A spokesperson for NHS Tayside, which oversees Ninewells Hospital, said: “NHS Tayside is currently investigating the circumstances of an alleged data breach which happened in a working clinical area where staff access patient information. “As a matter of governance, any data protection breach would be recorded and investigated by NHS Tayside and, where appropriate, reported to the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO). It would not be appropriate for us to comment further on individual staffing matters." NHS Tayside did not respond to questions about the nature of the accessed data nor who is thought to be behind the intrusion. Medical records in the UK are protected by the UK GDPR, contained in the Data Protection Act 2018 as well as several common law confidentiality rules. NHS staff are only allowed to access patient information where there is a legitimate clinical or other work-related need. A 35-year-old man whom police say was known to the child, was arrested and appeared in court on August 5 over the death of Minnie Merriman. The man issued no plea at Forfar Sheriff Court on the day of his arrest and has been remanded in custody. Merriman was found in Elliot Industrial Estate at approximately 0002 on Monday, August 3, with serious injuries. The young girl was then taken to Ninewells Hospital in Dundee, where she later died. Police Scotland said that they are not currently looking for anyone else in connection with her death. Other members of Merriman’s family, who are from West Yorkshire and were camping nearby, are being supported by specialists. A family statement, released through Police Scotland, read: “We are devastated with the loss of our beloved, absolutely incredible, beautiful and brave Minnie Moo. Our family asks that our privacy is respected at this extremely difficult time." Detective Inspector Mike Ness of Police Scotland’s major investigation team said: "Our thoughts remain with everyone affected by these events, especially Minnie's family. "A police presence will remain in the area while our enquiries continue. "Anyone with any concerns, or information, should approach these officers or contact Police Scotland on 101, quoting incident number 0008 of Monday, 3 August 2026." ®

If you manage Linux boxes long enough, you hit this exact wall. You spot a weird process eating CPU, kill it, wipe the script, and reset the user password. You grab a coffee, check things over, and come back five minutes later. The process is running again.

Raketu New Glenn zničil při testu vadný kyslíkový ventil jednoho z motorů • Firma už součástku upravila a plánuje obnovit lety do konce roku 2026 • Závada motoru BE-4 může ovlivnit také starty konkurenční rakety Vulcan

Wispr, the startup behind dictation tool Wispr Flow, has created an AI note-taking assistant that records meetings and generates conversation summaries for users.

The Wispr Flow Notetaker tool “captures your meetings so you can stop splitting your attention between listening and writing things down,” said Sahaj Garja, Wispr CTO and co-founder.

Notetaker starts recording with one click, and doesn’t require a bot to attend a video or voice call. It can also be used to capture in-person conversations.

The software has three key functions. Before a call, Notetaker displays a meeting brief with information such as meeting purpose and background of participants.

Once the meeting starts, a live transcript displays the dialogue text and labels speakers. A “what did I miss?” button provides a summary of talking points from the previous few minutes.

Finally, post-meeting, Notetaker generates a more detailed summary organized by topic that includes information such as key dates, decisions, and next steps. Users can search across notes from previous meetings in the Notetaker app. “Over time your meeting history stops being a folder of documents you have to go find and becomes something you can ask questions of,” said Garja.

Notetaker integrates with AI assistants such as Anthropic’s Claude and OpenAI’s ChatGPT via model context protocol. This allows users to connect outputs such as transcripts and summaries “into how you already work, instead of sitting in a separate app,” said Garja.

With Notetaker, Wispr competes in an increasingly busy market for AI note-taking apps that includes Fireflies, Granola and Otter.

Wispr claims Notetaker can produce more accurate transcripts than existing tools, partly because of the additional context it uses during transcription. It uses the same personal dictionary from Wispr Flow that includes acronyms, products, and preferred spellings, and can also draw on other sources such as calendar information to understand the purpose of a meeting and help ensure speakers are labelled correctly.

Before generating the final summary, Notetaker also re-reads the live meeting transcript and combines it with additional context to create a more accurate final output, Garja said.

Notetaker is the first new product launched by Wispr, which was founded in 2021 and has since raised $81 million in funding.

“We didn’t set out to build a dictation app,” said Garja. “The mission has always been to reshape how people interact with their devices, and dictation was the fastest way in.”

“Notetaker is the second product on that path. Dictation took the keyboard out of writing. Notetaker takes it out of meetings, so nobody has to spend the call typing up what everyone just said.”

User consent when recording calls

As AI note-taking tools have become more prevalent in the workplace, privacy concerns have arisen, including the need for all-party consent when recording a call in some jurisdictions, and whether meeting audio is used to train AI models. Two software vendors, Otter and Granola, currently face separate lawsuits in California that allege privacy law violations related to their products.

Wispr Flow Notetaker captures audio locally on a user’s device rather than joining the call as a visible bot. That means there’s no notification to signal that a conversation is being transcribed, which places responsibility on users to disclose the recording to others on the call in accordance with local laws, said Garja.

“Users should always let the other person know before you start recording or transcribing a conversation, whether it’s a video call, an in-person meeting, or a phone call,” he said, adding that Wispr intends to build additional features for automated consent messaging “in the coming weeks.”

Wispr doesn’t train its AI models on customer data without consent, though free and standard tier customers must choose to opt-out, according to Wispr’s privacy terms. Nor does it create “voiceprints or biometric profiles” of users or anyone else on a call using audio recording data, the company says.

When Notetaker is active, conversation audio is captured on a user’s device and processed on cloud servers to enable transcription. The recorded audio file is encrypted and stored temporarily on the user’s device or cloud storage, Wispr said. After a limited period, the audio is automatically deleted.

Notetaker is available with the Wispr Flow macOS app to free and paid subscribers, with support for Windows “coming soon.”

Soud v americkém státě Nové Mexiko ve čtvrtek nařídil internetové společnosti Meta Platforms zaplatit 567 milionů dolarů (téměř 12 miliard Kč) za újmy, které její platformy působí mladým lidem. S přihlédnutím k dřívějšímu verdiktu tak má společnost celkem zaplatit 942 milionů dolarů, což je malý zlomek jejího ročního výnosu, který loni činil 60 miliard dolarů. Čtvrteční verdikt firmě také nařizuje, aby změnila způsob, jakým její platformy fungují pro mladé uživatele ve státě. Meta, která provozuje sociální sítě Facebook a Instagram či komunikační aplikaci WhatsApp, uvedla, že se proti rozhodnutí odvolá. V případu tak nejspíš bude ještě rozhodovat soud vyšší instance.

The North Carolina Ports Authority has confirmed that a cyberattack disrupted IT systems and slowed operations at Port of Wilmington, Port of Morehead City, and Charlotte Inland Port. [...]

WordPress has fixed a pre-authentication reflected cross-site scripting (XSS) flaw in its login screen that affects every version of the content management system. pwn.ai demonstrated how the flaw can be chained into PHP code execution on the server when a logged-in administrator interacts with an attacker-controlled page. Tracked as CVE-2026-64638 (CVSS score: 8.9), the high-severitySwati Khandelwalhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/[email protected]

Netflix aktualizoval seznam podporovaných zařízení a systémů. Kdo má Windows 11 a prohlížeč Chrome, může už nově streamovat i v rozlišení 4K, doposud to bylo možné jen ve Full HD. Chrome se tak dostal na úroveň Edge a Safari. Kvalitnější obraz je pak nově dostupný také pro ChromeOS. Dostupnost ...

Demis Hassabis, the driving force behind Google DeepMind, is ascending to the role of chief scientist at Alphabet, Google’s parent company, replacing Jeff Dean who is leaving to work at a start-up.

The role will enable Hassabis to “put his full attention on actively shaping the future of AGI,” or artificial general intelligence, Alphabet CEO Sundar Pichai wrote on the company’s Inside Google blog.

Hassabis’ attention will still be divided, however: He will continue to lead research at Google spin-off Isomorphic Labs, which works on drug discovery, and although he will no longer be CEO of DeepMind, he will be its chair. Koray Kavukcuoglu will take over DeepMind, reporting directly to Pichai. He is currently its CTO.

Hassabis has been a strong promoter of AGI, defined by Google as the “hypothetical intelligence of a machine that possesses the ability to understand or learn any intellectual task that a human being can.”

He has a long career in AI, having helped found DeepMind in 2010. He has been a prominent figure in the AGI field, prophesying in May that it will be a viable technology within three years. He has been keen to tackle any barriers in the way of developing the technology; just last month, he called for greater self-regulation in the market, arguing that it would help drive the technology forward.

Hassabis welcomed the chance to focus on AGI development. “We have arrived at a pivotal moment in human history. I’ve been working towards AGI my whole life, and now, I feel it is close at hand. It’s critical that we collectively get the next steps right to ensure this all goes well for humanity and we usher in an incredible new age of discovery and wonder” he wrote in the Inside Google blog post.

Open Source had a great childhood. For two decades it got to be a kid. It ran around barefoot, gave everything away, trusted strangers, and never once thought about who was watching. It ran the kind of lemonade stand that took IOUs from anyone who wandered up — take what you need, pay me back whenever, no need to leave a name. It was idyllic. It was also, in retrospect, a little feral. Then, [email protected]

US defense and aerospace supplier IEH Corporation 'fessed up that a criminal managed to break into its Microsoft 365 mailbox in a filing with regulators. In a Form 8-K filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on Thursday, IEH said one of its staffers fell for a phishing scam that gave an attacker access to its M365 environment. The attacker "impersonated a prospective business contact" and sent the employee what appeared to be a genuine Microsoft sharing link. The accompanying fake login page duly harvested the victim's M365 credentials. "The threat actor gained access to mailbox contents, including email messages, attachments, customer communications, purchase orders, engineering-related documentation, and potentially export-controlled technical information," IEH said in the SEC filing [PDF]. IEH said it had found "no evidence" that the information was copied or exfiltrated, although it was accessible to the intruder during the "compromise period." IEH said it discovered the intrusion on August 4 but did not disclose when the compromised account was first accessed or how long the intruder remained inside. "The account was secured, malicious mailbox rules were disabled, evidence was preserved, and corrective actions are underway," it said. "Following containment and investigation activities, the company initiated a review of account security controls and authentication protections applicable to Microsoft 365 services." The incident has not disrupted operations, and IEH does not expect it to have a material impact, although the investigation continues. The absence of detected exfiltration does not mean the intruder merely browsed the inbox and left. Compromised mailboxes can be used to monitor communications, impersonate employees, redirect payments, or prepare follow-on attacks, while data theft is not always visible in Microsoft 365 logs. There is not enough information to attribute the attack. IEH's work for defense and aerospace customers could make it an attractive espionage target, but ordinary cybercriminals also compromise mailboxes for fraud and data theft. Both Russia and China have been caught snooping around US orgs for defense-related information in the past year, although there is nothing to suggest either was behind the attack on IEH. Brooklyn-based IEH makes hyperboloid connectors designed for harsh and high-stress environments. Its components are used in printed circuit boards, medical devices, commercial aircraft, fighter jets, missiles, satellites, and other systems. Some of the high profile US programs that use IEH's hyperboloid connectors include the PATRIOT air-defense system, AMRAAM, THAAD, the APKWS precision-guided rocket, and the MARK-48 torpedo. ®