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Forescout Research - Vedere Labs said it used Anthropic's Claude to port a working pre-authentication remote code execution (RCE) exploit from one WAGO programmable logic controller (PLC) to another, executing attacker-supplied ARM shellcode on live hardware. The exploit targets CVE-2021-31886, a stack-based buffer overflow in the Nucleus FTP server's handling of the USER command

Forescout Research - Vedere Labs said it used Anthropic's Claude to port a working pre-authentication remote code execution (RCE) exploit from one WAGO programmable logic controller (PLC) to another, executing attacker-supplied ARM shellcode on live hardware. The exploit targets CVE-2021-31886, a stack-based buffer overflow in the Nucleus FTP server's handling of the USER commandSwati Khandelwalhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/[email protected]

Threat actors are exploiting a severe security vulnerability in Sangoma Switchvox, an enterprise VoIP platform, that could allow unauthenticated remote code execution. The vulnerability in question is CVE-2026-9586 (CVSS score: 9.3), a critical unauthenticated SQL injection vulnerability in Sangoma Switchvox SMB Edition 8.3 (104997) that can allow attackers to remotely execute arbitrary code as

Threat actors are exploiting a severe security vulnerability in Sangoma Switchvox, an enterprise VoIP platform, that could allow unauthenticated remote code execution. The vulnerability in question is CVE-2026-9586 (CVSS score: 9.3), a critical unauthenticated SQL injection vulnerability in Sangoma Switchvox SMB Edition 8.3 (104997) that can allow attackers to remotely execute arbitrary code asRavie Lakshmananhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/[email protected]

The U.S. Department of Justice (DoJ) on Tuesday announced the takedown of a long-standing peer-to-peer (P2P) botnet known as Sality as part of a coordinated law enforcement operation. The effort was undertaken on August 31, 2026, by authorities from the U.S., Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania, in collaboration with private industry partners CrowdStrike and the Shadowserver Foundation. To that

The U.S. Department of Justice (DoJ) on Tuesday announced the takedown of a long-standing peer-to-peer (P2P) botnet known as Sality as part of a coordinated law enforcement operation. The effort was undertaken on August 31, 2026, by authorities from the U.S., Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania, in collaboration with private industry partners CrowdStrike and the Shadowserver Foundation. To that Ravie Lakshmananhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/[email protected]

Společně s rozmachem segmentu samotných deskových her začaly ve velkém vznikat i tituly podle velkých videoher. Nejde přitom jen o marketingové předměty, jedná se o perfektně propracované deskovky.

SonicWall warned customers that threat actors are chaining two new SMA1000 zero-day vulnerabilities in remote code execution attacks. [...]

Muž odhalil nevěru manželky díky kamerovému přenosu z robotického vysavače • Za porušení manželských povinností získal odškodné 500 000 tchajwanských dolarů • Za tajné nahrávání nakonec dostal trest pěti měsíců ve vězení a pokutu

Je tomu rok, co jsme vás informovali o reakci čínských výrobců na americký zákaz dovozu HBM pamětí do Číny. Již po 12 měsících nese tato reakce ovoce - Čína zahájila výrobu vlastních HBM3e pamětí…

A version 2 Linux kernel patch posted on August 31 fixes a stack overflow in the SA2UL hardware crypto driver. The Kernel Address Sanitizer, or KASAN, detected a one-byte write past a local buffer while strongSwan’s charon-systemd process was configuring an IPsec transform.

RxRPC is a Linux kernel transport for remote procedure calls. A teardown race reported in August shows that its network namespace cleanup can still reach a peer after that peer has been freed. The failure was caught by the Kernel Address Sanitizer, or KASAN, during automated testing.

A version 2 Linux kernel patch series posted on August 31 proposes a new eBPF security interface for applying Landlock policy during program execution. The 15-patch set introduces generic Linux Security Module policy objects, lets privileged BPF programs retain those objects in maps, and adds a helper that can apply a selected policy during exec processing.

Learning from the OpenAI-Hugging Face fiasco, as well as from recent revelations about its own model, Anthropic is revamping its security and alignment practices.

The company has established controls that flag when a model attempts to break out of a sandbox or successfully accesses the live internet, cordoned off its highest-risk test environments, and proposed a set of safety standards for its external testing partners, such as giving AI agents explicit instructions like “you should not access the internet.”

Anthropic conceded that three recent security incidents involving Claude reflect a “failure of operational security,” and also reveal issues with model reasoning capabilities and “recklessness.” Recent events “stressed that the urgency of improving our cybersecurity defenses is even higher than we previously believed,” the company noted.

Anthropic’s approach to security and alignment

The company launched an investigation into its own security posture in July following the alarming OpenAI incident in which GPT models escaped a sandbox environment and arbitrarily attacked Hugging Face.

The company subsequently disclosed three situations during cybersecurity testing in which Claude models (Opus 4.7, Mythos 5, and an internal research model) accessed computer systems they should not have been allowed to touch.

The pre-release models were intentionally running without cyber safeguards, a common practice in early testing, and were able to exploit misconfigurations in a third-party’s settings using basic hacking techniques. Flaws in their reasoning led them to believe that all the entities they accessed, including those on the live internet, were in-scope for their capture-the-flag exercise.

Anthropic maintained that its internal security posture was not a contributing factor. The exploits occurred in a third party environment where internet access was mistakenly left open, so “the models had no need to ‘hack out’ of anything, even if they had been inclined to do so.”

Still, the incidents underscored the importance of hardening the sandbox itself, the company said. Until now, builders had been “largely relying on a single layer of defense,” that is, the configuration of the environment, when they should have had several layers in place, including monitoring, setting explicit boundaries within prompts, and sealing sandboxes.

Following its discoveries, Anthropic paused its internal and external evaluations of pre-release models. Higher-risk reinforcement learning (RL) environments for pre-release models were also halted for several weeks, while some sandboxes were moved to isolated settings with more stringent security gating.

Researchers built and deployed a classifier that automatically identified a model’s attempts to “aggressively probe” or break out of a testing environment, and when it inadvertently gained access to the live internet. They also inspected previous model evaluations to identify sandbox escapes or misconfigurations.

The company said they found no examples of models breaching sandbox boundaries. And while several sandbox configurations were flagged, none resulted in a compromise of outside systems.

When it comes to alignment, however, Anthropic researchers discovered a common failure with motivated reasoning: Models believed they were still in a simulated environment when they were actually connected to the internet; thus, they did not think they were breaching the boundaries of their testing lab. The other flaw was “recklessness,” a model’s seeming willingness to take harmful actions in the wild to ensure it achieved its goals.

In response, the researchers have been resampling models, testing them in skewed settings, and filtering out environments that incentivize cheating. They have also overhauled their production RL stack, established a stricter review process, changed specifications around model rewards, and tightened criteria for human reviewers who often dismissed false positives.

Further, Anthropic has expanded its monitoring of internal employee usage, and continues to red team its stack. Some high-risk RL environments remain paused for manual review.

Researchers are still studying how, exactly, models determined whether or not they were connected to the live internet, and if they knowingly disregarded signs that they were, due to flaws in their reasoning. They have also “empirically” determined that defects in training sandboxes disproportionately contribute to misaligned behavior.

However, that is not the sole reason. “Solving alignment will involve addressing a very wide range of potential problems,” Anthropic noted, “and future alignment incidents may involve different behaviors and different causes from those we have seen so far.”

Testing best practices

Because the Claude security incidents occurred in third-party environments, and pre-release models often have weaker security safeguards, Anthropic is asking external testing companies to commit to a set of best practices.

Notably, they should explicitly set a model’s scope, and define permitted actions and what a model should and shouldn’t access. Boundaries must be stated as instructions (“you should not access the internet”) as opposed to descriptions of the environment (“you do not have internet access”).

Other suggested practices include running continuous, real-time monitoring, conducting evaluations inside a hardened sandbox with no internet access, and probing for vulnerabilities before even performing any testing, instructing the model itself to attempt to break out of its sandbox, and having it report back if it succeeds. Further, testers must confirm that evaluation challenges are actually solvable, rather than theoretical, so models don’t take actions outside their intended scope to achieve them.

“Because evaluations are sometimes conducted over hundreds or even thousands of runs, partners should ideally carry out this testing at length before beginning any evaluations,” Anthropic noted.

The company said it is developing companion best practices for those with access to Claude Mythos 5, which also runs without cyber safeguards.

Going forward, Anthropic described a “defense in depth” strategy. During alignment, a model is trained to be “helpful, honest, and harmless,” and is steered away from irreversible or contextually irrelevant actions. Models are given minimal permissions and their actions are limited, while offline monitoring notifies humans when things look wrong.

Finally, as a last resort, risky actions are blocked based on pre-determined classifiers, and humans can “pull the cord,” rework, or pause an agent when security layers fail.

Safety is just one part of it

Experts call the move a positive step, if a basic one. Best practices like better isolation and monitoring should have been in place before agents were kicked off to hack systems, noted David Shipley of Beauceron Security.

“Better late than never,” he said, adding: “All these frontier firms are benefiting from felony-humblebragging-as-marketing, but there are some solid improvements in this announcement.”

The fact that the EU Act is now in force adds another layer of context, Shipley pointed out: Europe’s regulators are digging into the safety issues posed by frontier AI. These companies have had one of the fastest growth trajectories in tech history, and, concurrently, arguably the fastest regulatory response. Ideally, regulators are taking lessons from the “social media mess” and staying on emerging tech’s case before massive harms ensue, he said.

At the same time, frontier AI companies are watching high-profile court cases like the one targeting Meta.

This adds a third layer of context: The speed at which these companies are being sued is also on an unprecedented trajectory. “So, we should also read this blog as building a paper trail for a due diligence defense for regulators and courts,” Shipley noted.

This article originally appeared on CSOonline.

Citrix on Tuesday announced that it has completed the acquisition of longtime partner Numecent, producer of technology that containerizes and manages Windows applications.

The acquisition builds on joint efforts to integrate Numecent’s management tool, Cloudpager, with Citrix Desktop-as-a-Service (DaaS) after an integration announced in April let administrators natively publish and manage the application containers through familiar Citrix workflows.

Numecent’s other product, Cloudpaging, packages Windows applications into isolated application containers independent of the underlying operating system, streaming them to Windows endpoints on demand rather than requiring them to be included in a desktop image. 

Citrix plans to further integrate the technology into its platform, while also continuing Cloudpaging and Cloudpager support for physical Windows devices.

“Enterprise customers have told us for years that application management is one of the most painful parts of running a Windows environment,” said Shawn Bass, SVP and GM of Citrix DaaS, in the announcement of the acquisition. “Numecent has solved this in a genuinely elegant way. By bringing Cloudpaging and Cloudpager into Citrix, we can make this capability native to every DaaS and physical desktop deployment so IT teams get back the time they spend wrestling with images and app conflicts.”

Analysts and consultants said the move will help enterprise IT to some extent, but will also increase vendor lock-in with Citrix while potentially exposing enterprises to data security risks.

Good for Citrix customers

Gartner VP Analyst Stuart Downes said, “overall, this is a positive for Citrix customers,” but he stressed that the promised conversions “are not 100% compatible.” 

He said, “low-level integrations into the kernel are generally not successful” because code that needs the lowest level of OS integration usually needs direct links to the hardware. Still, he estimated that applications at the low level probably account for only 2% of enterprise applications. 

For the more typical apps, Downes said that there will likely be “north of 90% compatibility. It varies. There are quite a lot of complex factors in app virtualization.” But he emphasized that Numecent offers two components: Cloudpager and Cloudpaging, and “we have yet to see how Citrix will integrate both.”

Justin Greis, CEO of consulting firm Acceligence, also sees a lot of potential savings for the enterprise.

“Large companies can have thousands of Windows applications, including legacy, custom, industry-specific, and highly specialized applications,” he said. “Many have dependencies on particular versions of Windows, libraries, configurations, or desktop images. Every major desktop refresh, Windows migration, VDI program, cloud move, acquisition, or infrastructure modernization effort can therefore create another application testing and repackaging cycle. The ability to abstract more of the application layer from the environment underneath it can remove a meaningful amount of that friction.”

Noah Kenney, principal consultant at Digital 520, added that the theoretical advantage that Citrix can now offer has great enterprise potential.

But, he argued, this likely amounts to an enterprise IT pay less now, pay more later situation.

“There are operational savings here, which is why customers will adopt it, but the bill comes due when they try to leave,” Kenney said. “This is a good acquisition for Citrix and probably bad for enterprise leverage over time. Citrix can now lose the desktop and still keep the customer. Every application moved into Cloudpager raises the cost of the next migration. Customers get the simplification now and Citrix gets the switching cost later.”

Half right

Sanchit Vir Gogia, chief analyst at Greyhound Research, said that he reads the containerization pitch as half right. “The packaging premise is valid. The cross-operating-system execution premise is not,” he said.

Gogia pointed out that Numecent Cloudpaging packages a Windows application with its dependencies and streams it to a Cloudpaging Player on a physical or virtual Windows endpoint, where it executes locally. “A Mac or Linux user reaches that application through Citrix’s remote delivery, where it still executes on Windows. That is cross-platform access, not cross-platform execution,” he said. “A Windows application does not become a Mac application merely because its pixels arrive on a Mac. The container is a packaging promise and the boundary of that promise is Windows.”

That said, he noted that there is still a lot of value in the Citrix arrangement, because Cloudpaging separates an application from a particular Windows image and carries that package across physical and virtual Windows environments, including Arm-based devices. 

“The real advance is not escaping Windows,” Gogia explained. “It is making application change less dependent on desktop change. Microsoft’s own App Assure data puts enterprise application compatibility above 99.7%, and Cloudpaging’s commercial logic lives almost entirely inside the fraction that remains. At enterprise scale, the final 1% of applications can carry far more than 1% of the business risk.”

But, he added, “Existing Numecent customers need binding answers on entitlements, migration and exit. Citrix has bought control of a useful Windows application lifecycle. Control now has to prove itself, and the proof it owes customers is less complexity, not merely more control for Citrix.”

Possible risk

However, consultant Brian Levine, executive director of FormerGov, pointed out that the nature of these new Citrix capabilities could expose users to serious security issues, including the risk of data exfiltration. 

He sees Cloudpager as “essentially a privileged switch that can push software to every Windows endpoint at once, which is precisely the kind of mass-distribution channel that produced SolarWinds and Kaseya. Bolting it onto Citrix, whose NetScaler gear has been a favorite ransomware target through repeated ‘CitrixBleed’ flaws, may leave CIOs and organizations wondering who will focus on security for the combined entity, and how will it prevent the type of attacks we’ve seen against Citrix.”

Citrix was asked to comment on these security questions, but did not do so by publication time. 

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