A distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack is one of the most popular tools in the cybercriminal arsenal. The motives behind such attacks can vary – from cyber-hooliganism to extortion. There have been cases where criminal groups have threatened their victims with a DDoS attack unless the latter paid 5 bitcoins (more than $5,000). Often, a DDoS attack is used to distract IT staff while another cybercrime such as data theft or malware injection is carried out.
Almost anyone can fall victim to a DDoS attack. They are relatively cheap and easy to organize, and can be highly effective if reliable protection is not in place. Based on analysis of the data obtained from open sources (for example, offers to organize DDoS attacks on Internet forums or in Tor), we managed to find out the current cost of a DDoS attack on the black market. We also established what exactly the cybercriminals behind DDoS attacks offer their customers.DDoS as a service
Ordering a DDoS attack is usually done using a full-fledged web service, eliminating the need for direct contact between the organizer and the customer. The majority of offers that we came across left links to these resources rather than contact details. Customers can use them to make payments, get reports on work done or utilize additional services. In fact, the functionality of these web services looks similar to that offered by legal services.
Example of a web service for ordering DDoS attacks that looks more like the web page of an IT startup than a cybercriminal operation
These web services are fully functional web applications that allow registered customers to manage their balance and plan their DDoS attack budget. Some developers even offer bonus points for each attack conducted using their service. In other words, cybercriminals have their own loyalty and customer service programs.
DDoS service advertised on a Russian public forum offering attacks from $50 per day
Some of the services we identified contained information on the number of registered users, as well as data on the number of attacks carried out per day. Many of the web services offering DDoS attacks claimed to have tens of thousands of registered accounts. However, these figures may be inflated by the owners of services to make their resources look more popular.
Statistics provided by one service to demonstrate its popularity with DDoS customers (479270 implemented attacks)
Statistics provided by one service to demonstrate the popularity of DDoS attack scenarios
Information about the popularity of a DDoS serviceRates for DDoS
The special features emphasized in the adverts for DDoS services can give a particular service an advantage over its competitors and sway the customer’s choice:
The target and its characteristics. A cybercriminal that agrees to attack a government resource will attract customers who are interested in this particular service. The attacker can ask for more money for this type of service than they would for an attack on an online store. The cost of the service may also depend on the type of anti-DDoS protection the potential victim has: if the target uses traffic filtering systems to protect its resources, the cybercriminals have to come up with ways of bypassing them to ensure an effective attack, and this also means an increase in the price.
Attack sources and their characteristics. This factor can determine the price the attackers ask for conducting their attacks. The cheaper it is for a criminal to maintain a botnet (defined, for example, by the average cost of infecting a device and including it in a botnet), the more likely they are to ask for bargain-basement prices for their services. For example, a botnet of 1000 surveillance cameras may be cheaper in terms of organization than a botnet of 100 servers. This is because cameras and other IoT devices are currently less secure – a fact that is often ignored by their owners.
Attack scenario. Requests for atypical DDoS attacks (for example, the customer may ask the botnet owner to alternate between different methods of DDoS attacks within a short period of time or implement several methods simultaneously) can increase costs.
The average cost of a DDoS attack as a service in a particular country. Competition can cause cybercriminals to raise or lower the cost of their services. They also try to take into consideration the ability of their audience to pay and devise their pricing policy accordingly (for example, a DDoS attack will cost US customers more than a similar offer in Russia).
Along with specific botnet features, the organizers of DDoS services also offer customers a tariff plan in which the buyer pays a per-second rental price for botnet capacity. For example, a DDoS attack of 300 seconds using a botnet with a total bandwidth of 125 Gbps will cost €5, with all other characteristics (power and scenarios) remaining the same for all tariffs.
The price list for one of the biggest services offering DDoS attacks
A DDoS attack lasting 10,800 seconds will cost the client $60, or approximately $20 per hour, and the attack specifications (scenario and computing power used) were not always stated on the customer-facing resource. Apparently, not all cybercriminals consider it appropriate to disclose the inner workings of their botnet (it’s also possible that some owners don’t actually understand the technical characteristics of their botnets). In particular, they don’t disclose the type of bots included in a botnet.
The price includes implementation of the following rather trivial scenarios:
- Multi-vector amplification (several amplification scenarios simultaneously).
The price list for a service that, with just a few clicks, allows clients to order a DDoS attack on an arbitrary resource accompanied with a detailed report
Some services offer a choice of attack scenario, which allows cybercriminals to combine different scenarios and perform attacks tailored to the individual characteristics of the victim. For example, if the victim successfully combats SYN-flood, the attacker can switch the scenario on the control panel and evaluate the victim’s reaction.
Various tariffs of an English-language service that varies its pricing according to the number of seconds a DDoS attack lasts
Among the offers we analyzed there were some in which the attackers stated different prices for their services depending on the type of victim.
Information found on a Russian site dedicated entirely to DDoS services
For example, the cybercriminals ask for $400 per day to attack a site/server that uses anti-DDoS protection, which is four times more expensive than an attack on an unprotected site.
Moreover, not all cybercriminals offering DDoS attacks will agree to attack government resources: such sites are closely monitored by law enforcement agencies, and the organizers don’t want to expose their botnets. However, we did come across services offering attacks on government resources as a separate item in the price list.
“The price may change if the resource has political status” reads a resource promoting DDoS attacks
Interestingly, some criminals see nothing wrong with providing protection from DDoS along with their DDoS attack services.
Some services offering DDoS attacks may also offer protection from such attacksPricing: a “cloud” example
Let’s consider a DNS amplification attack scenario. This type of attack involves the sending of a specially formed request (for example, 100 bytes in volume) to a vulnerable DNS server that responds to the “sender” (i.e. the victim) with a larger volume (kilobyte) of data. The botnet may consist of tens or even hundreds of such servers or the resources of a public cloud service provider. Add in public web load testing services that can be used to carry out a SaaS amplification attack, and we end up with a fairly heavy “sledgehammer”.
DDoS = Cloud + DNS Amplification + SaaS Amplification
The cost of this service depends on the cost of the provider’s resources. Let’s take Amazon EC2 as an example – the price for a virtual dedicated server with minimal configuration (for a DDoS attack, the configuration of the infected workstation is not as important as its bandwidth connection) is about $0.0065 per hour. Therefore, 50 virtual servers for the organization of a low-powered DDoS attack on an online store will cost cybercriminals $0.325 per hour. Taking into account additional expenses (for example, a SIM card to register an account and adding a credit card to it), an hour-long DDoS attack using a cloud service will cost the criminals about $4.
Price list for popular cloud service providers
This means the actual cost of an attack using a botnet of 1000 workstations can amount to $7 per hour. The asking prices for the services we managed to find were, on average, $25 per hour, meaning the cybercriminals organizing DDoS attack are making a profit of about $18 for every hour of an attack.Conclusion
The clients of these services understand perfectly well the benefits of DDoS attacks and how effective they can be. The cost of a five-minute attack on a large online store is about $5. The victim, however, can lose far more because potential customers simply cannot place an order. We can only guess how many customers an online store loses if an attack lasts the whole day.
At the same time, cybercriminals continue to actively seek new and cheaper ways to organize botnets. In this regard, the Internet of things makes life easier for them. One of the current trends is the infection of IoT devices (CCTV cameras, DVR-systems, “smart” household appliances, etc.) and their subsequent use in DDoS attacks. And while vulnerable IoT devices exist, cybercriminals are able to exploit them.
It should be noted that DDoS attacks and, in particular, ransomware DDoS have already turned into a high-margin business: the profitability of one attack can exceed 95%. And the fact that the owners of online sites are often willing to pay a ransom without even checking whether the attackers can actually carry out an attack (something that other fraudsters have already picked up on) adds even more fuel to the fire. All the above suggests that the average cost of DDoS attacks in the near future will only fall, while their frequency will increase.
The planning for Kaspersky Lab Security Analyst Summit (SAS 2017) is nearing completion and we have a small number of invitations available for malware researchers, law enforcement officials, incident responders and professionals involved in the fight against cybercrime.
If you’ve never been to SAS, ask around. You really are missing out on the best security conference in the industry – and event where the best connections are made, high-quality discoveries are shared in a fun, casual atmosphere.
This year, the conference will be in beautiful St Maarten at the Westin Dawn Beach Resort & Spa. The agenda is now live with a wide range of quality keynotes and presentations. If you still haven’t made up your mind, here are the top ten reasons to make a last-minute decision to join us in St Maarten.
Mark Dowd’s first ever conference keynote: Mark Dowd, of ISS X-Force fame, is globally respected for his work hacking – and fixing – some of the biggest software vulnerabilities. He has literally written the book on software security assessment and now focuses his efforts on breaking Apple’s iOS to look for security holes. At SAS 2017, Dowd’s keynote will focus on the memory corruption safety dance.
The Internet of Things (IoT) is everywhere around us, presenting amazing gadgets like drones and productivity devices. It also introduces a wide range of vulnerabilities. The agenda is filled with presentations on these weaknesses and promises a straightforward discussion on where the industry needs to go to protect the world from attacks that are inevitable.
The SAS conference is renowned for uncompromising APT revelations and 2017 promises een more. Kris McConkehy from PwC will reveal technical talk on a seven-year malicious campaign; BAE Systems and Kaspersky Lab with a story about chasing bad guys from Bangladesh to Costa Rica (hint: SWIFT); Researchers from Mandiant will discuss major campaigns against the hospitality and gaming industries; Lookout Security will provide new information on a nation-state backed mobile espionage case.
Much like IoT issues, the world is moving swiftly to smart city deployments. These manage transportation sectors, traffic lights, water meters and a range of technologies to increase efficiency and cut costs. At SAS 2017, Smart Cities will take center stage with a highly anticipated talk on the security problems with the deployment on a smart city municipal drone programs. SAS 2017 participants will also learn how to build and run an IoT honeypot for researching attacks and evaluate first results of IoT tracking project.
Security experts willpresent a cheap and simple hardware design that can empty one of the most popular ATM models in the world; others will talk about criminal gangstargeting banks and Apple and the hijacking of a major financial institution.
We are in the midst of a ransomware epidemic but did you know there is a new trend emerging regarding ransomware in targeted attacks? Think APTs merging with ransomware cybercriminals and you will understand why this is an incredibly important topic. Security experts from Google will also talk about how to harden Android against ransomware).
If you think the debate on vulnerability disclosure is complete, think again. SAS 2017 will present an entire session focused on this evergreen issue with some of the biggest names joining us to share their expertise – Katie Moussouris, Alex Rice, David Jacoby, Kymberlee Price and Cesar Cerrudo. There may even be an interesting news announcement
This year we found a new family of ransomware used in targeted attacks against organizations. After penetrating an organization’s network the threat actors used the PsExec tool to install ransomware on all endpoints and servers in the organization. The next interesting fact about this ransomware is that the threat actors decided to use the well-known Petya ransomware to encrypt user data. As you may know, this family of ransomware has a RaaS model, but the threat actor decided not to use this ability. To get a workable version of the ransomware, the group behind PetrWrap created a special module that patches the original Petya ransomware “on the fly”. This is what makes this new malware so unique.Tech details
The PetrWrap Trojan is written in C and compiled in MS Visual Studio. It carries a sample of the Petya ransomware v3 inside its data section and uses Petya to infect the victim’s machine. What’s more, PetrWrap implements its own cryptographic routines and modifies the code of Petya in runtime to control its execution. This allows the criminals behind PetrWrap to hide the fact that they are using Petya during infection.Modus operandi
After being launched PetrWrap delays its execution (sleeps for 5400 seconds = 1.5 hours). After that it decrypts the main DLL of Petya from its data section and gets ready to call its exported function ZuWQdweafdsg345312. This function normally prepares Petya for further operations and starts the MBR overwrite process. PetrWrap, however, needs to hook a couple of Petya’s functions first, so it replaces the instructions that call Petya’s DllEntryPoint with NOPs (hex bytes 0x90). This prevents Petya from proceeding on its own and allows PetrWrap to make all the necessary computations and preparations before letting it continue.
Main function of PetrWrap
After that PetrWrap makes the necessary cryptographic computations (we’ll discuss them in more detail below), hooks two Petya procedures (which are responsible for the generation of the configuration data, dubbed petya_generate_config, and for the MBR overwrite process, dubbed petya_infect) and then passes the execution to Petya. For more information on what the original Petya was capable of, please see our previous publication.Cryptographic scheme
Normally, Petya generates a 16-byte key and uses the Salsa20 cipher to encrypt the MFT of the NTFS partitions found on local drives. To make decryption possible only by its operators, it uses the Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key agreement algorithm with the curve secp192k1 and a public key is embedded into Petya’s body.
The criminals behind PetrWrap faced a problem: if they used Petya as is, they would be unable to decrypt the victim’s machine because they would need the Petya operators’ private key. So what they decided to do was to completely replace the ECDH part of Petya with their own independent implementation and use their own private and public keys.
PetrWrap implementation uses cryptographic routines from OpenSSL (whereas Petya used the mbedtls library) and proceeds as follows:
- The Trojan contains an embedded public key master_pub (which is a point on the curve prime192v1 which is again different from the one chosen by Petya);
- During each infection PetrWrap generates a new pair of session keys ec_session_priv + ec_session_pub;
- Computes ecdh_shared_digest = SHA512(ECDH(master_pub, ec_session_priv));
- ‘Intercepts’ the salsa key generated by Petya and encrypts it using ecdh_shared_digest (there are a number of semi-useless manipulations which come down to essentially encrypting the salsa key with AES-256 using different parts of ecdh_shared_digest as the key and IV);
- Constructs user_id which is a string representation that contains the encrypted salsa key and the ec_session_pub;
- Passes this user_id to Petya, which uses it as if it was its own data (puts it into the configuration for the bootloader to be shown to the user after the PC reboot).
The ECDH shared key computation implemented in PetrWrapHooked procedures
PetrWrap hooks two procedures in Petya which we will call petya_infect and petya_generate_config and replaces them with its own procedures dubbed wrap_infect and wrap_generate_config.
wrap_infect implements the following functionality:
- saves the salsa key generated by Petya for further use;
- patches the Petya bootloader code and ransom text in order to skip the flashing skull animation and to wipe all mention of Petya in the ransom message;
- passes execution to the original petya_infect procedure.
wrap_generate_config in turn does the following:
- calls the original petya_generate_config procedure;
- generates the user_id string according to the algorithm described in the previous paragraph;
- replaces Petya’s id string with this newly generated user_id.
The screen of the infected machineTechnical summary
As a result of all the manipulations described above, PetrWrap achieves the following goals:
The victim’s machine is locked and the MFT of NTFS partitions is encrypted securely (because Petya v3 which is used in this attack doesn’t have flaws of the earlier versions and implements Salsa20 correctly);
The lockscreen doesn’t show the flashing skull animation and doesn’t contain any mentions of Petya which makes it harder to assess the situation and determine the extent of the caused damage;
The developers of PetrWrap didn’t have to write the low-level bootloader code and risk making mistakes similar to the ones observed in earlier versions of Petya.
Unfortunately, this family of ransomware uses a strong encryption algorithm, meaning a decryption tool is out of the question. However, victims can try restoring files using third-party tools such as R-Studio.Detection
Kaspersky products successfully detect this ransomware as Trojan-Ransom.Win32.PetrWrap and PDM:Trojan.Win32.Generic.Conclusion
Targeted attacks on organizations with the main aim of encrypting data are becoming more popular. The groups using ransomware in their targeted attacks usually try to find vulnerable servers or servers with unprotected RDP access. After penetrating an organization’s network they use special frameworks like Mimikatz to obtain the necessary credentials for installing ransomware throughout the network. To protect against such attacks, organizations need to keep their server software up to date, use secure passwords for remote access systems, install security solutions on their servers and use security solutions with behavioral detection components on their endpoints.
17c25c8a7c141195ee887de905f33d7b – Trojan-Ransom.Win32.PetrWrap.b
Beginning in November 2016, Kaspersky Lab observed a new wave of wiper attacks directed at multiple targets in the Middle East. The malware used in the new attacks was a variant of the infamous Shamoon worm that targeted Saudi Aramco and Rasgas back in 2012.
Dormant for four years, one of the most mysterious wipers in history has returned.
So far, we have observed three waves of attacks of the Shamoon 2.0 malware, activated on 17 November 2016, 29 November 2016 and 23 January 2017.
Also known as Disttrack, Shamoon is a highly destructive malware family that effectively wipes the victim machine. A group known as the Cutting Sword of Justice took credit for the Saudi Aramco attack by posting a Pastebin message on the day of the attack (back in 2012), and justified the attack as a measure against the Saudi monarchy.
The Shamoon 2.0 attacks seen in November 2016 targeted organizations in various critical and economic sectors in Saudi Arabia. Just like the previous variant, the Shamoon 2.0 wiper aims for the mass destruction of systems inside compromised organizations.
The new attacks share many similarities with the 2012 wave and now feature new tools and techniques. During the first stage, the attackers obtain administrator credentials for the victim’s network. Next, they build a custom wiper (Shamoon 2.0) which leverages these credentials to spread widely inside the organization. Finally, on a predefined date, the wiper activates, rendering the infected machines completely inoperable. It should be noted that the final stages of the attacks are completely automated, without the need for communication with the command and control center.
While investigating the Shamoon 2.0 attacks, Kaspersky Lab also discovered a previously unknown wiper malware which appears to be targeting organizations in Saudi Arabia. We’re calling this new wiper StoneDrill. StoneDrill has several “style” similarities to Shamoon, with multiple interesting factors and techniques to allow for the better evasion of detection. In addition to suspected Saudi targets, one victim of StoneDrill was observed on the Kaspersky Security Network (KSN) in Europe. This makes us believe the threat actor behind StoneDrill is expanding its wiping operations from the Middle East to Europe.
To summarize some of the characteristics of the new wiper attacks, for both Shamoon and StoneDrill:
- Shamoon 2.0 includes a fully functional ransomware module, in addition to its common wiping functionality.
- Shamoon 2.0 has both 32-bit and 64-bit components.
- The Shamoon samples we analyzed in January 2017 do not implement any command and control (C&C) communication; previous ones included a basic C&C functionality that referenced local servers in the victim’s network.
- StoneDrill makes heavy use of evasion techniques to avoid sandbox execution.
- While Shamoon embeds Arabic-Yemen resource language sections, StoneDrill embeds mostly Persian resource language sections. Of course, we do not exclude the possibility of false flags.
- StoneDrill does not use drivers during deployment (unlike Shamoon) but relies on memory injection of the wiping module into the victim’s preferred browser.
- Several similarities exist between Shamoon and StoneDrill.
- Multiple similarities were found between StoneDrill and previously analysed NewsBeef attacks.
We are releasing a full technical report that provides new insights into the Shamoon 2.0 and StoneDrill attacks, including:
- The discovery techniques and strategies we used for Shamoon and StoneDrill.
- Details on the ransomware functionality found in Shamoon 2.0. This functionality is currently inactive but could be used in future attacks.
- Details on the newly found StoneDrill functions, including its destructive capabilities (even with limited user privileges).
- Details on the similarities between malware styles and malware components’ source code found in Shamoon, StoneDrill and NewsBeef.
Our discovery of StoneDrill provides another dimension to the existing wave of wiper attacks against Saudi organizations that started with Shamoon 2.0 in November 2016. Compared to the new Shamoon 2.0 variants, the most significant difference is the lack of a disk driver used for direct access during the destructive step. Nevertheless, one does not necessarily need raw disk access to perform destructive functions at file level, which the malware implements quite successfully.
Of course, one of the most important questions here is the connection between Shamoon and StoneDrill. Both wipers appear to have been used against Saudi organizations during a similar timeframe of October-November 2016. Several theories are possible here:
- StoneDrill is a less-used wiper tool, deployed in certain situations by the same Shamoon group.
- StoneDrill and Shamoon are used by different groups which are aligned in their interests.
- StoneDrill and Shamoon are used by two different groups which have no connection to each other and just happen to target Saudi organizations at the same time.
Taking all factors into account, our opinion is that the most likely theory is the second.
Additionally, StoneDrill appears to be connected with previously reported NewsBeef activity, which continues to target Saudi organizations. From this point of view, NewsBeef and StoneDrill appear to be continuously focused on targeting Saudi interests, while Shamoon is a flashy, come-and-go high impact tool.
In terms of attribution, while Shamoon embeds Arabic-Yemen resource language sections, StoneDrill embeds mostly Persian resource language sections. Geopolitical analysts would be quick to point out that Iran and Yemen are both players in the Iran-Saudi Arabia proxy conflict. Of course, we do not exclude the possibility of false flags.
Finally, many unanswered question remain in regards to StoneDrill and NewsBeef. The discovery of the StoneDrill wiper in Europe is a significant sign that the group is expanding its destructive attacks outside the Middle East. The target for the attack appears to be a large corporation with a wide area of activity in the petro-chemical sector, with no apparent connection or interest in Saudi Arabia.
As usual, we will continue to monitor the Shamoon, StoneDrill and NewsBeef attacks.
A presentation about StoneDrill will be given at the Kaspersky Security Analyst Summit Conference in April 2-6, 2017.
Kaspersky Lab products detect the Shamoon and StoneDrill samples as:
In 2016, Kaspersky Lab detected the following:
- 8,526,221 malicious installation packages
- 128,886 mobile banking Trojans
- 261,214 mobile ransomware Trojans
- Growth in the popularity of malicious programs using super-user rights, primarily advertising Trojans.
- Distribution of malware via Google Play and advertising services.
- Emergence of new ways to bypass Android protection mechanisms.
- Growth in the volume of mobile ransomware.
- Active development of mobile banking Trojans.
The year’s most prevalent trend was Trojans gaining super-user privileges. To get these privileges, they use a variety of vulnerabilities that are usually patched in the newer versions of Android. Unfortunately, most user devices do not receive the latest system updates, making them vulnerable.
Root privileges provide these Trojans with almost unlimited possibilities, allowing them to secretly install other advertising applications, as well as display ads on the infected device, often making it impossible to use the smartphone. In addition to aggressive advertising and the installation of third-party software, these Trojans can even buy apps on Google Play.
This malware simultaneously installs its modules in the system directory, which makes the treatment of the infected device very difficult. Some advertising Trojans are even able to infect the recovery image, making it impossible to solve the problem by restoring to factory settings.
In addition to the secret installation of advertising apps, these Trojans can also install malware. We have registered installations of the modular trojan Backdoor.AndroidOS.Triada, which modified the Zygote processes. This allowed it to remain in the system and alter text messages sent by other apps, making it possible to steal money from the owner of the infected device. With super-user rights the Trojan can do almost anything, including substitute the URL in the browser.
Representatives of this class of malicious software have been repeatedly found in the official Google Play app store, for example, masquerading as a guide for Pokemon GO. This particular app was downloaded over half a million times and was detected as Trojan.AndroidOS.Ztorg.ad.
Trojan.AndroidOS.Ztorg.ad imitating a guide for Pokemon GOCybercriminals continue their use of Google Play
In Google Play in October and November, we detected about 50 new applications infected by Trojan.AndroidOS.Ztorg.am, the new modification of Trojan.AndroidOS.Ztorg.ad. According to installation statistics, many of them were installed more than 100,000 times.
Trojan.AndroidOS.Ztorg.ad imitating a video player
Google Play was used to spread Trojans capable of stealing login credentials. One of them was Trojan-Spy.AndroidOS.Instealy.a which stole logins and passwords for Instagram accounts. Another was Trojan-PSW.AndroidOS.MyVk.a: it was repeatedly published in Google Play and targeted user data from the social networking site VKontakte.
Yet another example is Trojan-Ransom.AndroidOS.Pletor.d, distributed by cybercriminals under the guise of an app for cleaning operating systems. Usually, representatives of the Trojan-Ransom.AndroidOS.Pletor family encrypt files on the victim device, but the detected modification only blocked the gadget and demanded a ransom to unblock it.
Trojan-Ransom.AndroidOS.Pletor.d imitating a system cleanerBypassing Android’s protection mechanisms
Cybercriminals are constantly looking for ways to bypass Android’s new protection mechanisms. For instance, in early 2016, we found that some modifications of the Tiny SMS Trojan were able to use their own window to overlay a system message warning users about sending a text message to a premium rate number. As the owner of the smartphone cannot see the original text, they are unaware of what they are agreeing to, and send the message to the number specified by the attacker.
A similar method was used by Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Asacub to get administrator rights on the device. The Trojan hides the system request from the user, cheating the latter into granting it extra privileges. In addition, Asacub asks for the right to be the default SMS application, which allows it to steal messages even in newer versions of Android.
The authors of Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Gugi went even further. This malicious program is able to bypass two new Android 6 security mechanisms using only social engineering techniques. Without exploiting system vulnerabilities, Gugi bypasses the request for Android’s permission to display its window on top of other applications as well as the dynamic permission requirement for potentially dangerous actions.Mobile ransomware
While the very first mobile encryptor Trojan really did encrypt user data on a device and demand money to decrypt them, current ransomware simply displays the ransom demand on top of other windows (including system windows), thus making it impossible to use the device.
The same principle was used by the most popular mobile ransom program in 2016 – Trojan-Ransom.AndroidOS.Fusob. Interestingly, this Trojan attacks users in Germany, the US and the UK, but avoids users from the CIS and some neighboring countries (once executed, it runs a check of the device language, after which it may stop working). The cybercriminals behind the Trojan usually demand between $100 and $200 to unblock a device. The ransom has to be paid using codes from pre-paid iTunes cards.
Yet another way to block devices is to use the Trojan-Ransom.AndroidOS.Congur family, which is popular in China. These Trojans change the PIN code for the gadget, or enable this safety function by setting their own PIN. To do this, the ransom program has to get administrator rights. The victim is told to contact the attackers via the QQ messenger to unblock the device.
Mobile banking Trojans continued to evolve through the year. Many of them gained tools to bypass the new Android security mechanisms and were able to continue stealing user information from the most recent versions of the OS. Also, the developers of mobile banking Trojans added more and more new features to their creations. For example, the Marcher family redirected users from financial to phishing sites over a period of several months.
In addition, many mobile banking Trojans include functionality for extorting money: upon receiving a command from a server, they can block the operation of a device with a ransom-demand window. We discovered that one modification of Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Faketoken could not only overlay the system interface but also encrypt user data.
It is also worth noting that the cybercriminals behind malicious programs for Android did not forget about one of the hottest topics of 2016 – IoT devices. In particular, we discovered the ‘attack-the-router’ Trojan Switcher which targets the Wi-Fi network an infected device is connected to. If the Trojan manages to guess the password to the router, it changes the DNS settings, implementing a DNS-hijacking attack.A glance into the Dark Web. Contribution from INTERPOL’s Global Complex for Innovation.
The Dark Web provides a means for criminal actors to communicate and engage in commercial transactions, like buying and selling various products and services, including mobile malware kits. Vendors and buyers increasingly take advantage of the multiple security and business-oriented mechanisms put in place on Tor (The Onion Router) cryptomarkets, such as the use of cryptocurrencies, third-party administration services (escrow), multisignature transactions, encryption, reputation/feedback tracking and others. INTERPOL has looked into major Dark Web platforms and found that mobile malware is offered for sale as software packages (e.g. remote access trojans – RATs); individual solutions; sophisticated tools, like those developed by professional firms; or, on a smaller scale, as part of a ‘Bot as a Service’ model. Mobile malware is also a ‘subject of interest’ on vendor shops, forums and social media.Marketplaces
A number of mobile malware products and services are offered for sale on Dark Web marketplaces. Mobile malware is often advertised as part of a package, which can include, for instance, remote access trojans (RATs), phishing pages, or ‘hacking’ software bundles which consist of forensic and password-breaking tools. Individual/one piece tools are also offered for sale. For example, DroidJack was offered by different vendors on four major marketplaces. This popular Android RAT is sold openly on the Clearnet for a high price, but on the Dark Web the price is much lower.
Both variants (package and individual) sometimes come with ‘how-to’ guides which explain the methods for hacking popular operating systems, such as Android and iOS. More sophisticated tools are also advertised on the Dark Web, such as Galileo, a remote control system developed by the Italian IT company Hacking Team in order to access remotely and then exploit devices that run Android, iOS, BlackBerry, Windows or OS X. Another example is the source code for Acecard. This malware is known for adding overlay screens on top of mobile banking applications and then forwarding the user’s login credentials to a remote attacker. It can also access SMS, from which potentially useful two-factor authentication codes can be obtained by fraudsters.
The Android bot rent service (BaaS, or Bot as a Service) is also available for purchase. The bot can be used to gather financial information from Android phones and comes with many features and documentation, available in both Russian and English. More features and specifications can be developed on request. This service can cost up to USD 2,500 per month or USD 650 per week.
Mobile phishing products for obtaining financial information, tools that can control phones through Bluetooth or change their IMEI (International Mobile Equipment Identity), and various Android RATs that focus on intercepting text messages, call logs and locations, and accessing the device’s camera, are also displayed on Dark Web marketplaces.Vendor shops, forums and social media
Vendor shops are standalone platforms created by a single or group of vendors who have built up a customer base on a marketplace and then decided to start their own business. Generally, these shops do not have forums and merely advertise one specific type of illicit item, such as drugs or stolen personal information, but they also sell mobile malware (DroidJack). Tutorials are sometimes attached to mobile malware products, and information on which tools are fit for purpose and how to install and utilize them can also be found in forum threads and on social media. Furthermore, a Tor hidden service focused on hacking news was found to contain information on how to set up Dendroid mobile malware. This RAT, which is capable of intercepting SMS messages, downloading pictures and opening a dialogue box to phish passwords, dates from 2014 but was still offered in 2016 as part of several advertisements (packages) on different marketplaces.
Due to its robust anonymity, OPSEC techniques, low prices and client-oriented strategy, the Dark Web remains an attractive medium for conducting illicit businesses and activities, and one where specific crime areas may arise or grow in the future. The development of innovative technical solutions (in close cooperation with academia, research institutes and private industry), international cooperation and capacity building are fundamental pillars in the fight against the use of Dark Web by criminals.Statistics
In 2016, the number of malicious installation packages grew considerably, amounting to 8,526,221 – three times more than the previous year. As a comparison, from 2004 to 2013 we detected over 10,000,000 malicious installation packages; in 2014 the figure was nearly 2.5 million.
From the beginning of January till the end of December 2016, Kaspersky Lab registered nearly 40 million attacks by malicious mobile software and protected 4,018,234 unique users of Android-based devices (vs 2.6 million in 2015).
The number of attacks blocked by Kaspersky Lab solutions, 2016
The number of users protected by Kaspersky Lab solutions, 2016Geography of mobile threats
Attacks by malicious mobile software were recorded in more than 230 countries and territories.
The geography of mobile threats by number of attacked users, 2016
TOP 10 countries by the percentage of users attacked by mobile malwareCountry* %** 1 Bangladesh 50.09% 2 Iran 46.87% 3 Nepal 43.21% 4 China 41.85% 5 Indonesia 40.36% 6 Algeria 36.62% 7 Nigeria 35.61% 8 Philippines 34.97% 9 India 34.18% 10 Uzbekistan 31.96%
* We excluded those countries in which the number of users of Kaspersky Lab mobile security products over the reported period was less than 25,000.
** The percentage of attacked unique users as a percentage of all users of Kaspersky Lab’s mobile security products in the country.
China, which topped this rating in 2015, continued to lead the way in the first half of 2016 but dropped to fourth overall for the year, being replaced by Bangladesh, which led similar ratings throughout 2016. More than half of all users of Kaspersky Lab mobile security products in Bangladesh encountered mobile malware.
The most widespread mobile malware targeting users in Bangladesh in 2016 were representatives of advertising Trojans belonging to the Ztorg and Iop families, as well as advertising programs of the Sprovider family. This malware, as well as representatives of the AdWare.AndroidOS.Ewind and AdWare.AndroidOS.Sprovider families were most frequently found on user devices in all the countries in the Top 10, except China and Uzbekistan.
In China, a significant proportion of the attacks involved the Backdoor.AndroidOS.Fakengry.h and Backdoor.AndroidOS.GinMaster.a families as well as representatives of RiskTool.AndroidOS.
Most of the attacks on users in Uzbekistan were carried out by Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.Podec.a and Trojan-FakeAV.AndroidOS.Mazig.b. Representatives of the advertising Trojans Iop and Ztorg, as well as the advertising programs of the Sprovider family were also quite popular in the country.Types of mobile malware
Starting this year, we calculate the distribution of mobile software by type, based on the number of detected installation packages, rather than modifications.
Distribution of new mobile malware by type in 2015 and 2016
Over the reporting period, the number of new RiskTool files detected grew significantly – from 29% in 2015 to 43% in 2016. At the same time, the share of new AdWare files fell – 13% vs 21% in the previous year.
For the second year running, the percentage of detected SMS Trojan installation packages continued to decline – from 24% to 11%, which was the most notable fall. Despite this, we cannot say that the SMS Trojan threat is no longer relevant; in 2016, we detected nearly 700,000 new installation packages.
The most considerable growth was shown by Trojan-Ransom: the share of this type of malware among all installation packages detected in 2016 increased almost 6.5 times to 4%. This growth was caused by the active distribution of two families of mobile ransomware – Trojan-Ransom.AndroidOS.Fusob and Trojan-Ransom.AndroidOS.Congur.Top 20 malicious mobile programs
Please note that the ranking of malicious programs below does not include potentially unwanted programs such as RiskTool or AdWare (advertising programs).Detection %* 1 DangerousObject.Multi.Generic 67.93% 2 Backdoor.AndroidOS.Ztorg.c 6.58% 3 Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Svpeng.q 5.42% 4 Trojan.AndroidOS.Iop.c 5.25% 5 Backdoor.AndroidOS.Ztorg.a 4.83% 6 Trojan.AndroidOS.Agent.gm 3.44% 7 Trojan.AndroidOS.Ztorg.t 3.21% 8 Trojan.AndroidOS.Hiddad.v 3.13% 9 Trojan.AndroidOS.Ztorg.a 3.11% 10 Trojan.AndroidOS.Boogr.gsh 2.51% 11 Trojan.AndroidOS.Muetan.b 2.40% 12 Trojan-Ransom.AndroidOS.Fusob.pac 2.38% 13 Trojan-Ransom.AndroidOS.Fusob.h 2.35% 14 Trojan.AndroidOS.Sivu.c 2.26% 15 Trojan.AndroidOS.Ztorg.ag 2.23% 16 Trojan.AndroidOS.Ztorg.aa 2.16% 17 Trojan.AndroidOS.Hiddad.an 2.12% 18 Trojan.AndroidOS.Ztorg.i 1.95% 19 Trojan-Dropper.AndroidOS.Agent.cv 1.85% 20 Trojan-Dropper.AndroidOS.Triada.d 1.78%
* Percentage of users attacked by the malware in question, relative to all users attacked.
First place in the Top 20 is occupied by DangerousObject.Multi.Generic (67.93%), used in malicious programs detected by cloud technologies. Cloud technologies work when the antivirus database contains neither the signatures nor heuristics to detect a malicious program. This is basically how the very latest malware is detected.
In second place was Backdoor.AndroidOS.Ztorg.c, the advertising Trojan using super-user rights to secretly install various applications. Noticeably, the 2016 rating included 16 advertising Trojans (highlighted in blue in the table), which is four more than in 2015.
The most popular mobile banking Trojan in 2016 was Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Svpeng.q in third place. The Trojan became so widespread after being distributing via the AdSense advertising network. Due to a vulnerability in the Chrome browser, the user was not required to take any action to download the Trojan on the device. It should be noted that more than half of the users attacked by mobile banking Trojans in 2016 encountered representatives of the Svpeng family. They use phishing windows to steal credit card data and also attack SMS banking systems.
Representatives of the Fusob family – Trojan-Ransom.AndroidOS.Fusob.pac and Trojan-Ransom.AndroidOS.Fusob.h – claimed 12th and 13th respectively. These Trojans block a device by displaying their own window and demanding a ransom to remove it.Mobile banking Trojans
In 2016, we detected 128,886 installation packages of mobile banking Trojans, which is 1.6 times more than in 2015.
Number of installation packages of mobile banking Trojans detected by Kaspersky Lab solutions in 2016
In 2016, 305,543 users in 164 countries were attacked by mobile banking Trojans vs 56,194 users in 137 countries the previous year.
Geography of mobile banking threats in 2016 (number of users attacked)
Top 10 countries by the percentage of users attacked by mobile banking Trojans relative to all attacked usersCountry* %** 1 Russia 4.01 2 Australia 2.26 3 Ukraine 1.05 4 Uzbekistan 0.70 5 Tajikistan 0.65 6 The Republic of Korea 0.59 7 Kazakhstan 0.57 8 China 0.54 9 Belarus 0.47 10 Moldova 0.39
* We excluded those countries in which the number of users of Kaspersky Lab mobile security products over the reported period was less than 25,000.
** Percentage of unique users attacked by mobile banking Trojans, relative to all users of Kaspersky Lab’s mobile security products in the country.
In Russia – ranked first in the Top 10 – mobile banking Trojans were encountered by 4% of mobile users. This is almost two times higher than in second-placed Australia. The difference is easily explained by the fact that the most popular mobile banking Trojan Svpeng was mostly spread in Russia. Representatives of the Asacub and Faketoken families were also popular there.
In Australia, the Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Acecard and Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Marcher families were responsible for most infection attempts. In South Korea (7th place) the most popular banking Trojans belonged to the Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Wroba family.
In the other countries of the Top 10, the most actively distributed mobile banking Trojan families were Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Faketoken and Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Svpeng. The representatives of the latter were especially widespread in 2016, with more than half of mobile users encountering them. As we have already mentioned, this was the result of them being distributed via the AdSense advertising network and being loaded stealthily via a mobile browser vulnerability.
The Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Faketoken family was in second place in this rating. Some of its modifications were capable of attacking more than 2,000 financial organizations.
Third place was occupied by the Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Asacub family, which attacked more than 16% of all users affected by mobile bankers. These Trojans are mainly distributed in Russia, often via SMS spam.Mobile Trojan-Ransom
In 2016, the volume of mobile ransomware increased considerably both in the number of installation packages detected and in the number of users attacked. Over the reporting period, we detected 261,214 installation packages, which is almost 8.5 times more than in 2015.
Number of mobile Trojan-Ransomware installation packages detected by Kaspersky Lab
(Q1 2016 – Q4 2016)
In 2016, 153,258 unique users from 167 countries were attacked by Trojan-Ransom programs; this is 1.6 times more than in 2015.
Interestingly, a large number of installation packages in the first two quarters of 2016 belonged to the Trojan-Ransom.AndroidOS.Fusob family, though there was a fall in activity in the third quarter. The subsequent growth in the fourth quarter was fueled by an increase in activity by the Trojan-Ransom.AndroidOS.Congur family: it includes relatively simple Trojans that either block a device using their own window, or change the device’s password.
Geography of mobile ransomware threats in 2016 (number of users attacked)
TOP 10 countries attacked by Trojan-Ransom malware – share of users relative to all attacked users in the country.Country* %** 1 Germany 2.54 2 USA 2.42 3 Canada 2.34 4 Switzerland 1.88 5 Kazakhstan 1.81 6 United Kingdom 1.75 7 Italy 1.63 8 Denmark 1.29 9 Mexico 1.18 10 Australia 1.13
* We excluded those countries in which the number of users of Kaspersky Lab mobile security products over the reported period was less than 25,000.
** Percentage of unique users attacked by mobile Trojan ransomware, relative to all users of Kaspersky Lab’s mobile security products in the country.
The largest percent of mobile users attacked by ransomware was in Germany – over 2.5%. In almost all the countries in this ranking, representatives of the Trojan-Ransom.AndroidOS.Fusob and Trojan-Ransom.AndroidOS.Svpeng families were particularly popular. Kazakhstan (5th place) was the only exception – the most frequently used ransom programs there were various modifications of the Trojan-Ransom.AndroidOS.Small family.
More information about these three families of mobile Trojan ransomware can be found in a dedicated study.Conclusion
In 2016, the growth in the number of advertising Trojans capable of exploiting super-user rights continued. Throughout the year it was the No. 1 threat, and we see no sign of this trend changing. Cybercriminals are taking advantage of the fact that most devices do not receive OS updates (or receive them late), and are thus vulnerable to old, well-known and readily available exploits.
This year, we will continue to closely monitor the development of mobile banking Trojans: the developers of this class of malware are the first to use new technologies and are always looking for ways to bypass security mechanisms implemented in the latest versions of mobile operating systems.
In 2016, one of the most controversial issues was the safety of IoT devices. Various Internet-connected ‘smart’ devices are becoming increasingly popular, though their level of security is fairly low. Also in 2016, we discovered an ‘attack-the-router’ Trojan. We see that the mobile landscape is getting a little crowded for cybercriminals, and they are beginning to interact more with the world beyond smartphones. Perhaps in 2017 we will see major attacks on IoT components launched from mobile devices.
The demand for tests appeared almost simultaneously with the development of the first antivirus programs – in the mid-to-late 1990s. Demand created supply: test labs at computer magazines started to measure the effectiveness of security solutions with the help of self-made methodologies, and later an industry of specialized companies emerged with a more comprehensive approach to testing methods.
The first primitive tests scanning huge collections of malicious and supposedly malicious files taken from everywhere were rightfully criticized first and foremost by the vendors. Such tests were characterized by inconsistent and unreliable results, and few people trusted them.
More than 20 years have passed since then. In that time, protection solutions have continuously evolved and become more and more efficient thanks to new technologies. However, the threats have developed too. In their turn, the laboratories have been steadily improving their testing methods, devising the most reliable and accurate procedures of measuring the work of security solutions in different environments. This process is neither cheap nor easy, and that’s why we now have a situation where the quality of testing depends on the financial standing of a laboratory and its accumulated expertise.
— Eugene Kaspersky (@e_kaspersky) 3 февраля 2017 г.
When it comes to the costs of testing, the main question is: cui prodest? (Lat. who benefits?) And this is one of those rare cases where high-quality work benefits everyone: both vendors and customers. The fact is that independent testing is the only way to evaluate the effectiveness of a security solution and to compare it with its competitors. Other methods simply do not exist. For a potential customer, testing plays an important role in understanding what kind of product best meets their needs. For vendors it provides an opportunity to keep up to date with the industry; otherwise, they may not notice when their product falls behind the competition, or development is heading in the wrong direction. This practice is also used in other industries, for example, EURO NCAP independent security tests.
However, the world is changing, and new solutions are emerging for old problems. The cybersecurity industry welcomes products based on modern approaches, such as machine learning. The potential opportunities are breathtaking, although it may take years before we see them implemented effectively. Of course, in their marketing materials the vendors of so-called next-gen anti-malware software are keen to talk about the incredible capabilities of their products, but we shouldn’t believe everything they say – it’s better to continue comparing solutions based on test results.Basic testing methodologies
The question “How do you test?” was asked by the testers in the early years of the industry. They still ask themselves this question to this day. Testing methodologies have evolved in line with the evolution of cyber threats and security solutions. It all started with the simplest method – an on-demand scan.
On-demand scan (ODS). The test lab collects all types of malicious programs (mainly files already infected with malware – nowadays it’s mostly with Trojans), adds them to a folder on the hard disk, and then launches the security product in question to test it against the entire collection. The more the product catches, the better it is. Sometimes in the course of testing, files are copied from one folder to another, which is slightly closer to a real work scenario.
At one time this method used to be enough, but now the lion’s share of advanced security technologies don’t work with this type of testing, meaning it’s not possible to assess how effectively solutions actually counter the latest threats. Nevertheless, ODS is still used, often in combination with more advanced methods.
On-execute test. This is the next stage in the development of test methods. A collection of samples is copied and launched on a machine where the security software is running, and the reaction of the security solution is recorded. This was once viewed as a very advanced technique, but its shortcomings were soon revealed in practice. A modern cyber-attack is carried out in several stages. A malicious file is just one part of that attack and isn’t intended to function on its own. For instance, the sample may be waiting for command-line parameters, require a specific environment (e.g., a specific browser), or it may be a module in the form of a DLL that connects to the main Trojan, rather than running on its own.
Real-world test (RW). This is the most complicated test method, but also the closest to reality, imitating the full cycle of infecting a system. The testers open a malicious file delivered via email on a clean system with the security solution installed, or via a browser following a real malicious link to check whether the whole infection chain works, or if the solution being tested was able to stop the process at some stage.
These types of tests reveal various problems that security software may experience when working in the real world with real threats.
However, this method of testing requires serious preparatory work. Firstly, full-scale testing of a hundred or more samples requires a large number of machines, or a lot of time – something that few laboratories can afford. Secondly, many of today’s Trojans can tell if they are being launched in a virtual environment and won’t work, hindering the efforts of any researchers trying to perform an analysis. Therefore, in order to obtain the most reliable results, the test laboratory must use physical computers, rebooting the system after running each malware sample. Or to use virtual machines, but be more careful while selecting samples for testing.
Another difficult task is generating extensive databases of malicious links. Many of them are used just once or work with restrictions (for example, only in certain regions). And the quality of the RW test is highly dependent on how good the laboratory is at finding such links and whether it handles them correctly. Obviously, there is no point if one product works when a link is opened, while the others cannot be tested because the link has subsequently “died”. To achieve accurate results, there needs to be a large number of these links, but providing them can be difficult.
Proactive test. According to this technique, a security solution is tested using samples that are unknown to it. To do this, the experts install the test product and do not update it for a period of time, from some days till several weeks. A collection of malicious programs that appeared after the last update is then used to perform the ODS and OAS tests. Some testers run on-execute tests. Some test companies pack or obfuscate known threats to test the security solution’s ability to identify malicious behavior. Laboratories also disable access to the cloud. This may cause some protection technologies to fail, meaning the products are not being tested on an even playing field and undermining the relevance of the test.
Removal or remediation (test for the complete removal of malware). This checks the ability of a security solution to treat the system, i.e., clean autorun keys, remove a task scheduler and other traces of malware activity. This is an important test, because poor treatment may cause problems when booting or using the OS or, what is worse, the restoration of the malware in the system. During testing, a “clean” system is infected with a malicious program from the collection of malware samples. The computer is then rebooted, and a security solution with the latest updates is installed. The majority of testers perform the test to check the quality of a solution’s treatment; it may be in the form of a separate test or as part of an RW test.
Performance test. This test evaluates how effectively a security solution uses the system resources. To do this, the speed of various operations are measured with the security solution installed and running. These operations include system boot, file copying, archiving and decompression, and the launching of applications. Test packets simulating realistic user work scenarios in the system are also used.
False positive test. This test is necessary to determine the reliability of the final evaluation. Obviously, an anti-malware program that detects all programs as malicious, will receive scores of 100% in the protection category, but will be useless for the user. Therefore, its reaction to legitimate applications has to be checked. To do this, a separate collection of popular software installation files is created and tested using different scenarios.
Feedback. This is not a test methodology, but rather the most important stage of any test, without which the results cannot be verified. After performing all the tests, the laboratory sends the preliminary results achieved by the product to the respective vendor, so that they can check and reproduce the findings and identify any errors. This is very important because a test laboratory simply doesn’t have the resources to check even every hundredth case, and errors are always possible. And those errors are not necessarily caused by the methodology. For example, during an RW test an application can successfully penetrate a machine but not perform any malicious actions because it is intended for a different region, or it is not initially malicious, being used instead for advertising purposes. However, the program was installed and the security solution didn’t block it, resulting in a reduced score.
At the same time, a security solution is designed to block malicious actions. In this case, however, no malicious actions were performed, and the anti-malware program worked as planned by the vendor. It is only possible to handle such cases by analyzing the code of the sample and its behavior; in most cases, the test company doesn’t have the resources for that and the vendor’s help is required.Specialized tests
Another layer of methodologies are those used for in-depth testing of specific types of threats or specific security technologies. Many customers need to know which solution is most effective against encryptors, for example, or which product offers online banking systems the best protection. An overall evaluation of a security solution is not very informative: it only shows that one product is “no worse than the others”. This is not enough, so a number of test laboratories carry out specialized tests.
Exploits. Counteracting exploits is more difficult than detecting malware samples and not all security solutions can do it successfully. To assess exploit prevention technologies, laboratories use RW tests: the testers collect links to exploit packs, follow them on a clean machine, record the traffic and reproduce it for all the anti-malware solutions in a test. In order to make the experiment as pure as possible, some companies, in addition to real exploit packs, create their own exploits using frameworks like Metasploit. This makes it possible to test a security solution’s reaction to the exploitation of software vulnerabilities using unknown code.
Financial threats. Internet banking and bank client systems are very popular vectors of attack with cybercriminals because they offer direct financial benefits. A number of specific technologies are used, for example, substitution of web page content or remote system management, and it is necessary to check how well a security solution counteracts them. Also, many vendors offer specialized security technologies to protect against financial threats (for example, our SafeMoney); their effectiveness is also checked by these tests.
Special platforms. The vast majority of tests are carried out on the most common platform – an up-to-date version of Microsoft Windows for desktops. However, users are sometimes interested in the effectiveness of a security solution on other platforms: Android, Linux, Mac OS, Windows servers, a mobile operating system, or even earlier Windows versions (e.g., Windows XP still works on most ATMs, and banks are unlikely to upgrade any time soon). These tests are usually carried out according to the simplest methods, because demand for them is minimal.Types of tests
Besides methodology, tests differ by type. A security solution can be tested independently of competitors (certification) or together with competitors (comparative test). Certification only determines whether a solution combats existing threats effectively. Comparative tests take up more of a laboratory’s resources, but offer the vendor and potential customer more information.
Tests also differ in terms of their frequency and the methods used to calculate the results. Most test companies carry out regular tests that are performed every one to six months. The results of each test are calculated independently: the same solution can be scored highly in one test, while in the next test it may get a low score, or vice versa. In addition to the features of the product itself, this depends on the collections used or changes to the methodology.
In the case of continuous testing, security solutions are also tested at regular intervals, but scores are given cumulatively, for example, every six months following monthly testing, or both cumulatively and for each test. Of all the numerous tests conducted, the most indicative for the consumer and the most important for the vendor are continuous tests. Only the results of “a long distance race” make it possible to calculate the results obtained from different product versions with a variety of collections and to achieve the most relevant product evaluation.
The main thing about continuous tests is that only their results allow to both evaluate the effectiveness of previous and current versions of the product and understand how it is likely to behave in the foreseeable future. High scores in annual or longer testing suggest that constant work is being done on the product. It is not only receiving database updates; the developers are closely watching the threat landscape and responding to changes.Market players
There are numerous companies on the anti-malware testing market. This is undoubtedly beneficial for the industry, as each of them carries out tests on their own collections, and assessments from different laboratories make it possible to evaluate the overall quality of a security solution. However, it should be noted that not all test companies use sufficiently developed methodologies. Below are the best known test laboratories.
AV Comparatives. This Austrian company is one of the oldest on the anti-malware testing market. It specializes in security solutions for B2B and performs a range of tests including RW tests on its own closed collection. The tests are held every month over a period of 10 months, and the best vendors are awarded the Product of the Year or the Top Rated title. Once a year its analysts test solutions for Android and Mac OS, using ODS, OAS and On-Execute approaches.
AV-TEST. A German company was founded 20 years ago and currently is the biggest player on the market. It conducts monthly comparative RW tests, the results of which are provided every two months; it also uses the ODS + ODS + OES methodology (i.e., the sample is scanned, run and scanned again). It conducts performance tests. The company also tests Android and twice a year tests Mac OS using the ODS method.
MRG Effitas. Based in the UK, the company has been testing since 2009. It specializes in in-depth technology tests and carries out quarterly comparative RW tests (360 Assessment). MRG also tests financial threats (online banking test) and occasionally performs exploit prevention tests. It also carries out various on-demand tests.
SE Labs was founded by former DTL employee Simon Edwards. It has replaced DTL on the market and uses the same set of tests. It conducts quarterly RW tests, including exploit-prevention tests, using its own attacks devised on the basis of frameworks.
Virus Bulletin. It conducts very simple test certification based on ODS methods using the static Wildlist collection, available for download by vendors. It also carries out heuristic tests of anti-malware solutions whose databases have not been updated for several weeks.
ICSA Labs. This US company is a division of Verizon. It only performs certification tests and additionally tests Anti-APT class solutions.
NSS Labs. Yet another US company focused on the corporate segment. Its results are not published, but instead provided on a paid subscription. The company’s arsenal includes RW tests, exploit prevention tests and protection against APTs.
Magazines and online publications such as PC Magazine, ComputerBild, Tom’s Hardware Guide, etc., also carry out their own antivirus tests. However, their approach is not very transparent: they don’t make their malware sample collections public and don’t provide feedback to the vendor.
In addition to the aforementioned market players, there are plenty of local players conducting irregular or specific tests at the request of vendors. Care should be taken when evaluating their results because their methodology is often not transparent, and the selection of comparative testing participants is far from complete. It should be noted that a high-quality methodology is not invented overnight; it is a complex and expensive process that takes years of work, requiring significant resources and expertise. Only such tests provide an objective picture of the security product market.How to win tests
To come out top in testing, it’s not enough to simply introduce new technologies; coming first in a test is always the result of arduously and continuously correcting errors. The more high-quality tests a product participates in, the more accurate the information developers get about where to look for challenges and shortcomings.
Winning in a simple test carried out by a company that doesn’t have a well-developed methodology can be useful for marketing: you can place a label on the product box and issue a press release, but experts know that it’s necessary to look at the results of the flagship tests. The most important thing about them is a clear, fully developed methodology that corresponds to the modern threat landscape.
Even first place in a test where product performance and false positives are not tested, doesn’t reveal anything about a product’s ability to cope with modern threats without having a negative impact on the user. It’s easy to achieve 100% protection, but much harder to do so without interfering with the user’s work. And if a vendor doesn’t participate in the more advanced tests, it’s a clear sign that they have some serious problems with product performance.